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Abstract
Often we are less concerned with who signed something than with what
attributes (director of this company etc.) they have. We propose three
Attribute Based Signature schemes, namely, Decentralised Traceable At-
tribute Based Signatures DTABS, Attribute Based Signatures with User-
Controlled Linkability ABS-UCL, and Attribute Based Signatures with
Hidden Expressive Policy ABS-HEP. The Traceability assures that sig-
natures in dispute, caused by any misuse/abuse cases, can be traced back
to their signers. The judge of public opinion guarantees that no misattri-
bution (framing) can take place. Additionally, User-Controlled Linkability
gives a lightweight solution to session–style ABS; signers can choose to
link some of their signatures that are directed to the same verifier, and
the verifier will be convinced that those signatures are signed by the same
anonymous person. Hidden expressive policy gives the organizations the
flexibility to change their signing policies without notifying the outside.
All the three schemes are given and proven generically in a modular way.
Instantiations for the first two schemes are also given to show both feasi-
bility and practicality of the proposed schemes. The first two schemes
substantially improve the state-of-the-art of Attribute Based Signatures
that use Bilinear maps as a building block and shape it into a practical
form, offering a decentralised version of ABS where multiple authorities
are involved and yet no reliance on a central authority is needed.
In the third scheme, we move ABS into a new stage, where we increase the
level of expressiveness of the signing policies to use general circuits, and
at the same time, we give the signer the ability to fully hide his signing
policy. This scheme makes use of hardness assumptions on the newly
realised cryptographic building block, i.e. Multilinear maps.
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This chapter is an an introduction to the thesis’ contents. First, we give motivations
and definitions to explain why the novel ideas achieved in this thesis are indeed useful
and practical. No technical details are given in this chapter but rather a resume´ of the
contributions that we claim in the rest of it. After giving an explanation on where/how
attribute based cryptography works, we present the three main technical contributions
of this thesis which represent its main core:
• The first is Decentralized Traceable Attribute Based Signatures DTABS, CT-
RSA’14 version (published in [EKGK14], full version in [EKGK13]).
• The second is Attribute Based Signatures with User-Controlled Linkability ABS-
UCL, CANS’14 (published in [EKCGD14]).
• The third one is Attribute Based Signatures with Hidden Expressive Policy ABS-
HEP [EKC14], US Patent PCT/US2014/047773, filed for Hewlet Packard (HP)
company on 23/07/14.
Modularity plays an essential role in this thesis. Attribute based signatures, ABS,
is among the hot and promising topics in applied cryptography. We aim at providing
modular generic solutions to some open questions concerning ABS, e.g. decentral-
ization, traceablity, user-controlled linkability, and hidden policy. These features are
crucial to safely put ABS into practical use. Note that it’s not always possible to give
a generic solution for any crypto problem. The importance of the proposed solutions
is that they are completely independent from concrete building blocks. To instantiate
1
a given generic scheme, one can employ the most efficient building blocks that fit the
bill of the security requirements defined in the security model of the proposed scheme.
1.1 Why Attribute based Cryptography?
Access control It is very well known that access control appears in many aspects
of our life. One can mention the physical access through security gates at a building,
or virtual access by a computer program to a memory. Attribute/role based access
control play a tremendous role in this area; for instance, someone who has got the
right role or the right set of attributes can be granted access to that computer memory.
Confidentiality A trivial way to protect a confidential document is to encrypt it and
hold the encryption keys. A coarse-grained access control is when you allow specific
people (e.g. specified by their names) to access these confidential data, but this is
definitely not the most efficient way. Here lies the importance of the attribute based
encryption. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic mechanism for en-
forcing fine-grained access control to plaintext, whether it is a secret PIN for opening
a door, or a confidential document of a company. In another sense, it simultaneously
offers a fine grained access control mechanism and the confidentiality by means
of encryption. Examples can range from distributed network storage (or storage
in the cloud), through social networks (with different portions of your profile and
different categories of posts encrypted such that only your selected circles of friends
can decrypt, possibly on a per-circle basis), to regulatory compliance where service
providers want to prove that they indeed comply with certain regulations/clients
requirements
Authenticity Attribute Based Signatures ABS, in their turn, can be always used as a
mechanism for authentication. The ability to sign a message where the signature can be
verified correctly, implies the possession of a certain corresponding set of credentials
which satisfy a certain policy1. The identity of the signer as well as the subset of
attributes that have been used to sign the message stay hidden from the verifier. An
1A policy is a Boolean combination between some credentials, e.g. A ∨ (B ∧ C).
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extra level of anonymity might require hiding the relations between the credentials
which could be used to sign certain messages, and this case can also be covered by
ABS. To deal with this case, the signer should use a special type of ABS where he
can hide everything related to his attributes including the policy which he signs with
respect to.
1.2 How does Attribute Based Cryptography work?
In attribute based cryptography, every participant has a signing/decryption key, to
sign/decrypt some documents/ciphertexts, based on the attributes that he holds. Let’s
take the example of an attribute based signature (ABS) and see how it works. In ABS,
a signer who possesses a set of attributes from the relevant authority/authorities, can
sign a message with any predicate that is satisfied by his attributes. The signature re-
veals no more than the fact that a single user, with some set of attributes satisfying
the predicate, has attested to the message. In particular, the signature should hide the
attributes used to satisfy the predicate and any identifying information about the signer
(that could link multiple signatures as being from the same signer1). Furthermore,
users should not be able to collude to pool their attributes together. Assume that a
signer wants to use a subset of his attributes A1 ⊂ A = {αi}ni=1 to sign a message
w.r.t. a predicate Ψ. In the Signing algorithm, for a signer to be able to sign a message,
he should have a set of attributes that satisfy the predicate Ψ, i.e. Ψ(A1) = 1. In At-
tribute Based Encryption, the scheme works in a similar way, i.e. for a user to be able
to decrypt a ciphertext, he should have enough attributes to satisfy a certain predicate
Ψ that has been used in the encryption algorithm, which means only specific people
who have enough attributes/credentials can access this data that has been encrypted.
There are two types of policies in terms of their monotonicity; a monotone type where
there is no negation, e.g. Ψ = (A ∧ B) ∨ C and a non-monotone type where negation
is allowed e.g. Ψ = (A ∧ B) ∨ ¬C. Policies also differ from each other by their level
of expressiveness as follows: There is the threshold type, where one can satisfy Ψ if
he has n out of m attributes. There is also the predicate type where the fan-outs of the
nodes are limited to 1, whereas the most expressive type of policies are the general
circuits, where their fan-outs are greater than or equal to one.
1See chapter 5 for more details on user-controlled linkability.
3
1.3 Modular Approach to build ABS
There are two approaches to design cryptographic schemes; The first is the modular
approach in which the whole is divided into manageable, feasible and secure smaller
tasks which we usually call the building blocks of the scheme. One has to stick these
building blocks together in a secure way in order to have the scheme in its final shape.
The Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proof (NIZK) and its weaker version, the Non-
Interactive Witness indistinguishable (NIWI), can be thought of as special modules
because of their special role in gluing other modules together to finally yield secure
cryptographic schemes.
The second approach, is mostly the industrial one or what is called ad hoc ap-
proach, therein, the main motivation is to get a practical/efficient scheme, regardless
to how complex/non-standard the proof of the whole scheme could become. There
is no doubt that the former approach has the great feature of making use of existing
schemes, but the most important feature in the modular design is that the modules used
to realise such a scheme can be replaced by more efficient/secure1 versions that would
serve better than the originals.
1.4 Decentralized traceable attribute based signatures
The first contribution that we present in this thesis is a modular approach to build
Decentralized Traceable Attribute Based Signatures (DTABS) [EKGK14]. DTABS has
been built on top of multiple secure modules. In order to get an efficient scheme based
on cryptographically secure modules, the challenge is to find suitable schemes that fit
the bill for both efficiency and security at the same time. In DTABS, as shown in Figure
1-1, we use One Time Signatures schemes (OTS), Unforgeable Digital Signatures,
Bilinear Maps, CCA-Encryption Scheme, Span Programs, and NIZKs that represent
the state of the art in terms of efficiency and at the same time are compatible with each
other.
Intuition of DTABS As illustrated in Figure 1-2, a signer with identity id receives
a set of attributes from possibly more than one attribute authority (AA), where the
1In the event that a weakness is discovered in one or more concrete modules, one can replace them
by different modules that are more secure.
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Figure 1-1: Modules connected together to get DTABS
attributes are in reality signatures on the concatenation of attributes names and his
identity. To sign a message, a signer can use any subset of his attributes as long as it
satisfies the signing predicate. He first needs to produce a NIZK proof that is formed
of two parts; the first part is actually used to convince the signer that he can satisfy the
predicate whereas in the second part, in order to provide the traceability, the signer
id should encrypt his own identity id, and produce the second part of the NIZK that
convinces the verifier that the id which has been encrypted is the same as the one in
the signatures which he got from the attribute authorities. The opener (or tracer) has
the secret key of the encryption scheme, which means that he can open any signature
by simply decrypting the ciphertext attached to it. Moreover, the opener should also
send the Judge1 another NIZK (NIZK2) to convince him that he has correctly opened
the signature (to prevent framing users).
1The Judge doesn’t hold any secret keys and therefore one can think of it as the judge of a public
opinion.
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Figure 1-2: Communications between different DTABS entities
1.4.1 Contribution
DTABS main contribution
• Formal security model for decentralized traceable attribute-based signatures.
• Decentralization: Our focus is on the more realistic setting where there are mul-
tiple attribute authorities responsible for distributing the attributes/credentials to
the users, and hence the word Decentralized.
• Traceability: This is a very important security requirement when it comes to
real life. Anonymity is a good feature that ABS usually offer, but it should be
controlled in the sense that it cannot be abused, e.g. framing users, misuse/abuse
cases. To solve this problem, we add two entities to the ABS scheme. The first
is the Opener who will be called to open the signatures in question in order
to remove the anonymity and therefore be able to tell who has produced these
signatures. Moreover, we have a Judge who has no secret keys, and yet he is
able to tell whether or not the Opener has correctly opened the signature, thanks
to the NIZK tool.
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• Generic construction for DTABS: We give a security model for DTABS which
implies the security requirements needed from the underlying modules that are
going to be used in order to realise it, so anyone can actually instantiate the
DTABS using different modules as long as they satisfy the security requirements
stated in the generic construction.
• Moreover, we present two example instantiations of the generic construction
and provide the first construction not relying on idealized assumptions. Our
constructions meet strong security requirements and permit expressive signing
policies. We also have a Random Oracle Model (ROM) instantiation that is
presented in the following chapter for reasons of clarity.
1.5 ABS with User-Controlled Linkability
In chapter 5, the main concern that we take into consideration is the practicality. We
propose a solution for a very important and practical issue when it comes to commu-
nication between people over the Internet. While there is no doubt that anonymity is
definitely required and desirable in a lot of applications, in other applications more
confidence between Internet communicators that they are surely talking to each other,
in analogous way to cookies, is also required and desirable. To get the best of both
worlds, we introduce yet another useful feature to ABS, namely user-controlled linka-
bility (UCL), hence the name ABS-UCL. UCL permits different uses than those the
tracing authorities can offer. The tracing authority is generally thought of as “for
trouble-shooting” whereas UCL is intended to be built into normal use. For instance,
in the world of attributes, assume that a signer wants to open a session with a recipient
(in a analogous way to the idea of cookies which can provide state above the stateless
HTTP). Additionally, the signer wants to maintain this session in a convincing way
that he continues to be the same person whom the recipient is communicating with,
not somebody else who has enough credentials to satisfy the same policy in question.
Additionally, he wants to do so without revealing any extra information other than this
fact. One can easily see that the tracing authority can’t be much help here, whereas
user-controlled linkability can let a signer link a set of his signatures by using a special
type of digital signatures, a Tag scheme, to sign the recipient’s name “recip”, so that the
recipient can actually verify that a certain set of signatures surely belong to the same
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signer without actually knowing who that signer is. Note that a tracer cannot provide
this service as he needs to open all those signatures before he can tell whether or not
they belong to the same signer.
We build ABS-UCL in a modular fashion, and this requires a non-interactive zero
knowledge proof (NIZK system), two Unforgeable Digital Signature Schemes (one of
them is deterministic), Span Programs, and bilinear groups. We give security defini-
tions and a generic construction of a ABS-UCL. We also give a practical instantiation
of the scheme with the full details. Finally, we show how to change the practical ABS-
UCL in order to get a new construction of our DTABS that is much more efficient than




• Formal security model for attribute based signatures with user controlled linka-
bility.
• Decentralization: Again, and similar to our DTABS, we deal with the case where
there are multiple attribute authorities that are responsible for distributing the
attributes/credentials to the users.
• User-Controlled Linkability: It allows for a signer to convince a certain verifier
that a set of signatures all belong to him without revealing any further informa-
tion about his identity or the attributes that he holds.
• Generic construction for ABS-UCL: We abstractly use the underlying modules
needed to realise ABS-UCL. Security proofs are also given for the generic con-
struction.
• Instantiations: We give a practical instantiation of ABS-UCL in the random ora-
cle model. Moreover, we use the given instantiation to give a practical instanti-
ation of our DTABS.
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1.6 ABS with Hidden Expressive Policy
In Chapter 6, we introduce yet another novelty by presenting the first attribute based
signature scheme that deals with the most expressive types of policies, i.e. circuits.
Moreover, and in order to increase the level of the anonymity in the proposed scheme,
the signer can actually hide the policy under which he signs the messages. This prop-
erty can be very helpful in many real business cases. We present below one of the
cases in which fully anonymous ABS for circuits can perfectly fit in.
Real Case Scenario Let us take a company as an example, although the proposed
solution is suitable for various types of organizations. Assume that the company has
employees in different positions. According to their positions, the employees are al-
lowed to sign some messages on behalf of the company, e.g., the CEO alone can cre-
ate a signature, a certain number of managers in certain levels can work together to
make a signature, and ordinary employees can go through a referendum to generate a
signature. These signatures should be indistinguishable outside the company. More
formally, we want the identities of the signers, along with the internal hierarchy of the
company, to be hidden from a signature verifier, as this is the sensitive information of
the company. The only information that the verifier could learn from a given signa-
ture is that the signature was generated following company policies, without knowing
anything about those policies.
1.6.1 Contribution
All the previous Attribute Based Signatures used bilinear maps as a building block
to construct their schemes. In our scheme, we use multilinear maps that allow us to
overcome some of the limitations caused by the bilinear maps, namely, the type of
the policy. In our scheme, it is possible to go from boolean formulas/span programs
(circuits with fanout=1) to deal with general circuits (fanout ≥ 1 see Fig. 1-3), and
yet avoid the backtracking attack [GGH+13b] that could happen at any OR-gate if one
used Bilinear maps (for more details on the attack see Section 6.2). This is all possible
thanks to the multilinear maps.
The contribution of Chapter 6 is three-fold, as follows:
• Circuits: It is the first attribute-based signature scheme that can deal with gen-
eral circuits as the signing policy. All previous schemes were restricted to the
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Figure 1-3: Example of a circuit
predicate type due to their reliance on bilinear maps.
• Policy privacy: The proposed attribute-based signature scheme allows the sign-
ing policy to be hidden, which means that signers are not asked to reveal any
sensitive information about their roles or about the internal hierarchies of their
companies.
• Constant size signature: The proposed scheme provides a constant size signa-




In this chapter, we outlined the main contributions in this thesis. We gave an introduc-
tion to each of the three Attribute Based Signature schemes which we propose, namely,
Decentralized Traceable Attribute Based Signatures (DTABS), Attribute Based Signa-
tures with User-Controlled Linkability (ABS-UCL), and Attribute Based Signatures
with Hidden Expressive Policy (ABS-HEP). Each of these schemes aims at solving






Cryptography was originally the art of concealing information. More precisely, rewrit-
ing comprehensible information in an incomprehensible format that makes it unread-
able without the possession of the “secret key”. Modern cryptography, is the science
that deals with problems related to information security, e.g. confidentiality, authentic-
ity, data integrity, etc. In this chapter, we will give an introduction to some important
cryptographic notions, symmetric/asymmetric encryption schemes and their related
security notions and different types of signature schemes and their related security no-
tions. Moreover, we talk about an important topic in modern cryptography, provable
security, by which we can show that certain cryptosystems are secure assuming that
certain mathematical problems are computationally hard (e.g. factoring, discrete log-
arithm, etc.). We also compare the two famous security models in cryptography, the
Random Oracle model and the Standard model. In the former, we assume the exis-
tence of an ideal hash function, that would be eventually replaced by “regular secure
hash functions” when implemented, whereas in the latter, we don’t rely on idealized
assumptions at the expense of believing that some “non–standard” assumptions hold.
Finally, we give an introduction to attribute based cryptography, show the progress in
this interesting topic starting from 1984 where Identity based encryption was intro-
duced. Furthermore, we talk about different types of both attribute based encryption
(ABE) and attribute based signatures (ABS).
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2.2 Encryption and Related Security Definitions
2.2.1 Symmetric Encryption
The symmetric encryption setting considers two parties who share a secret key and
use it to encrypt/decrypt the transmitted data between them. A symmetric encryp-
tion scheme consists of three algorithms that are (E.KG,E.Enc,E.Dec); let M be the
message space, C the space of ciphertexts, and the key space is K. Below are the
descriptions of the algorithms:
• E.KG(1λ): is a randomized algorithm that, given the security parameter λ1, re-
turns a key sk ∈ K.
• E.Enc(sk,m): is a randomized or stateful algorithm that on input of a key sk ∈ K
and a paintext m ∈M, outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• E.Dec(sk, c): is a deterministic algorithm that on input of a key sk and a cipher-
text c ∈ C outputs a message m ∈M ∪ ⊥.
Correctness: The encryption scheme is correct if the receiver can always get the
original plaintext when he decrypts a given ciphertext, more formally:
∀m ∈M,Pr[sk← E.KG(1λ) : E.Dec(E.Enc(sk,m), sk) = m] = 1
The main problem with the symmetric key encryption is sharing the key between
the parties over insecure channels. In [DH76], they define the public key encryption
notion for the first time in the public literature, where two parties can communicate
over insecure channels, to securely share a key. It’s computationally infeasible for an
adversary who is listening to their communication, to recover the key from the public
information which they transmit back and forth between each other.
2.2.2 Asymmetric or Public Key Encryption
An asymmetric encryption scheme consists of the following algorithms:
1The security parameter is usually used to tune the security level of a cryptosystem to make breaking
the scheme computationally infeasible. The higher the value of λ, the smaller the adversary’s advantage
in breaking the scheme. For instance, in an encryption scheme, the security parameter controls the
length of the keys and ciphertexts.
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• E.KG(1λ): is a randomized algorithm that takes the security parameters as input
and returns a pair of keys (pke, ske) ∈ K2, the public key pke and its matching
secret key ske, respectively.
• E.Enc(pke,m): A randomized algorithm that takes a public key pke, a plaintext
m ∈M and returns a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• E.Dec(ske, c): A deterministic algorithm that takes the secret key ske and a ci-
phertext c ∈ C, and returns a message m ∈M ∪ ⊥.
Correctness: The encryption scheme is correct if the receiver can always get the
original plaintext when he decrypts a given ciphertext, more formally:
∀m ∈M,Pr[(ske, pke)← E.KG(1λ) : E.Dec(E.Enc(pke,m), ske) = m] = 1
2.2.3 Security Notions: CPA-CMA-CCA-AE
We clearly want the attacker to be unable to recover the secret key, or recover all of the
plaintext. In 1949, Shannon [Sha49] gives the first precise security notion:
“The ciphertext should reveal no information about the plaintext”
Perfect Secrecy
More formally, Shannon defined perfect secrecy as follows:
Definition 1. [Sma13] A cryptosystem has perfect secrecy if
Pr(Plaintext = m|Ciphertext = c) = Pr(Plaintext = m)
for all plaintexts m ∈M and all ciphertexts c ∈ C.
Another way to define perfect secrecy is to say that the two distributions
E.Enc(k,m0) and E.Enc(k,m1) are computationally indistinguishable for any two
messages m0 and m1 (denoted E.Enc(k,m0) ≈p E.Enc(k,m1)) This security notion is
considered to be strong and very hard to achieve.
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Semantic Security or Security against Chosen Plaintext Attacks CPA [KY00,
GM84]
It says that E.Enc(k,m0) ≈p E.Enc(k,m1) should only hold for pairs that the at-
tacker can exhibit and not for all pairs of messages in M. Adversaries here are consid-
ered to be eavesdroppers, that just listen to the network traffic but they don’t change or
inject any packets. This definition cannot guarantee secrecy or integrity under active
attacks. Note that any system that is secure against CPA is considered to be offering
confidentiality.
Integrity or Security against Chosen Message Attack CMA [KL07]
Integrity (or data-origin authentication) is to prevent an adversary, or a “forger”,
from creating a message that looks like it comes from a legitimate sender. To do this,
the sender adds a tag to the message. The receiver then verifies that this tag belongs
to this message, using a shared key. More formally, a system is secure against chosen
message attack if no efficient adversary is able to produce a tag to any message that
can be verified correctly by the receiver. He should not be able to produce a valid tag
for a message even if he already knows another tag for it. The basic way to ensure
message integrity is to apply MAC techniques [PP10] to add tags to the messages.
The security against chosen message attack doesn’t guarantee confidentiality, that’s
why they came up with a more general and natural notion of security which is the
security against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA). To clearly explain the idea of the
CCA security notion, we will first define two important notions; Indistinguishability
and Non-malleability.
Indistinguishability
This is based on the following game/experiment [RS92]: the adversary sends two
messages of his choice to the challenger, and then gets an encryption of one of them.
The adversary’s goal is to tell which one was encrypted. The indistinguishability prop-
erty intuitively implies that an adversary seeing only a ciphertext should not be able to
extract the plaintext.
Non-malleability
Originally formulated by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN91], this asks that an adver-
sary who sees a ciphertext of one of several messages of his choice cannot come up
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with further ciphertexts whose messages are “meaningfully” related to his challenge
ciphertext, even if he cannot decrypt any of these himself.
Both Indistinguishability and Non-malleability are formulated by a heirarchy of
four games, known as IND–CPA, IND–CCA1, Parallel CCA and IND–CCA2 respec-
tively and which differ in when the adversary can additionally obtain decryptions of
ciphertexts:
• CPA: the adversary never decrypts,
• CCA1: also known as Lunchtime attack. The adversary can only decrypt before
he gets his ciphertext
• Parallel CCA: the adversary can decrypt adaptively before he gets his challenge
ciphertext. After he gets his ciphertext he can just decrypt (once) as many mes-
sages as he wants but not adaptively.
• CCA2: the adversary can decrypt at any time, provided he does not ask for the
challenge itself to be decrypted.
There are two types of each of the above attack types; the Non-malleable CCA
attack (NM–CCA1) and the Indistinguishable CCA1 attack (IND–CCA1). The at-
tacker’s goal differs from one to the other. As we defined them above, in the NM–
XXX, the cryptosystem is said to be broken if the attacker succeeds in making a new
valid cipher out of another one. For the IND–XXX, the attacker is asked to distin-
guish between two ciphers with a non negligible probability. So what are the relations
between these different attacks?
Let F be the attacker. The following table summarizes for each attack, the at-
tacker’s power and goal. Then, we will give the relationships between NM–XXX and
the IND–XXX.
F’s power in 1st stage
C
hallenge





Enc/Dec — Lunchtime CCA (CCA1)
Enc/Dec Non–adaptive Dec Parallel CCA
Enc/Dec Dec Adaptive CCA (CCA2)
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In each attack, the goal of the attackers could be one of two choices, Malleability
or Distinguishability. Thus the system is said to be Non-malleable secure (NM) or
Indistinguishable (IND) secure against any of the following attacks: CPA, Lunchtime
CCA (CCA1), Parallel CCA, or Adaptive CCA (CCA2).
Relations among Security Notions
Malleability is considered as a stronger goal than the Distinguishability, therefore
there will be a trade-off in any Goal-Attack relation. It can be illustrated by the fol-
lowing relationships [BS99, DDN91]:
• NM–XXX⇒ IND–XXX
• NM–XXX ⇔ IND–(XXX ∪ Non-adaptive decryption queries in 2nd phase),
where XXX ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
Replacing XXX by each member of the set would give us the following results:
• NM–CPA⇔ IND–Parallel CCA
• NM–CCA2⇔ IND–CCA2 1
• NM–CCA1⇔ IND–(Parallel CCA)
We will formalize the most interesting case of the security requirements for any en-
cryption scheme, i.e. IND–CCA2 security 2 Besides the usual correctness requirement,
IND–CCA is defined by the game in Fig. 2-1.
We say that an encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure if for all λ ∈ N, all
polynomial-time adversaries F have a negligible 3 advantage
AdvIND-CCAPKE,F (λ) =
∣∣Pr[ExpIND-CCA-0PKE,F (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExpIND-CCA-1PKE,F (λ) = 1]∣∣
In other words, an adversary that chooses 2 messages, and receives the encryption
of one of them, is not able to guess which message has been encrypted, even if it is able
to ask for decryption of any ciphertext of its choice (except the challenge ciphertext).
1That’s why sometimes they don’t differentiate between the two notions NM and IND since CCA2
is the most used one.
2We will follow the literature and call it IND-CCA.
3In theory, the term negligible refers to a function (n) which is smaller than 1/nα for all α > 0
and sufficiently large n. In practice, one can think of  ≤ 1/280.
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Experiment: ExpIND-CCA-bPKE,F (λ):
• (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ).
• (m0,m1, stfind)← Ffind (pk : Dec(sk, ·)), where |m0| = |m1|.
• Cb ← Enc(pk,mb).
• b∗ ← Fguess
(
stfind, Cb : Dec
Cb(sk, ·)), where DecCb returns ⊥ if
queried on Cb.
• Return b∗.
Figure 2-1: IND–CCA security game for PKE
Authenticated Encryption (AE) Authenticated encryption1 (Fig. 2.2.3) is the re-
sult of combining both concepts, security against chosen plaintext attacks and security
against chosen message attacks [BCK96, BN00]. It’s a very natural notion of secu-
rity where the adversary has real power to encrypt/decrypt messages of his choice.
If a cryptosystem is secure against CPA and CMA then it is secure against CCA
[BN00], hence AE =⇒ (NM/IND)-CCA. To give an example of a good combina-
tion between MAC and CPA to guarantee the security against CCA attacks, one can
recall the “Encrypt than MAC” method. Let the ciphertext be c = (c1, tag) where
c1 := E.Enc(skenc,m) and tag = Sign(skmac, c1). Since the Adversary cannot create
a valid new tag, then he cannot create a valid cipher, so the decryption power will be
useless (it always returns ⊥ for invalid ciphers), and therefore the problem will be re-
duced to a normal chosen plain text attack which we already know the system is secure
against.
Although authenticated encryption ensures confidentiality against active adver-
saries that have the powers to decrypt some ciphers, it doesn’t prevent replay attacks
or side channel attacks2 on its own. TLS3 is a real example of authenticated encryption
1In 2012, they started a competition to build new AE schemes. “ CAESAR: Competition for Au-
thenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness” [cae12].
2Like a timing attack or any other attack based on information gained from the physical implemen-
tation of a cryptosystem and not from brute forcing or theoretical weaknesses in the algorithms.
3Surprisingly, TLS doesn’t apply the Encrypt than MAC technique but rather its opposite. It first
applies a MAC to the plaintext, then adds up to 255 bytes of padding to get the message up to a multiple
of the cipher (e.g., AES’s) block size. Now it CBC-encrypts the record! Therefore the padding is not
protected by the MAC, and hence the existence of padding oracle attacks.
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Figure 2-2: Authenticated Encryption
(TLS uses, amongst many other choices, CBC AES-128 for encryption and HMAC-
SHA1 for MAC)1
2.3 Digital Signatures and Related Security Definitions
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [DH76] introduced the concept of digital signatures. In
this concept, a signature scheme consists of three algorithms:
• KeyGen(1λ): takes as input a security parameter 1λ, and outputs for a signer, a
pair of a secret signing key and public verification key (sk, pk).
• Sign(m, sk): takes as input a messagem and the signer secret key sk, and outputs
a signature σ.
• Verify(σ,m, pk): it outputs 1 if signature verifies correctly and 0 otherwise.
2.3.1 Security Definitions
• (Existential) Unforgeability:[GMR88] Unforgeability under adaptive chosen-
message attack requires that any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary
F that is given a signing oracle Sign(sk, ·, ·) has a negligible advantage in win-
ning the following game:
– A key pair (sk, vk) is generated and vk is sent to F.
– F makes a polynomial number of queries to Sign(sk, ·, ·).
1See [AP13] for a good explanation on current TLS/DTLS implementations’ vulnerabilities, espe-
cially when it comes to side channel attacks.
19
– Eventually, F halts by outputting a tuple (σ∗,m∗) and wins if σ∗ is valid
on m∗ and m∗ was never queried to Sign.
• Strong Ungforgeablity:[BSW06] A signature system is said to be strongly un-
forgeable if the signature is existentially unforgeable and, given signatures on a
certain message m, the adversary cannot produce a new signature on m.
• One Time Signature (OTS) A signature system is said to be an unforgeable one
time signature if in the unforgeability game the adversary is restricted to a single
signing query. A strongly unforgeable OTS is an unforgeable OTS system where
the adversary can’t produce a new signature on the queried message m.
2.3.2 Different Types of Digital Signatures
To give more flexibility to the signature scheme so it can be used in a wider range
of real scenarios, they have come up with the idea of parametrizing the signing and
verification keys [CH91, MPR11, RST01]. One can think of the verification key as
VK= (Ψ, pk) and the secret key as SK= (w, sk). In the signing algorithm, there is the
extra condition that Ψ(w) must hold. For instance, given a signature σ on a messagem
generated by the signing key SK=(w, sk), σ verifies correctly against the verification
key VK=(ψ, pk), if and only if w satisfies Ψ, i.e. Ψ(w) holds. In some scenarios,
where one might aim to preserve the privacy of signers, a signature generated by a
user holding (sk, w) should reveal no information about w except the fact that it does
satisfy the predicate Ψ. Different types/forms of Ψ would lead to different variants of
digital signatures. Below, we try to briefly describe some of these variants.
Group Signatures Group signatures were first introduced by Chaum and Heyst in
[CH91]. They defined as follows: A group of people wants to create a signature
scheme, which we will call a group signature scheme, in which only members of the
group can sign messages, the receiver can verify that it is a valid signature of that group
(using the group verification key), yet the signer stays anonymous to the verifier, we
call this property anonymity. In case of dispute later on, the signature can be “opened”
to reveal the identity of the signer, this property is usually called traceability. In some
systems there is a third party that can trace the signature, or undo its anonymity, us-
ing a special trapdoor (tracing key). Other systems might support revocation where
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the group manager can selectively disable the membership of a specific member but
without affecting signature scheme. One can think of the predicate Ψ here as a mem-
bership test to tell whether or not a signer belongs to a given group. Two security
models/schemes were defined, the BMW model [BMW03] where the security of such
group signature can be achieved by proving Full–traceability and Full–anonymity, and
the BSZ one [Men05] in which the security requirements are Anonymity, Traceability
and Non-frameability (the reason to have different security requirements is the change
in the level of trust in Issuer and Opener authorities). In the BMW model, the group is
considered to be static whereas in the BSZ model, the group is dynamic in the sense
that it contains a Join protocol, which means that members can join at any time. The
signatures produced by different group members look indistinguishable to their veri-
fiers, whereas the group manager has the power to reveal the identity of misbehaving
signers.
Ring Signatures As defined in [RST01], a ring signature makes it possible to spec-
ify a set of possible signers without revealing which member actually produced the
signature. Unlike group signatures, ring signatures have no group managers, no setup
procedures, no revocation procedures, and no coordination. Any user can choose any
set of possible signers that includes himself, and sign any message by using his secret
key and the others’ public keys, without even getting their approval or assistance. Ring
signature schemes are simplified group signature schemes which have no managers.
In [RST01] they called such signatures “ring signatures” instead of “group signatures”
since rings are geometric regions with uniform periphery and no center. A ring here
simply represents a set of possible signers.
2.4 Provable Security
Roughly speaking, a cryptographic scheme is provably secure if it’s secure under some
specified mathematical hardness assumptions. We assume that a certain problem is
computationally hard, and we prove that any efficient algorithm that one might find
to break the given scheme can be used as an efficient algorithm (oracle) to solve the
underlying “hard” problem. Herein lies the role of the mathematical problems that are
believed to be hard, e.g. Discrete Logarithm problem (Dlog), Diffie–Hellman prob-
lem, Factoring large composite numbers, Finding the shortest vector in lattices, RSA
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assumption and many others. For example, we might say that a certain scheme S is
secure under the assumption that the Computational Diffie–Hellman CDH problem is
hard. We then say that the security of the scheme S can be “reduced” to the CDH
problem. Therefore, breaking the scheme leads to solving the CDH problem. Below,
we define the game-based model of security proofs in cryptography, which happens
between a challenger and an adversary.
2.4.1 Challenger C vs Adversary F
Let us first state some facts about the challenger C and the adversary F in a general
game-based security proof:
• X: A mathematical problem that is believed to be hard.
• Challenger’s goal: C wants to solve problem X .
• Adversary’s power: F knows how to break the Scheme S.
Description: We assume that there exists an adversary F that has enough power to
efficiently1 break the scheme S. The challenger will manipulate the adversary F to let
her help him in solving his problemX . The challenger Cwill simulate the behaviour of
the scheme S to convince the adversary that she is “communicating” with the scheme
itself. It means that C has to efficiently respond to all of F’s queries that S is supposed
to answer. The challenger C will always start from the given problem instance that
he had at the beginning. C will involve these given in all his responses to F so at
the end when F breaks the system S, C will use this information/result in order to
solve the problem X . We can formulate what we have just said above in the following
statements.
• If X is hard, then S is provably secure.
• If there exists an Adversary F who can efficiently break S, then there exists a
challenger C who uses F’s power to efficiently solve X .
1In a (polynomial) time that is better than brute forcing.
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2.4.2 Random Oracle Model (ROM) vs Standard Model
Hash functions are very important tools in cryptography. It’s not easy to imagine
their absence as most of the existing cryptosystems rely on them. By definition, hash
functions transform a long input into a fixed-size output, that we usually call message
digest. A good hash function must satisfy certain well known properties; one way,
i.e. hard to invert, collision resistant, i.e. hard to find two different messages that hash
down into the same digest, second pre-image resistance, i.e. given a message m1, it
is difficult to find another message m2, where m2 6= m1, but both hash to the same
digest. The fact that the range is smaller the the domain means there must be collisions
but they should be hard to find, hence finding collisions is possible but the probability
of finding one should be negligible.
The essential question that determines the quality of a given hash function is to test
the randomness of its outputs. Do perfectly (ideal) random hash functions exist? In
practice the answer is definitely no, logically speaking, it’s going to be “too slow to
compute, too big to store”! In theory, ideal hash functions are called random oracles
[BR93]. An ideal hash function has all the good properties of an excellent hash func-
tion in addition to its exclusive property which is the randomness. Any cryptosystem
that is proven secure using a random oracle as its hash function is said to be provably
secure in the random oracle model ROM, whereas cryptosystems that only use regu-
lar (non-ideal) hash functions in their proofs are considered to be provably secure in
the standard model. Most of the implemented schemes that are in use nowadays are
proved secure in the ROM, e.g. RSA-OAEP is one of them, which has been proven
provably secure in the ROM reduced to the hardness of the RSA problem. What is the
difference between the random oracle model and the standard model (where we use the
a real hash function)? Is it just the randomness that is offered by the random oracle?
According to [Gal12], in the proofs, wherever we use the random oracle, we assume
that the random oracle is a third party accessible by all other parties including the ad-
versary. Which is logical somehow, because we can’t once say that the adversary can’t
break the system due to its limited power and then after that say that she can compute
a random function! In this case, the whole scenario is not valid any more, and the ad-
versary can simply brute force the scheme. So the random oracle is an “independent”
party that answers all the queries of all other parties1.
1For more details on the comparison between Random Oracle model and Standard Model, we refer
the reader to The Random Oracle Model: A Twenty-Year Retrospective [KM15].
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2.5 Attribute Based Cryptography
Attribute-based cryptography has emerged as an important research topic in recent
years. It offers a versatile solution for designing role-based cryptosystems. In such
systems, users are assigned attributes, and private operations (e.g. decryption/signing)
are associated with security policies. Only users possessing attributes satisfying the
policy in question can perform such operations. For instance, “any registered doc-
tor can sign a prescription”, or “any director of the company can access its encrypted
data”, etc. The first proposals of attribute-based cryptosystems were: an encryption
scheme by Goyal et al. [GPSW06] (inspired by Sahai and Waters [SW05]) and a sig-
nature scheme by Maji et al. [MPR08]. Moreover, Attribute based cryptography can be
considered as a natural extension and generalisation of the work that have been done
before in public key cryptography field. We will give an overview of progression in
this field, starting from Identity Based Encryption (IBE), leading to Attribute Based
Encryption (ABE) and Signatures (ABS).
2.5.1 Identity Based Encryption (IBE)
The concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) is due to Shamir in 1984 [Sha84]. The
idea of it is to allow a party to encrypt a message using the recipient’s identity as
a public key. A trusted/central authority is responsible for providing private keys in
correspondence with every public key. The main advantage of IBE over traditional
public-key encryption is by simplifying the implementation of the secure communica-
tion between the users by avoiding certificate management. The users can simply use
their email addresses as their identities.
In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [BF03] found an elegant solution to Shamir’s idea
using pairings (See 3.5). Separately, Cocks [Coc01] in the same year also found an-
other implementation of the IBE system based on quadratic residues, which is the only
IBE that doesn’t use pairings. Another identity based encryption based on pairings has
been proposed by Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara, 2000.
One can say that Boneh-Franklin’s IBE was the principal work that has catalysed
a series of further research in this domain. Their original scheme is provably secure
in the random oracle model based on the hardness of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman using Type-1 pairings. Subsequently, there were so many attractive areas of
research to improve Boneh-Franklin scheme, like proving it secure without random
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oracle, extending it to Hierarchical Identity based encryption (HIBE), upgrading it
to use Type-2 or Type-3 pairings and much more. Galindo in [Gal05] has corrected
a flaw in the security reduction of the original BF-IBE scheme, and he upgraded it to
Type-2 pairings assuming the existence of a hash function toG2 which doesn’t seem to
easily exist as pointed out by Chatterjee-Menezes in [CM09]. Canetti et al. [CHK03]
and separately, Boneh-Boyen [BB04b] in 2004 introduced the Selective-ID 1 secure
identity based encryption that has been proven CCA secure without random oracle,
and another one which was considered quite impractical, which is Adaptive-ID CCA
secure [BB04c].
In 2004, based on Boneh-Boyen work, Waters [Wat04] came up with an IBE which
is Adaptive-ID CCA secure with relatively long public parameters, it has been followed
up by some works done by Naccache [Nac05] and separately by Chatterjee-Sarkar
[CS06] that have showed the trade-off between keeping the same length of the public
parameters of Waters’ scheme, or decreasing them by loosening the security reduction.
In 2006, Gentry introduced an IBE scheme that is Adaptive-ID CCA secure [Gen06],
has a tight security reduction, and efficient. But the security proof was based on a
non-static assumption, which means that the number of the elements in the instance of
the hard problem depends on the number of the queries the attacker makes. Note that
Gentry’s security proof is based on the idea that has been used in the security proof of
Cramer-Shoup’s public key cryptosystem in 1998 [CS98].
2.5.2 Attribute Based Encryption (ABE)
Attribute based encryption can be seen as a generalisation of the identity based encryp-
tion technique. It offers a fine-grained access control over encrypted data. The data,
instead of being encrypted under someone’s public key (e.g. public key cryptosystem)
or someone’s identity (or email address, etc. like IBE), it will be encrypted with respect
to a certain policy or it will embed some attributes in it, hence the two famous types
of ABE (i.e. Ciphertext-Policy ABE and Key-Policy ABE). In a general ABE scheme,
we either have a single attribute authority or multiple attribute authorities where each
of them is responsible of a certain set of attributes. The scheme is called decentralised
if there is no reliance on a central authority.
1In a selective security model, for instance, selective-ID, the adversary has to choose the ID that he
wants to attack ahead of the game.
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Figure 2-3: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption
More specifically, in Ciphertext-Policy ABE [BSW07], a user who has a set of
attributes that satisfies the policy under which the data is encrypted, can decrypt the
ciphertext. For instance, in Fig 2-3, as Ψ(A1) = 0 and Ψ(A2) = 1, Alice can then
decrypt the ciphertext CT but Bob cannot. In the second type of ABE, Key-Policy
ABE [ALdP11], the encryptor encrypts the data with respect to some attributes but the
decryptor now has a key that corresponds to a certain policy. He can decrypt a certain
ciphertext if the policy attached to his secret key is satisfied by the attributes embedded
in the given ciphertext.
For instance, a very useful feature in CP-ABE is that encryption of some data
with respect to some policies can happen even before the users have obtained their
private keys. Thus, data can be encrypted without knowledge of the actual set of
users who will be able to decrypt; it only specifies the policy which allows to decrypt.
Therefore, future users can still decrypt some encrypted data as long as they have
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enough attributes to satisfy the underlying policy.
2.5.3 Attribute Based Signatures (ABS)
In traditional digital signature schemes, the recipient of a signature is convinced that a
particular signer has indeed authenticated the message in question. In Attribute-Based
Signatures (ABS) [MPR08, MPR11], messages are signed with respect to a signing
policy expressed as a predicate. Thus, the recipient is convinced that someone with a
set of attributes satisfying the signing predicate has indeed authenticated the message
without learning the identity of the signer or learning how the predicate was satisfied
(i.e. which set of attributes was used in the signing). Furthermore, users cannot collude
to pool their attributes together.
There are many applications of attribute-based signatures such as attribute-based
messaging, e.g. [BFK+06], trust negotiation, e.g. [FLA06], and leaking secrets. Re-
fer to [MPR11] for more details and comparison with related notions such as mesh
signatures [Boy07] and anonymous credentials [CL01].
Besides correctness, the security of attribute-based signatures requires signer pri-
vacy and unforgeability. Informally, signer privacy (sometimes is also referred to as
anonymity), requires that a signature reveals neither the identity of the signer nor which
set of attributes was used to satisfy the associated predicate. On the other hand, un-
forgeability requires that a signer cannot forge a signature with respect to a signing
predicate that her individual attributes do not satisfy, even if she colludes with other
signers.
Attribute Based Signature is a special signature scheme that can be considered as
the signature version in the attribute based cryptography field. In ABS, an attribute
authority or multiple ones, delegate their signing power to some signers based on the
attributes which they have (e.g. Professor at Computer Science Department, Chan-
cellor, etc.). A policy Ψ is a well defined relation (e.g. predicate) between these
attributes. The signer can sign a certain message m with respect to a policy Ψ if he
has enough attributes to satisfy it. Let A be a set of attributes for which a certain
signer holds the corresponding secret keys, i.e skA, the signer can sign a message m
with respect to Ψ using the secret key skA iff Ψ(A) = 1. Variants of attribute-based
signatures exist in the literature each supporting policies that differ in their expres-
siveness. Those can be categorized into three main types of policies: non-monotonic
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policies, e.g. [OT11], monotonic policies, e.g. [MPR11], and threshold-based policies,
e.g. [LK08, SSN09, LAS+10, HLLR12, GNSN12]. Schemes with more expressive
policies are more interesting since they cover a larger scale of potential applications.
Nevertheless, their current state–of–the–art instantiations are less efficient. The size
of the signatures in existing instantiations of those supporting “monotonic” and “non-
monotonic” policies, in the best case, are linearly dependent on the number of at-
tributes in the policy [MPR11, OT11]. While the works of [HLLR12, GNSN12] yield
constant-size signatures, they only support threshold policies.
Early proposals of attribute-based signatures considered the case of multiple at-
tribute authorities where each authority is responsible for a sub–universe of attributes
[MPR08, OT11]. However, the multi–authority case still had the problem of relying
on the existence of a central trusted authority. Moreover, in some cases, the secu-
rity (unforgeability) of the whole system is compromised if the central authority is
corrupted. Okamoto and Takashima [OT13] recently proposed the first decentralized
construction.
Traceability in attribute-based signatures was first addressed by Khader [Kha07]
who proposed the notion of attribute-based group signatures. In this notion, only the
anonymity of the identity of the signer is preserved, whereas the attributes used are
not hidden. This is an undesirable property for many applications. Later, Khader
et al. [KCD09] proposed a traceable attribute-based signature scheme that relies on
the verifier to decide the policy and thus requiring interaction in the signing protocol.
Even though this can be useful in certain applications (see [KCD09] for details), such
interaction is prohibitive for many applications. A more recent construction by Escala
et al. [EHM11] adds the traceability feature (it was called revocation by the authors)
to standard ABS schemes. The proposed scheme in [EHM11] is in the inefficient
composite-order groups setting and was originally proven in the Random Oracle Model
(ROM) [BR93]. Although the authors described how the reliance on random oracles
could be removed, this was done informally and without a concrete construction or a
full security proof. In addition, their construction relies on a central attribute authority
which could be a bottleneck when the number of members of the system increases.
Below, we present a table of comparison of existing ABS schemes in terms of
dealing with the following features; generic construction, full anonymity (i.e. to hide
the identity and the signing attribute of the signers), traceability, decentralisation, user-
controlled linkability, and hidden policy.
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Table 2.1: Existing ABS schemes and their features
Feature [Kha07] [OT13, OT11] [MPR08] [EHM11]
Generic Construction 8 8 3 8
Full Anonymity 8 3 3 3
Traceability 3 8 8 7 1
Decentralisation 8 3 8 8
UCL 8 8 8 8
Hidden Policy 8 8 8 8
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we gave a cryptographic background that is needed in the rest of the
thesis. We first presented symmetric/asymmetric encryption notions and their related
security definitions (CPA, CMA, CCA, and AE). We also discussed different types of
digital signature schemes, e.g. group signatures, ring signatures. Moreover, we gave
the definition of provable security, showed how it is based on hardness assumptions,
and discussed the difference between the two types of security models, namely, ran-
dom oracle model and standard model. At the end, we gave an introduction to the
main topic that we are going to deal with in this thesis, i.e. Attribute based signatures.





In this chapter, we define the Discrete Logarithm Problem (Dlog) and some of its vari-
ants. The Dlog family of assumptions has been heavily used in cryptography along
with factorization and lattices. We show how the difference between the levels of dif-
ficulty of Dlog relies on the algebraic groups in which we try to solve it. Moreover,
we give some recent results on solving the Dlog in some fields. We have also created
a useful reduction diagram to give an idea about the relationships between Dlog and
some of its variants. In this chapter, we focus on groups of points on a suitable elliptic
curve. For this, we first define elliptic curves, Bilinear Pairings, and then move on to
show the properties of special elliptic curves that preserve a good level of difficulty of
Dlog and at the same time are considered to be pairing-friendly, since pairings have
become very popular and used in most of the cryptographic schemes. We then general-
ize bilinear maps to define multilinear maps, yet another useful cryptographic module
that has been recently realised after a decade of being a part of the open problems’
world.
The last part of this chapter will be about the Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge
proofs (NIZK proofs), in which a prover can prove to a verifier that he surely knows a
witness for an NP-problem but without letting the verifier gain any extra information
beyond this fact, hence the zero knowledgeness. Note that NIZK proofs are widely
used in recent cryptographic schemes. Finally, we present different existing types of
NIZKs.
30
Figure 3-1: Exponential Function Behaviour
3.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem Dlog
DLog in an abstract group (G, ?): Let G be a group whose group law we denote
by the symbol ?. The Discrete Logarithm Problem for G is to determine, for any two
given elements g and h in G, an integer a satisfying;
g ? g ? g ? · · · ? g︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a times)
= h
Dlog in a multiplicative group (G,×): LetG be a finite cyclic multiplicative group
with n elements. Let g be a generator ofG; then every element h ∈ G can be written in
the form h = gx for some integer x ∈ Zn. Thus,we can define the Discrete Logarithm
function for the generator g as:
Dlogg :G→ Zn, where Dlogg(h) = x ∈ Zn
To have an idea about the behaviour of the Dlog, let’s have a look at the scatter
graph in Figure 3-1 [PHP08]; in this example, we have the set of points representing
f(x) = 627x mod 941 for x = 1, 2, 3, . . . .
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Hardness of Dlog in different groups Let’s state some proved facts about the hard-
ness of the DLog in different groups.
• In (Zn,+), the discrete logarithm problem Dlog can be solved in linear time.
• In F∗pn the discrete logarithm problem can be solved in sub-exponential time.
We can distinguish between two Number Field Sieve algorithms, one in large
characteristic fields [Sch99], which takes time
Lpn(1/3, (64/9)
1/3)




Lpn(β, c) = exp
(
(c+ o(1))(log pn)β(log(log pn)1−β
)
Note that, as per [PSV06], no data points are available for computing discrete
logarithm in Fp6 where p is a large prime.
• In a subgroup of an elliptic curve1 over a finite field K, E(K), by Pollards rho
method [Pol78], takes time O(
√|K|), which is based on the birthday paradox.
So, from a quick look at the above results, one can tell how important it is to make
the right choice for a group in order to make the Dlog the hardest possible. Roughly
speaking, one cannot ignore the other factors that play a tremendous role in choosing
such a group, like how hard it is to do group operations, inversion, and hashing into
the group, but the most important part lies in the achieved security level. In a given
cryptosystem, we have the length of the keys, and we also have the level of security
of the cryptosystem based on the fastest known computational attack against such a
cryptosystem. We usually compare the security of public key cryptosystems to sym-
metric key cryptosystems. We can state some facts to help clarify this idea, and why
elliptic curve cryptosystems ECC can be considered as a better choice when it comes
1Note that some elliptic curves have shown serious vulnerabilities against Dlog, like supersingular
elliptic curves with small embedding degree [MOV93] or where |E(Fp)| = p [Sma99]. See 3.4.3 for
more details.
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to having shorter keys. In [BKK+09] they give an explanation of the relation between
length of the keys and the security level, saying that 160-bit key for an ECC yields an
80-bit security whereas RSA takes 1024 bit length moduli in order to give same secu-
rity level1. In other words, for symmetric key algorithms, we have that block ciphers
with n–bit key are secure against≈ 2n–time attacks. We also know that hash functions
with n-bit output are secure against ≈ 2n/2–time attacks. It is very important to figure
out what is the current key length recommendation with respect to Dlog and Factoring
based cryptosystems. Does factoring a modulus of length n take 2n time? Does com-
puting Dlog in a group with 2n elements take 2n time? Based on the previous example
that we have just mentioned, it is clearly not the case. The keys will be much longer
when considering asymmetric key algorithms. To make things clear, we will have yet
another example, achieving 112 bit security.
Example 1. . According to NIST, to achieve 112–bit security, we should have the
following:
• For factoring, we need a 2048-bit modulus.
• For Dlog in order-q subgroup of F∗p, we need ‖q‖ = 224, ‖p‖ = 2048.
• For Dlog in an elliptic curve group of order q, we need ‖q‖ = 224.
3.2.1 Recent results on Dlog
To give the reader an idea about the current situation of the Dlog hardness, we list
some of the recent results that show the state-of-the-art of Dlog in different cases:
• In [BBD+13], authors use the function field sieve algorithm to solve the Dlog in
GF(2809), which is a prime field degree.
• In [Jou13b], Joux was able to compute discrete logarithms in GF(26168) =
GF(2257∗24) using less than 550 CPU hours.
• Dlog in Medium Prime Case: In [Jou13a], they introduce a new technique called
Pinpointing, which allows them to construct multiplicative relations much faster,
1See Algorithms, key sizes and parameters, Enisa 2014, for more details on current recommenda-
tions for key size in different cryptosystems [Eni14]. Another useful website for recommended key
sizes is [Gir14]
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thus reducing the asymptotic complexity of relations’ construction. They show
the feasibility of their method with discrete logarithm records in two medium
prime finite fields, the first of size 1175 bits and the second of size 1425 bit
(GF(p47), GF(p57), p is a 25-bit prime)
How does this affect current cryptosystems that are in use?
In pairing-based cryptography (section 3.5), if one wants to use Type-1 pairing, by
using supersingular curves (of genus 1 or 2), for instance, in characteristic 2, one would
have a group over GF(2p) for some prime (e.g., p = 257), now the pairing would
map into an extension of this field of small degree k ≤ 6, which is called the MOV
attack [MOV93] (see paragraph 3.4.3). Hence, the target group would be contained in
GF(2p∗k).
3.3 Diffie–Hellman Problem
Many other problems that are related to DLog are believed to be hard as well. We will
first define the original Diffie–Hellman problem, which is directly related to DLog,
then we discuss different versions of Diffie–Hellman. It was the insightful idea of
Diffie–Hellman key exchange algorithm that gave a brilliant new direction in cryptog-
raphy [DH76], called public key cryptography, where there is no need any more to
exchange the key secretly. Now Bob and Alice can exchange a common secret session
key over insecure channel, where the adversary Eve can see both their public keys, but
doesn’t have enough computational power to get their “secret key” efficiently (e.g. in
polynomial time).
What is the Diffie–Hellman problem? Alice and Bob can easily share the public
parameters (G, g, etc.), where g is a generator of a group G (e.g. group of points
on a well chosen elliptic curve). Bob thinks of a value x, computes gx and sends it
to Alice. Alice in her turn, does the same by choosing a value y, computing gy and
sending it back to Bob. Both of them can easily work out gxy and have it as their
shared secret session key. Now Eve can see g, gx and gy. But the question that Diffie
and Hellman asked in their work is, can Eve efficiently compute gxy? This problem is
what is known as the Computational Diffie–Hellam problem (CDH). There is also the
decisional version of it, below are their formal definitions:
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CDH The Computational Diffie–Hellman problem CDH is as follows:
Given g, ga, gb ∈ G, where a, b ∈ Zp.
Compute gab.
DDH The Decisional Diffie–Hellman problem DDH is as follows:
Given g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G, where a, b, c ∈ Zp.
Decide if gc = gab.
3.3.1 Decisional, Gap, Strong, Hashed, and Twin Notions
We will define here weaker variants of the Diffie–Hellman problem, or what can also
be called stronger assumptions than the original computational and decisional DH as-
sumptions. It seems to be a good idea to generally define some useful notations which
are going to be integrated into the original DH problem to make new useful assump-
tions.
– Decisional For every computational problem there exists a decisional version of
it [Bon98], which is, instead of computing the solution of a problem instance, the
problem will be to check whether a given element of a specific group is a solution of
this problem without necessarily solving the problem.
– Gap This is the idea of separating the Decisional problems from computational
ones in cryptographic groups [JN03]. That happened after they found that decisional
problems can be polynomially solved in certain groups. So they wanted to make sure
that the computational problem stays hard in the same groups where the decisional
problem is easy. Here comes the idea of the Gap, which measures the hardness of the
computational problem for an adversary that has already a full access to a decisional
oracle that solves the decisional version of the problem.
– Hash The hash can be integrated into decisional problems [GKR04], let’s say the
DDH, so instead of distinguishing between a random element of a specific group and a
solution of a problem instance, the problem will be to to distinguish between a random
string and a hashed solution of the problem.
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– Twin The Twin concept for any problem instance is to compute it twice based on
a certain given [CKS08]. So instead of having two variables and the question is to
compute their product, the given will be three variables, so the question will be to to
find the products of two chosen pairs from what is given.
In the coming sections, we will further explain elliptic curves and pairings, and
later come back to different existing hardness assumptions where some of them involve
pairings; we will also give a diagram of the reduction relationships between them.
3.4 Elliptic Curves
We first define projective planes then we define elliptic curves.
Definition 2. [Sma13]: LetK be any field. Consider the set of triples (X, Y, Z), where
X, Y, Z ∈ K are not all simultaneously zero. Such a triple is called a projective point.
On these triples, define an equivalence relation (X, Y, Z) ≡ (X ′, Y ′, Z ′) if there exists
a λ ∈ K such that X = λX ′, Y = λY ′ and Z = λZ ′. The projective plane P2(K)
over K is defined as the set of equivalent classes (X, Y, Z).
Definition 3. [Gal12] An elliptic curve over a field K is the set of solutions in the
projective plane P2(K) of a non-singular (see next section) Weierstrass equation
E : y2z + a1xyz + a3yz




where ai ∈ K, i = 1, · · · , 6.
The set of K-rational points on E, i.e. the solutions in P2(K) to the above equa-
tion, is denoted by E(K). Notice that the curve has exactly one rational point with
coordinate Z equal to zero, namely (0, 1, 0). This is the point at infinity, which will be
denoted by OE . The affine version of the Weierstrass equation is:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6
The K-rational points in the affine case are the solutions to E in K2, plus the point at
infinity OE .
Let us see the difference between singular and non-singular Weierstrass equations,
and how they change according to the characteristic of the underlying field K.
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3.4.1 Singular vs non-Singular (smooth) Weierstrass equation
In general, for any equation, the singular points are those at which all the partial deriva-
tives simultaneously vanish [Gal12]. We say that the discriminant of the equation
should be different from zero. The discriminant of a polynomial is the product of the
squares of the differences of the polynomial roots. In particular, for a Weierstrass equa-
tion, its singularity depends on the characteristic of the underlying field on which it is
defined. For example, if E(x, y) is defined over K, then we can distinguish between
the following cases: (See [Gal12] for proofs)
• If char(K)6= 2, 3, then every Weierstrass equation over K is isomorphic over K
to a Weierstrass equation
y2z = x3 + a4xz
2 + a6z
3
for some a4, a6 ∈ K. It is called the short Weierstrass form, and this equation is
non-singular if and only if the discriminant −16(4a34 + 27a26) 6= 0 in K.
• If char(K) =3, then every Weierstrass equation over K is isomorphic over K to a
Weierstrass equation




is non-singular if a22(a
2
4 − 4a2a6)− a34 6= 0
• If char(K) = 2, then every Weierstrass equation over K is isomorphic over K to
a Weierstrass equation
y2z + xyz = x3 + a2x
2z + a6z
3
which is non-singular if a6 6= 0 or to
y2z + yz2 = x3 + a4xz
2 + a6z
3
which is non-singular for all a4, a6 ∈ K.
Definition 4. The Group Law (+) on an Elliptic Curve [Sma13]: Let E denote an
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elliptic curve given by
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6
and let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) denote points on the curve. Then








when x1 6= x2, and set
λ =
3x21 + 2a2x1 + a4 − a1y1
2y1 + a1x1 + a3
,
µ =
−x31 + a4x1 + 2a6 − a3y1
2y1 + a1x1 + a3
when x1 = x2 and P2 6= −P1. If
P3 = (x3, y3) = P1 + P2 6= O
then x3 and y3 are given by the formulae
x3 = λ
2 + a1λ− a2 − x1 − x2,
y3 = −(λ+ a1)x3 − µ− a3.
Definition 5. Group of points on an Elliptic Curve [Gal12]: The group of points on
an elliptic curve consists of the set of affine points of the curve plus the point at infinity
OE which represents the identity element of the group. The law of the group is the
aforementioned addition.
Example 2. Addition on an elliptic curve: Figure 3-2 shows how the addition of two
points on an elliptic curve can be geometrically illustrated.
38
Figure 3-2: Addition on an elliptic curve
3.4.2 Ordinary vs Supersingular Elliptic Curves
To begin with, both supersingular and ordinary curves are non singular curves [Gal12].
Now, for any prime power q, we let Fq denote the field of q elements. We give a couple
of useful definitions/theorems that we are going to use later on in this section.
Definition 6. (q-Frobenius map)[Gal12] Let p be a prime and let q = pm for some
m ∈ N. Let E be an elliptic curve over Fq. The q-Frobenius map is the rational map
piq : E → E such that piq(OE) = OE and piq(x, y) = (xq, yq).
Theorem 1. (Hasse bound) [Gal12] Let E be an elliptic curve over Fq and denote t
the trace of q-Frobenius map. Then |t| ≤ 2√q.
Theorem 2. [Gal12] The number of points on an elliptic curve over Fq lies in the
Hasse interval [q + 1− 2√q, q + 1 + 2√q], therefore t = q + 1−#E(Fq).
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Definition 7. (Embedding degree)[Gal12] Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a
finite field Fq and let n be a prime dividing #E(Fq). The embedding degree of E with
respect to n is the smallest integer k such that n divides qk − 1.
Definition 8. [Gal12] An elliptic curve E defined over a field Fq of characteristic p is
supersingular if p|t, where t = q + 1−#E(Fq). If p - t then E is ordinary.
Supersingular curves have small embedding degree k, k = 2 for prime fields, and
k ≤ 6 for others. They also support a distortion map Φ : E(Fq) → E(Fqk). A
comparison of a family of ordinary curves (MNT) [MNT01] and supersingular curves
is given in [PSV06], in which they consider two examples of cryptosystems, namely,
the (BLS) short signature scheme of Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [BLS04b] and the
identity based encryption scheme (IBE) of Boneh and Franklin [BF01].
3.4.3 Attacks on Vulnerable Curves
Anomalous attack When an elliptic curve E(Fpm) has a trace of Frobenius equal to
1, the number of points on the curve equals pm. In this case the elliptic curve is said
to be anomalous and there exists an efficient reduction which enables an attacker to
solve the discrete logarithm problem on E in polynomial time [Sma99]. This method
works by transporting the discrete logarithm problem on E to the discrete logarithm
problem on the additive group of Fp, where the discrete logarithm problem can be
solved in linear time.
GHS attack This attack works for some elliptic curves defined over a finite field of
characteristic two. It was shown by Gaudry, Hess and Smart [GHS02] that the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem ECDLP on an elliptic curve E(F2n) can be reduced
to the discrete logarithm problem on an associated hyperelliptic curve1 C(F2m) where
m < n (i.e. the associated hyperelliptic curve is defined over a smaller field). This is
done through a process known as the Weil descent. In some instances, where the genus
of C is large enough, there exists a sub-exponential algorithm to solve the discrete
logarithm in C.
1Hyperelliptic curves are a special class of algebraic curves and can be viewed as generalizations
of elliptic curves, see [MZW96] for more details.
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MOV-reduction and FR-reduction In [MNT01], the authors give a good compar-
ison of both well known attacks FR-reduction [FR94] and the MOV attack [MOV93]
that actually embed a subgroup G ⊂ E(Fq) to F∗qk for an extension field Fqk and re-
duce ECDLP based on G to Dlog based on a subgroup of F∗
qk
. Let n =order(G), and
the n-torsion subgroup is denoted as E[n] = {P ∈ E|nP = O}.
• In MOV-reduction, ECDLP on G is reduced to Dlog for the smallest integer k
such that E[n] ⊂ E(Fqk). As a result, ECDLP in groups defined over supersin-
gular curves can be efficiently reduced to Dlog in F∗
qk
for k ≤ 6.
• In FR-reduction, ECDLP onG is reduced to DLP for the smallest integer k such
that n|qk − 1.
It is easy to see that in general, MOV =⇒ FR-reduction. But when n is prime and
n 6 |q − 1 then, E[n] ⊂ E(Fqk)⇐⇒ n|qk − 1, and therefore MOV⇐⇒ FR-reduction.
Recent MOV attack on Supersingular curves over field of characteristic 3 In
[SSHT12], the authors estimate the time complexity of solving Dlog over GF (36n) for
n = 193, 239, 501 as 272, 278, 2111 respectively. This estimation is based on their result
in which they solved the Dlog over GF (36·97) in 148.2 days by using 252 CPU cores
using ηT pairing [HSV06]. The method which they use is an improved version of the
function field sieve (FFS), which was first proposed in [Adl94], 1994. In [SSHT12],
they describe their computational result as a contribution to the secure use of pairing-
based cryptosystems with the ηT pairing by saying that n should be greater than 239
to keep 80 bit security.
3.5 Bilinear Maps or Pairings
The first time pairings were used in Cryptography was in 1993, when Menezes et al.
[MOV93] proposed their famous MOV-reduction to reduce the ECDLP to the Dlog.
Thereafter, in 1994 and 1999, Frey et al. [FR94] proposed the FR-reduction to also
reduce the ECDLP to the Dlog. Hence, the use of pairing was first considered to be
destructive in the sense that it can only be used to break elliptic curve cryptosystems.
The first time when pairings were used for “good” was in 2000 due to Joux [Jou00]1.
1Well, same thing happened with lattice-based cryptography, it was first used for “bad”, i.e. in
cryptanalysis, the LLL algorithm [LL82] to factor polynomials, whereas in 1986, people started using
41
Shortly after Joux’s work, the pioneering work of Boneh-Franklin [BF03] appeared
in 2003, which was actually behind this revolution of pairing–based cryptosystems.
In [BF03], they built the first practical identity based encryption after many years of
Shamir’s thought on IBE in 1984 [Sha84]. Pairings that were used in the original BF
scheme was renamed later, by Chatterjee-Menezes [CM09] as Type-1 pairings, that
can only be used with supersingular elliptic curves. Later on, some vulnerabilities
were found with supersingular curves. As a result, people became more interested in
studying ordinary curves, how to construct them and how to define pairing-friendly
curves. The conditions are not easy to satisfy, for instance, a curve should have a rel-
atively high embedding degree to resist against MOV-attack, but at the same time stay
computationally useful. Note that efficient bilinear maps can also be built over groups
of points on hyperelliptic curves, the general case of elliptic curves, however, we will
focus here on the simple and practical type of pairings which use elliptic curves.
3.5.1 Types of Pairings
A bilinear map can be defined as a function that maps any pair of elements from two
given groups (e.g. groups of points on an elliptic curve) to an element in another group
(subgroup of a multiplicative group of a finite field, which is the case for the Tate
Pairing).
Let G1,G2 and GT be three groups of the same prime order p, a pairing is an
efficiently computable function e : G1 ×G2 → GT , satisfying that:
1. e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab, for all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2 and all a, b ∈ Zp
2. Non-degeneracy, which is, if g1 is a generator ofG1, g2 is a generator ofG2 then
e(g1, g2) is a generator of GT .
According to the existence of an isomorphism ψ: G2→G1 and ψ−1 we can define three
general types of bilinear mappings as by [CM09].
• Type-1: if ψ and ψ−1 both are efficiently computable, then we can look at G1
andG2 as the same group, i.e. G1 ≈ G2 effectively. We can define the pairing as
e : G×G→ GT . Type-1 is called symmetric bilinear pairings. When G1 6= G2
we can distinguish between two types of “asymmetric” pairings that are Type-2
and Type-3.
Lattices in a constructive way, i.e. to build cryptosystems.
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• Type-2: Here only ψ is efficiently computable. A typical example is to take
G1 ⊂ E(Fq) and G2 ⊂ E(Fqk), the extension field of E(Fq), therefore the
Trace map will play the role of the isomorphism ψ 1.
• Type-3: if no efficiently computable ψ or ψ−1 are known, then we call it Type-
3. As by [GPS08], this type has some advantages over Type-2 in terms of the
elements size, group operations, and hashing into G2.
3.5.2 Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves
A great reference on pairing-friendly elliptic curves is Freeman et al.’s work [FST10],
in which they formalize and classify previous work already done in this area by Miyaji
et al. [MNT01], Barreto et al. [BLS03], Scott et al. [SB06], and many other impor-
tant relevant work. As we mentioned earlier, the early cryptographic work that used
pairings focused on pairings of Type-1, which seemed to be only feasible with super-
singular elliptic curves. With the presence of MOV and FR reductions (see 3.4.3),
along with the recent records on solving Dlog in multiplicative fields of small char-
acteristic (see 3.2.1), people had to think of using ordinary elliptic curves to build
pairings. Note that in these reductions, curves with small embedding degree k are
more vulnerable. Also note that the best known attack on ECDLP is the parallelized
Pollard rho algorithm [Pol78] which has running time O(
√
r) where r is the size of
the largest prime-order subgroup of E(Fq), whereas the best known attack on Dlog in
finite fields is the index calculus which has running time subexponential in the field
size [SWD96]. As they show in [FST10], in order to achieve the same level of security
in both groups, the size qk of the extension field must be significantly larger than r.
Let ρ be the parameter that measures the base field size relative to the size of the prime
order subgroup , i.e. ρ = log(q)/ log(r). Note that log(qk)/ log(r) = k · ρ. Now, let’s
reconsider the 112–bit security level given in example 1, if one wants to achieve 112–
bit security level, we have to set up a system with a subgroup of a size r = 224, and a
2200 ≤ qk ≤ 3600–bit extension field. Therefore, one can choose between (ρ ≈ 1 and
10 ≤ k ≤ 16) or (ρ ≈ 2 and 5 ≤ k ≤ 8). Note that the embedding degree can’t be a
large number if we want the pairings to be practical. On the other hand, small ρ values
1This type is widely used in cryptographic protocols although more research has been made [CM09]
and [SV07] to study the real necessity of the existence of ψ and the benefits that it offers in terms of
functionality, security, performance and whether or not Type-3 can always be used instead of Type-2.
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are in fact desirable in order to speed up the arithmetic on the elliptic curve. Of course,
the ideal situation is when ρ = 1. Informally speaking, a pairing-friendly elliptic curve
is an elliptic curve with a small embedding degree and a large prime-order subgroup.
We will distinguish between the two cases, i.e. supersingular and ordinary curves, as
follows:
Supersingular curves have been classified in three types:
• If q = p a prime, maximum k = 2
• If q = 2m, maximum k = 4
• If q = 3m, maximum k = 6
In the last two, Fq must be larger due to Coppersmith’s index calculus method for Dlog
in finite fields of small characteristic [Cop84]. However, Kolbitz-Menezes in [KM05]
support the idea that ordinary curves with small embedding degree are not necessarily
more secure than the supersingular curves with the same embedding degree against
the MOV [MOV93] and FR [FR94] attacks. With the first choice, although it is not
affected by Coppersmith’s index calculus method [Cop84], the embedding degree is
2, which is very small, therefore p should be really large to achieve certain security
level, and this makes working in the base field almost impractical. In Freeman et al.’s
paper [FST10], they classify pairing-friendly curves, according to their construction,
to families and non-families and formally defined the term “pairing-friendly”.
Definition: suppose E is an elliptic curve defined over finite field Fq. We say that
E is pairing-friendly if the following two conditions hold:
1. There is a prime r ≥ √q dividing |E(Fq)|,
2. The embedding degree of E with respect to r is less than log2(r)/8.
That is why supersingular curves are always considered as pairing-friendly curves if
they have large prime-order subgroup since the embedding degree k is always less than
or equal to 6. The fact that supersingular curves with embedding degree 6 are defined
over fields of small characteristic made the achievement of a higher level of security
necessarily through constructing pairing-friendly ordinary curves. On the other hand,
ordinary curves are defined as families, of two types, sparse and complete (definitions
below)1. As per [FST10], a pairing-friendly ordinary curve can be constructed if and
only if all the following conditions hold:
1According to [FST10], there is no such thing as family of supersingular curves.
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1. q is prime or prime power.
2. r is prime.
3. The trace of the curve t is relatively prime to q (i.e. t and q are co-prime).
4. r divides q + 1− t.
5. r divides qk − 1, and r doesn’t divide qi − 1 for 1 ≤ i < k.1
6. 4q − t2 = Dy2 for some sufficiently small positive integer D and some integer
y.
Where D is the the CM discriminant of the curve, it should be small in order to be
able to find an equation of such a curve.
So the idea of finding or constructing a curve can be summarized by two steps;
firstly, we fix k and compute some integers, t, r, q such that there is an elliptic curve
E(Fq) that has an embedding degree k, trace t, and a subgroup of prime order r. The
second step is actually performed by using the complex multiplication method [FST10]
to find the equation of the curve defined over Fq. Now if we want to generalize the
construction method of a family of curves instead of constructing a single curve, one
should write r, t, and q as polynomials r(x), t(x), and q(x). This method has been used
to construct MNT curves [MNT01], BLS curves [BLS03], and others. Remember that
we need q(x) and r(x) to be primes. So we need to find x0 for which q(x0) and r(x0)
are both primes. But the only things that we know about prime values of polynomials
are conjectures. That’s what actually stops the process of constructing a family of
paring-friendly ordinary curves from being an easy task. To differentiate between the
complete families and the sparse ones, we can look at condition (6) of constructing
families of pairing-friendly ordinary curves, 4q(x) − t(x)2 = Dy2. If we can find a
polynomial y(x) ∈ Q[x] that satisfies the equation, i.e. we can write y in terms of x,
we say that the family is complete, otherwise, it is said to be sparse. For the condition
(1), it becomes q(x) = p(x)d, d ≥ 1, and p(x) represents primes (In the literature,
most of the well known families of pairing-friendly curves have d = 1). The ρ value




1Condition (5), which is in fact the definition of the embedding degree, can be replaced by [r divides
φk(t− 1)].
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For the sparse families, the well known families in the literature are the MNT
[MNT01], GMV [GMV07], and Freeman [Fre06].
In the complete families we have three different families which are the Cyclotomic
families, Sporadic families, and Scott-Barreto families as per [FST10]
According to Aranha et al. [AFCK+12], the state-of-the-art of pairing friendly
elliptic curves is as follows:
1. There are the MNT curves [MNT01], with k = 3, 4, 6, ρ ≈ 1.
2. There are Freeman curves [Fre06] with k = 10 ρ ≈ 1.
3. KSS [KSS08] curves: k = 18, ρ ≈ 4/3
4. BN [BN06] curves: k = 12, ρ ≈ 1
5. BLS12 [BLS03] curves: k = 12, ρ ≈ 1.5
6. BLS24 [BLS03] curves: k = 24, ρ ≈ 1.25
Note that all of the above are families of curves. In [AFCK+12] they implemented
asymmetric pairings of Type–3 derived from (KSS), (BN) and (BLS) elliptic curves at
the 192-bit security level and found that (BLS12) is the fastest among the others. In
the same paper, they showed that the pairings computation at the 192-bit security level
is not as expensive as people previously thought.
To achieve the 192-bit security level, they gave the following requirements:
• In order to resist the Pollard’s rho attach [Pol78] on ECDLP in G1, the bitlength
of r should be at least 384.
• In order to resist the number field sieve attack [Adl94] on Dlog in F∗
qk
, the
bitlength of qk should be at least 7680.
3.5.3 Pairings: Supersingular Curves Vs Ordinary Curves
We have previously defined the pairings in an abstract way. Here we will take the
example of the Tate pairings and its modified version and see what the differences are
when it’s applied over the two types of curves, supersingular and ordinary [PSV06].
First letG1,G2, andGT represent three finite abelian groups such that the Dlog is hard
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in the three of them. As we mentioned earlier, we mean by a pairing a non-degenerate
bilinear map:
t : G1 ×G2 → GT
Let G1 be a subgroup of E(Fq) of a prime order r, G2 ⊂ E(Fqk), k be the embedding
degree, i.e. r divides qk − 1, and r - qs − 1, 0 < s < k. If P ∈ G1, let fP denote the
function with divisor1
(fP ) = r(P )− r(O)
Now, we can define the unmodified Tate pairing t as following, if Q ∈ Fqk then;
t(P,Q) = fP (DQ),
where DQ is a divisor equivalent to (Q)− (O).
The original method to calculate the pairing is due to Miller [Mil86]2, while lots
of optimizations that have been applied to it later in both types of elliptic curves; for
supersingular curves, they reached a very high level of computational efficiency, and
for ordinary curves, they found some counterparts of the nice features (e.g. distortion
map) of the supersingular curves.
We now distinguish between the cases of supersingular and ordinary elliptic curves
as follows:
• The main advantage of the supersingular curves is the existence of a distortion
map defined as φ : E(Fq) → E(Fqk). We now let G1 = G2 = E(Fq), the
modified Tate pairing over supersingular elliptic curves will be then defined as
follows:
For P,Q ∈ E(Fq), tˆ(P,Q) = t(P, φ(Q))(qk−1)/r
This is what we have previously categorized as symmetric pairings or Type–1
pairings. It has the advantage that tˆ(P,Q) = tˆ(Q,P ) which solves the hashing
problem that will occur in the ordinary curve case. An additional advantage
appears when dealing with fields of characteristic three, pairings will be much
faster due to efficient tripling formulae.
1A divisor is just a notation for a finite multi-set of points [Gal12]. For a function f , a divisor (f)
is a way to write down the intersection points (and their multiplicities) of f and a curve E.
2 In 1986, Victor Miller described an algorithm for evaluating the Weil pairing on an algebraic
curve. Although the paper has never been published, it is the basis of pairing based cryptography, and it
had lots of follow on work in cryptography.
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• In the ordinary elliptic curve case, there is no distortion map, and the pairings
will be asymmetric since Q will be in E(Fqk). The modified Tate pairings over
ordinary elliptic curves will be then defined as follows:
For P ∈ E(Fq), Q ∈ E(Fqk), tˆ(P,Q) = t(P,Q)(qk−1)/r
Barreto et al. [BKLS02, BLS04a] tried to find some counterparts to the nice
features of the supersingular curves and came up with some ideas which improve
the performance of the pairings. If r doesn’t divide q − 1, k is even and x(Q) ∈
Fqk/2 then we can use both the denominator elimination technique in Miller’s
algorithm and the twist technique.
Twist curve definition [Gal12] Let E be an elliptic curve over K. A twist of E is
an elliptic curve E˜ over K such that there is an isomorphism φ : E → E˜ over K¯ of
pointed curves (such that φ(OE) = OE˜).
Example of twist curves [BLS04a] Let E be given by y2 = x3 + ax + b defined
over Fqk , and consider its twist defined over Fqk/2 as E˜(Fqk/2) : y2 = x3 + v2ax+ v3b
for some quadratic non-residue v ∈ Fqk/2 . In Fqk , v is a quadratic residue, which




The advantage of using the twist curve is by performing the operations that do
not use pairing (such as key generation and point transmission) use only arithmetic
on Fqk/2 . That was the case of a quadratic twist. Note that all elliptic curves have
quadratic twists (i.e. degree 2). So far, for the higher-order twists we have two cases
[BN06]:
• Curves that have quartic twists: those with CM discriminant = 1, defined by
y2 = x3 + ax.
• Curves that have cubic and sextic twists: those with CM discriminant = 3,
defined by y2 = x3 + b.
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3.6 Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Problem BDH and some of
its variants
When cryptographers found out about the attractive relationship between bilinear map-
pings and elliptic curves, which are considered to be more efficient than finite fields,
it happened that most of the research have relied on the symmetric pairing, namely
Type-1. That’s why the literature has lots of different notations and symbols, and
sometimes they can easily get the reader confused of which is which. Below we give
the definitions of computational and decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman:
CBDH The Computational Bilinear Diffie–Hellman problem CBDH is as follows:
Given g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G.
Compute e(g, g)abc.
DBDH The Decisional Bilinear Diffie–Hellman problem DBDH is as follows:
Given g, ga, gb, gc, gz ∈ G.
Decide if e(g, g)abc = e(g, g)z.
In [SV07], they abstractly define the pairing problem that deals with groupsG1 and
G2 as Gi where i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}, and they define a pairing problem instance which is
Γ = (q,G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, e) where G1,G2, and GT denote groups of prime order q.
g1 and g2 are two fixed generators of G1 and G2. Below, we present the three different
types of BDH.
BDHi,j,k : We define the BDHi,j,k problem to be the following:
Given gai , g
b
j , and g
c
k, with a, b, c ∈ Fq, compute e(g1, g2)abc
One can easily notice that the original definition of BDH is the same as BDH1,1,1.
coBDHj,k : We define the coBDHj,k problem to be the following:




j , and g
c
k, with a, b, c ∈ Fq, compute e(g1, g2)abc.
BDHφi,j,k : We define the BDH
φ
i,j,k problem to be the following:
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Given gai , g
b
j , and g
c
k, with a, b, c ∈ Fq, compute e(g1, g2)abc. In this case, the
adversary has access to an oracle which computes values under the isomorphism φ.
Notation:
A ≥B means that problem B is no harder than problem A, which means that
assumption A is weaker than assumption B (or B is a stronger assumption comparing
to A). Moreover, if an adversary F can solve A, then F can be used as an Oracle in
order to solve B. A ≡ B means that the assumptions A and B have the same hardness
level, i.e. A ≥B and B ≥A.
Relationships between different BDH types
In [SV07], they give the following relationships between the different types of BDH:
1. if i + j + k = i′ + j′ + k′, then BDHi,j,k ≡ BDHj′,j′,k′ . This means that any
two problems that have two inputs from G1 and one from G2 and vice versa are
equivalent. The same holds for BDHφi,j,k and BDH
φ
i′,j′,k′ .
2. i+ j+ k ≤ i′+ j′+ k′ =⇒ BDHφi,j,k ≥BDHφj′,j′,k′ . This can be easily checked.
let’s take the example where BDHφ1,1,1 ≥BDHφ2,2,2. In fact the isomorphism φ
will map all elements in G2 into elements in G1, and so the BDH problem will
have all its inputs from G1, thus it can be solved using the BDHφ1,1,1.
3. The trivial fact that says, BDHi,j,k ≥BDHφi,j,k . If one can solve the BDH problem
without the existence of φ, then he can solve it with its existence.
4. BDHi,j,k ≥coBDHj,k ≥BDHφ2,j,k.
For BDHi,j,k ≥coBDHj,k , it’s easy to notice that coBDHj,k has all the input
elements of BDHi,j,k plus one extra element so it can be easily solved using
BDHi,j,k as an oracle.
For coBDHj,k ≥BDHφ2,j,k, using the function φ one can get ga1 from the given ga2 ,
and then feed them to the coBDHj,k to compute e(g1, g2)abc.
Next, we give a table of some of the existing hardness assumptions with their
abbreviations, and a diagram of reductions between some of them. The details will
be given in appendix A.
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Diffie–Hellman and Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Variants Page
CDH Computational Diffie–Hellman 165
DDH Decisional Diffie–Hellman 165
GDH Generalized Diffie–Hellman 165
SCDH Square Computational Diffie–Hellman 165
Inv–CDH Inverse Computational Diffie–Hellman 165
DCDH Divisible Computational Diffie–Hellman 165
ł-wDH or ł-DHI l-weak Diffie–Hellman or Diffie–Hellman Inverse 166
q–SDH q-Strong Diffie–Hellman 166
HDDH Hash Diffie–Hellman 166
ODDH Oracle Diffie–Hellman 166
SDH Strong Diffie–Hellman 166
GapDH Gap Diffie–Hellman 167
GapHDDH Gap Hash Diffie–Hellman 167
DLIN Decision Linear Diffie–Hellman 167
BDH Computational Bilinear Diffie–Hellman 49
DBDH decisional Bilinear Diffie–Hellman 49
l–BDHI l–Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Inversion 169
l–wBDH l–weak Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Inversion 169
BPI Bilinear Pairing Inversion 169
l–BDHE l–Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Exponent 169
TwinDH Twin Diffie–Hellman 167
STwinDH Strong Twin Diffie–Hellman 167
TwinDDH Twin Decisional Diffie–Hellman 168
STwinDDH Strong Twin Decisional Diffie–Hellman 168
STwinHDDH Strong Twin Hashed Diffie–Hellman 168
TwinBDH Twin Bilinear Diffie–Hellman 169
STwinBDH Strong Twin Bilinear Diffie–Hellman 169
GapBDH Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman 169
BDDH modified Bilinear decisional Diffie–Hellman 170
q–BDDHI q– Bilinear decisional Diffie–Hellman Inversion 170
truncated q–ABDHE truncated q– Augmented Bilinear DH Exponent 170
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3.7 Diagram of Reductions
Discrete Logarithm Twin DH
Computational
Diffie–Hellman









3, . . . , q–1
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3.8 Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP)
A non-mathematical introduction to zero-knowledge proofs is provided by [QQQ+90]
in which they entertainingly narrate the secret of Ali Baba’s legendary cave, and how
it got rediscovered by Mick Ali later on. They explain the idea of the zero-knowledge
property of such proofs in a very simple way. Originally, the idea of zero-knowledge
proofs started with the fascinating work presented in [GMR89]. Prior to their work,
the main focus was on the soundness of the proofs, i.e. to deal with a malicious Prover
who attempts to fool the verifier into believing a false proof. In [GMR89], they tried
to deal with malicious verifiers. What happens if we don’t trust the verifier? The
intention was to come up with some convincing proofs of some statements that reveal
nothing beyond the validity of the assertion being proved. It’s this contradictory nature
that makes it appealing to cryptographers and therein lies their importance and vast
applicability in cryptography; one always wanted to make sure that malicious parties
are surely following certain predetermined protocols. Now, those malicious parties are
forced to provide zero-knowledge proofs of the correctness of any internal secret action
that they want to perform during the execution of the protocol, but without revealing
their actual secrets.
Zero-knowledge proofs can be considered as a general class of protocols between
two parties, called the prover P and the verifer V. Trivially, zero-knowledge proofs
should allow a prover to prove to a verifier the validity of a certain assertion (Com-
pleteness). Moreover, prover may not fool a verifier to accept false assertion (Sound-
ness). Both completeness and soundness must hold with high probability. The zero-
knowledgeness property which is the most important property of ZKP assures that the
proof doesn’t reveal anything beyond the validity of such assertion/statement. The
exciting result appears in [GMW91]; they prove that all languages in NP have zero-
knowledge proof systems. Well, it does exist for the three-coloring problem1, which is
in the class NP-complete, and since any NP-problem can be translated into an instance
of that problem, hence the existence of ZKPs for any NP problem.
Loosely speaking, to prove that a proof is zero knowledge we proceed as follows;
we fix a prover P , and we show that whatever an arbitrary feasible adversary, i.e. a
verifier V can compute after his interaction with P on an input (assertion) x, is compu-
tationally indistinguishable from what an arbitrary non-interactive feasible algorithm
1See [ZKP14] for an interactive zero knowledge 3-colorability demonstration.
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can compute on his own given the same input x. The latter is what we call simu-
lation. If one can simulate the interaction with a certain prover, i.e. without having
access to the secret, and yet the result is computationally indistinguishable from the
result of interacting with the prover, we conclude that the interaction doesn’t leak any
extra information beyond the validity of the assertion. In other words, if the verifier
can’t distinguish between the real case (where there is a secret) and simulated case
(there is no secret), then the amount of information that he can extract is the same, and
obviously doesn’t depend on the “secret”, hence the zero-knowledgeness of a proof
system.
Let R = {(x, y) ⊂ X × Y } be an efficiently computable binary relation. For any
pair (x, y) ∈ R, y is called the statement and x is the witness for y. Let LR be the
language consisting of statements in R i.e., LR = {y ∈ Y : ∃x ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ R}
Completeness: A zero-knowledge proof is perfectly complete if all runs between
honest prover and honest verifier are accepting. A zero knowledge protocol is 1-
incomplete if for all (x, y) ∈ R, the interaction between an honest prover and an
honest verifier fails with probability at most 1.
Soundness: A zero-knowledge proof is 2-unsound if an honest verifier accepts an
incorrect input y with probability at most 2. An input y is incorrect if (x, y) /∈ R for
all possible witnesses x.
Zero Knowledge: As defined in [GO94] and [GMR89], an interactive proof sys-
tem for a language LR is zero-knowledge if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time ver-
ifiers1 V ∗, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (simulator) SV ∗ that
on input y produces a probability distribution SV ∗(y) such that {SV ∗(y)}y∈LR and
{< P (y), V ∗(y) >}y∈LR are polynomially indistinguishable. According to [GMR89],
this version of zero-knowledge is often called computational zero-knowledge. The
proof system is called perfect zero-knowledge if the aforementioned distributions are
equal, whereas it’s a statistical zero-knowledge if those distributions are statistically
close.
Simulation Sound Zero Knowledge: Similar to the soundness property of proof
systems, this states that with overwhelming probability, the prover should be incapable
of convincing a polynomially bounded verifier of a false statement even after letting
him see any number of simulated proofs of his choosing.
1Which can be thought of as a nondeterministic Turing Machine (TM) which randomly chooses
between available transitions at each point according to some probability distribution.
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Proofs vs. Arguments In zero-knowledge proof system, the proof remains valid
even if an infinitely-powerful prover is involved [GMR89] whereas in a zero-
knowledge arguments, it is required that only polynomially-bounded provers can-
not cheat (except with negligible probability), given some complexity assumption
[BCC88].
3.8.1 Σ Protocols
A protocol P is said to be a Σ-protocol [Sma13] for a relation R if:
• P is of a 3-move form, which means that the statement should be known to
both prover and verifier ahead, the prover sends the verifier a commitment a,
the verifier responds with a challenge c and then the prover sends his response
z. To better understand the idea, we will give an example on how to prove the
possession of a secret or witness x, for which y = gx is public. The protocol for
a proof of knowledge of x goes as follows:
– P → V : a = gk for a random k,
– V → P : c
– P → V : z = k + c · x (mod q).
The verifier now verifies that the prover knows the secret discrete logarithm
x by verifying that: a = gzy−c.
• Completeness: if P, V follow the protocol on input y and private input x to P
where (x, y) ∈ R, the verifier always accepts.
• Special Soundness: From any y and any pair of accepting conversations on input
y, (a, c1, z1), (a, c2, z2) where c1 6= c2, one can efficiently compute x such that
(x, y) ∈ R. This is sometimes called the special soundness property, which
means it’s indeed a proof of knowledge where the witness can be extracted. In
the previous example, it’s easy to see that the witness would be x = z2−z1
c2−c1 (mod
q).
• Special Honest-Verifier Zero Knowledge: There exists a polynomial-time sim-
ulator S, which on input y and a random c outputs an accepting conversation
of the form (a, c, z), with the same probability distribution as conversations be-
tween the honest P, V on input y. This property is called special honest-verifier
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zero knowledge, HVZK. One can easily see that the verifier doesn’t learn any-
thing as he can simulate the whole transcript as follows:
– Generate a random value c (mod q).
– Compute a = gzy−c
Eventually, he outputs the transcript (a, c, z). Someone cannot tell the simulation
of a transcript from a real transcript, and therefore the order in the interaction is
what matters.1
3.8.2 Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) Proofs
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK), introduced by Blum, Feldman, and Micali
in 1988 [BFM88], is a fundamental cryptographic primitive that has been used im-
plicitly or explicitly in a majority of current cryptosystems. It mainly tries to re-
move the interaction between the prover and the verifier in zero-knowledge proof
systems. Let R be an NP relation on pairs (x, y) with a corresponding language
LR = {y | ∃ x s.t.(x, y) ∈ R}. A NIZK proof system Π for a relation R is a tuple
of algorithms (NIZK.Setup,NIZK.Prove,NIZK.Verify,NIZK.Extract,NIZK.SimSetup,
NIZK.SimProve) defined as follows: NIZK.Setup takes as input a security parameter
λ and outputs a reference string crs and an extraction key xk which allows for wit-
ness extraction. On input (crs, x, y), NIZK.Prove outputs a proof pi if R(x, y) = 1.
On input (crs, y, pi), NIZK.Verify outputs 1 if pi is a valid proof that y ∈ LR, and
0 otherwise. NIZK.Extract outputs the witness x from a valid proof pi. Finally,
NIZK.SimSetup outputs a simulated reference string crssim and a trapdoor tr, which
is used by NIZK.SimProve to simulate proofs without a witness. Below we define the
properties that a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) system can enjoy. Note
that a NIZK system has to be complete, sound and zero knowledge whereas the need
for the other properties depends on the case for which the NIZK is being used:
• Perfect Completeness: ∀λ ∈ N, ∀(x, y) ∈ R, we have
Pr
[
(crs, xk)← Setup(1λ);pi ← Prove(crs, x, y) : Verify(crs, y, pi) = 1] = 1 .
1In other words, a verifier who succeeds in extracting information from a real proof must also be
able to extract information from a simulated one where no information is available in the first place! This
actually leads to a contradiction, and proves that the protocol can’t actually leak sensitive information
in either situation.
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• Soundness: ∀λ ∈ N, ∀y /∈ LR, we have for all adversaries F
Pr
[
(crs, xk)← Setup(1λ); pi ← F(crs, y) : Verify(crs, y, pi) = 1] ≤ 2−λ .
If the above probability is 0, we say the system has perfect soundness.
• Knowledge Extraction: A proof system is a Proof of Knowledge if there exists
an efficient extractor algorithm Extract which can extract the witness from any
proof the adversary outputs. Note that if a proof system is a proof of knowledge
then it is sound. More formally, for all adversaries F, we have
Pr
[
(crs, xk)← Setup(1λ); (y, pi)← F(crs);x← Extract(crs, xk, y, pi)
: Verify(crs, y, pi) = 0 OR (x, y) ∈ R] ≤ 1− ν(λ) .
Where ν(λ) is a negligible function. If the above probability is 1, we say the
system has perfect knowledge extraction.
• Witness Indistinguishability: The system is witness indistinguishable if for all
PPT adversaries F, we have
Pr
 (crs, xk)← Setup(1
λ); (stfind, y, x0, x1)← Ffind(crs);
b← {0, 1}; pi ← Prove(crs, xb, y); b∗ ← Fguess(stfind, pi)




If ν(λ) = 0, we say the system has perfect witness indistinguishability.




(crssim, tr)← SimSetup(1λ) : FSim(crssim,tr,·,·)(crssim) = 1
]
≈ Pr [(crs, xk)← Setup(1λ) : FProve(crs,·,·)(crs) = 1] ,
where Sim(crssim, tr, x, y) outputs SimProve(crssim, tr, y) if (x, y) ∈ R or ⊥ oth-
erwise.
• Simulation-Soundness:1 The system is simulation-sound [Sah99] if the adver-
1Note that in [Sah99, GMY03], they show how to add a strong one time signature scheme to a
57
sary cannot produce a proof for a false statement even after seeing simulated




(crsSim, tr)← SimSetup(1λ); (pi∗, y∗)← FSimProve(crsSim,tr,·)(crsSim)
: (pi∗, y∗) /∈ Q ∧ Verify(crs, y, pi) = 1 ∧ y /∈ L
]
≈ 0
If we limit the number of queries to one, we call the system one-time simulation-
sound.
• Simulation Sound Extractability:1 By combining simulation-soundness and
knowledge extraction, we get Simulation-Sound Extractable Proofs [Gro06].
This requires that we can extract a witness from any proof the adversary outputs
even after seeing simulated proofs. More formally, (here we abuse the notation
and assume that SimSetup now also outputs the extraction key xk), we have for
all PPT adversaries F that
Pr

(crsSim, tr, xk)← SimSetup(1λ);
(y, pi)← FSimProve(crsSim,tr,·)(crs, xk);
x← Extract(crs, xk, y, pi) : (y, pi) /∈ Q ∧ Verify(crs, y, pi) = 1
∧ (x, y) /∈ R
 ≤ ν(λ)
Now, we present two versions of NIZK systems; one in the random oracle model
where the idea is to use a hash function H that works as a random oracle in order to
avoid the interactivity in the proofs. This NIZK system [FS87] is simulation sound
extractable [FKMV12]. The second one is in the standard model that needs a common
reference string between parties but doesn’t use ideal hash functions (random oracle).
This NIZK system [GS08] is not simulation sound extractable [GS08].
3.8.2.1 Fiat-Shamir Heuristic
In [FS87], they give a method to avoid the interactivity in the ZK system, i.e. non-
iteractive ZK arguments. To see how this works in a simple example, we can take
the previous example of possession of a secret discrete logarithm; we can avoid the
regular NIZK system (i.e. it is not simulation sound) to eventually get a simulation-sound NIZK.
1Also called Non-malleability in the literature, note that a non-malleable NIZK is also simulation
sound [GMY03].
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second step, i.e. the verifier sends the challenge to the prover by hashing the value of
the commitment to get c, c← H(a), so the verifier can apply the hash function on the
commitment being sent by the prover in order to get the challenge, and use it later on
in the verification algorithm.
3.8.2.2 GS-proofs
In 2007, Groth and Sahai [GS08] proposed new non-interactive witness indistinguish-
able (WI) and zero knowledge (ZK) proofs based on bilinear maps, for which they gave
three instantiations according to the admitted assumption. While the zero knowledge
property assures that a verifier can’t learn anything about the witness of a statement,
the witness indistinguishablity assures that, in the case that an NP assertion has more
than one witness, if a prover provides a certain proof that uses one of these witnesses,
the verifier can’t tell which witness is being used. It’s clear that zero knowledge-
ness implies witness indistinguishability. The first instantiation is based on the sub-
group decision problem, which is; suppose we have a composite order bilinear group
(n,G, GT , e, P ) where n = pq. Then G = Gp × Gq, where Gp,Gq are the subgroups
of prime order p and q respectively. Boneh, Goh and Nissim introduced the subgroup
decision assumption, which claims that it is hard to distinguish a random element from
G from a random element from Gq. It’s the most efficient instantiation, but it works
with Type-1 bilinear maps 1. The second instantiation is based on the XDH assump-
tion. The Symmetric XDH assumption says that the DDH problem is hard in both G1
and G2. The third instantiation is based on the decisional linear Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem DLIN, which assumes that, given u, v, h ∈ G and ua, vb, hc ∈ G, it’s hard to tell if
c = a + b or it’s a random in Zp. The intuition of this NIZK is the following [GS08];
to prove that z is the encryption of m under the product of the two keys x and y, we
encode it this way; c is the encryption of the value committed to in d under the product
of the two keys committed to in a and b.
Assume that we have the following bilinear maps f : A1 × A2 → A3 and F :
B1 × B2 → B3, and we have a set of simultaneous equations of the following types:
Pairing Product Equation (PPE), Multi-scalar multiplication Equations (MME) in A1
1As we mentioned earlier, Type-1 pairing is not recommended any more because of the fact that
several recent attacks have been realised to solve the discrete logarithm problem DLog in the multi-
plicative finite fields of small characteristic (2 or 3), and the nature of the Elliptic curves used in Type-1
pairings (super singular curves) necessitate the use of such fields.
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(respectively inA2), and Quadratic Equations in Zn. The idea is to construct a witness-
indistinguishable/Zero knowledge proofs for the simultaneous satisfiability of a set of
such equations. In the common reference string that will be provided to the verifier,
a description of the following maps will be given: {ιi : Bi → Ai}i which are the
commitment schemes and {ρi : Ai → Bi}i. The fact that the commitment schemes
are homomorphic will give the following results:
• ∀x ∈ A1,∀y ∈ A2 : F (ι1(x), ι2(y)) = ι3(f(x, y))
• ∀x ∈ B1, ∀y ∈ B2 : f(ρ1(x), ρ2(y)) = ρ3(F (x, y))
There are two settings when it comes to producing the common reference string (crs);
in the first setting, the keys used in ιi are hiding keys, which means that ι is perfectly
hiding (which offers the WI/ZK), whereas in the second setting, the keys used in ι
are binding (which offers witness extractibility). The main idea of GS proofs is the
following: the two settings that offer the soundness and the WI/ZK alternatively, are
computationally indistinguishable based on the assumption that the distributions of the
hiding and the biding keys are computationally indistinguishable.
Syntax and Equations The language for these proofs is of the form
L := {statement st | ∃ witness w : E(st,w) holds }
E(statement, ·) could be one of the three types that we will describe below, where
these equations are defined by the public values {Ai, T ∈ G, ai, bi,Γ = (γij) ∈
Matn×m, t ∈ Zp, tT ∈ GT}, whereas the witness ⊂ {X1, . . . , Xm, Y1, . . . , Yn ∈ G,
x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn ∈ Zp}, which we underline for simplicity.














• Multi-Scalar Multiplication Equation (MSME) in G1:2
1In the NIZK, tT should be either 1 or
n∏
i=1
e(Pi, Qi), for some known Pi, Qi.





























The GS proof system is formally defined by the following tuple of algorithms
GS = ({GSSetup,GSProve,GSVerify,GSExtract}, {GSSimSetup,GSSimProve})
Soundness Setting:
• GSSetup : Takes as input the description of a bilinear group P and outputs a
soundness reference string crs and an extraction key xk.
• GSProve : Takes as input crs, a set of equations statement and a witness, and
outputs a proof Ω for the satisfiability of the equations.
• GSVerify : Given crs, a set of equations and a proof Ω, it outputs 1 if the proof is
valid, and else 0.
• GSExtract : Takes as input a soundness crs, the extraction key xk and a valid
proof Ω, and outputs the witness used for the proof.
Witness indistinguishability /Zero knowledge (WI/ZK) Setting:
• GSSimSetup : On input a bilinear group description P, outputs a simulation
reference string crsSim and a trapdoor key tr that allows us to simulate proofs.
• GSSimProve : Takes crsSim, a statement and the trapdoor tr and produces a sim-
ulated proof ΩSim without a witness.
The main assumption on which GS proofs rely is that the distributions of strings
crs and crsSim are computationally indistinguishable. In other words, the distributions
of the hiding keys and the binding keys of the commitments schemes used respectively
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in the WI/ZK setting and soundness setting are computationally indistinguishable, and
therefore the simulated proofs are indistinguishable from proofs output by GSProve.
The proof system has prefect completeness, perfect soundness, composable
witness-indistinguishability or composable zero-knowledge[GS08] 1.
We will give two examples to clarify the way GS proofs work. The first one is the
following:
Example 3. (As given in [CM14]) Let A,B ∈ G1, and t ∈ GT . We will give a NIWI
proof of knowledge of Y1, Y2 ∈ G2, based on the DLIN assumption, such that:
e(A, Y1) · e(B, Y2) = t
• Setup: Let e : G1 ×G2 → GT
• Common Reference String crs:
– Let H ∈ G2, a, b, i, j ∈ Zp.
– U = aH, V = bH, I = iU, J = jV,K = (i+ j)H
– crs = (U, V, I, J,K)
• Commitments:
– Select s11, s12, s13, s21, s22, s23 ∈ Zp
– Compute:
d11 = s11U + s13I,
d12 = s12V + s13J,
d13 = Y1 + s11H + s12H + s13K,
d21 = s21U + s23I,
d22 = s22V + s23J,
d23 = Y2 + s21H + s22H + s23K
1As defined in [GS08], In composable zero-knowledge, the real crs and the simulated crsSim are
computationally indistinguishable. Moreover, the adversary, given access to the secret simulation key tr
, still cannot distinguish real proofs from simulated proofs on a simulated crsSim, (See [GS08] for more
details).
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– The commitment is: d = (d11, d12, d13, d21, d22, d23).
• Proof:
– Compute
θ1 = s11A+ s21B
θ2 = s12A+ s22B
θ3 = s13A+ s23B
– The proof is θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3).
• Verification
Check that:
– θ1, θ2, θ3 ∈ G1, d11, d12, d13, d21, d22, d23 ∈ G2,
– e(A, d11) · e(B, d21) = e(θ1, U) · e(θ3, I)
– e(A, d12) · e(B, d22) = e(θ2, V ) · e(θ3, J)
– e(A, d13) · e(B, d23) = e(θ1, H) · e(θ2, H) · e(θ3, K) · t
Example 4. The second example is the following. The equation is
PPE(X, Y ) : e(A, Y ) · e(X,B) · e(X, Y ) = 1 (3.1)
determined by A ∈ G1, B ∈ G2. The prover needs to show that he knows of witnesses
X and Y that they satisfy the equation PPE. We chose the RHS of the equation to be
one so that it’s possible to give a NIZK according to the restrictions that Groth-Sahai
have for the PPE equations. Roughly speaking, the prover will commit to the witnesses
and give them away, along with some extra information (proofs) so that the verifier
can check on the satisfiability of larger version of the equation PPE. Analogously to
the pairing e, we define another bilinear map E that is suitable for the commitments:
Let E : G21 ×G22 → G4T , with
E1 ((λ1, λ2) , (ω1, ω2)) =
(
e(λ1, ω1) e(λ1, ω2)
e(λ2, ω1) e(λ2, ω2)
)
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We can extendE so it can deal with vectors of pairs of group elements. The generalized
form is Em : Gm×21 × Gm×22 → G4T . In this sense, E can be viewed as a special case













e(λ11, ω11) · e(λ21, ω21) e(λ11, ω12) · e(λ21, ω22)
e(λ12, ω11) · e(λ22, ω21) e(λ12, ω12) · e(λ22, ω22)
)
Since we are going to use the second instantiation of the GS proofs, which is based on
the SXDH assumption (it states that DDH is hard in both groups G1 and G2 ), we will
define the commitment scheme that they use in this instantiation along with the maps






. For the commitment scheme, we choose α1, α2, t1, t2 ← Zp so that
the commitment keys (ck) are { ~u1, ~u2} for the group elements inG1 and {~v1, ~v2} forG2
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to the GS paper, let ρ1 = r1 + t1r2, ρ2 = s1 + t2s2, R = (r1, r2) ← Zp and S =
(s1, s2)← Zp, then we commit to X and Y as follows:
• c = Commit(ck,X,R) = (gr11 gt1r21 , Xgα1r11 gα1t1r21 ) = (gρ11 , Xgα1ρ11 ).
• d = Commit(ck, Y, S) = (gs12 gt2s22 , Y gα2s12 gα2t2s22 ) = (gρ22 , Y gα2ρ22 ).
Based on equation 3.1, we will write another equation where the verifier is able to ver-
ify that the commitments to the witnesses of equation 3.1 satisfy it. The new equation
is1











. For the verifier to be able to check on the
satisfaction of equation 3.2, the prover still needs to compute φ and θ to send them
along with the commitments, knowing that the maps ι1, ι2 and ιT are parts of the
public parameters.
1 denotes component-wise multiplication
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φ and θ. The two parts of the proof, φ and θ can be written as follows:1
• φ = R>ι2(B) +R>Γι2(Y ) + (R>ΓS − T>)~V .
• θ = S>ι1(A) + S>Γ>ι1(X) + T ~U .
In our example, Γ = 1. Note that, originally in the GS paper they used addition as
the group law since we usually work over groups of points on elliptic curves, but for












































Verification On input (G1,G2,GT , e, ι1, ι2, ιT , ~U, ~V , φ, θ, c, d) the verifier should be
able to check on the satisfaction of equation 3.2 by simply evaluating E1 and E2 on
both sides where their inputs are all given.
1Usually, two extra terms are added to φ and θ that are −T>~V and T ~U where T ← Mat2×2(Zp)
but they always cancel each other, so we can safely omit them in the computation.
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For the LHS of equation (3.2):
E1(ι1(A), d) E1(c, ι2(B) E1(c, d)
= E1((0, A), (gρ22 , Y g
α2ρ2
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For the RHS of the equation (3.2):
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One can easily see that the first three elements of the matrices in the LHS and RHS
match, and that LHS2,2/RHS2,2 = PPE(X, Y ) which is equal to 1 as per our example.
Therefore, equation (3.2) verifies correctly.
3.9 Multilinear Maps
A more general version of the bilinear maps, i.e multilinear Maps, has been consid-
ered one of the open problems for almost a decade. Finding useful multilinear maps
was considered by Boneh and Silverberg (in 2002 [BS02]) as an almost impossible
mission within the realm of algebraic geometry (Where they also showed how helpful
multilinear maps could be to Broadcast Encryption). Surprisingly, Grag, Gentry, and
Halvei, using ideal lattices, announced a promising achievement by finding something
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that is morally equivalent to multilinear maps, i.e instead of having a function
eˆ : G1 ×G2 × · · · ×Gn → GT ,
they define a set of bilinear maps as follows;
E = {ei,j; ei,j : Gi ×Gj → Gi+j|i, j ≥ 1, i+ j ≤ k}







i+j : ∀a, b ∈ Zp
Despite the intensive cryptanalysis that the authors have done in their paper, they them-
selves mentioned that the development and cryptanalysis of this tool are still at a
nascent stage. Nevertheless, this result is an exciting opportunity to study new con-
structions using the Multilinear maps abstraction. Subsequent to their paper, another
practical Multilinear scheme, this time over integers, has been built by Coron, Lepoint
and Tibouchi [CLT13]. Note that this scheme showed serious vulnerabilities against
Zeroizing Attack as presented in [CHL+14]. The attack relies on an adaptation of
the zeroizing attack against the Garg, Gentry and Halevi (GGH) candidate multilinear
maps [GGH13a]. Some countermeasures have been introduced to mitigate against this
attack [BWZ14], but as shown in [CLT14], the attack seems, so far, to stay valid albeit
the adoption of those countermeasures.
In a nutshell, here are the two constructions:
• The first construction [GGH13a]:
It works in the polynomial ring R = Z[X]/(Xn + 1), where n is large enough
for security reasons. One can generate a secret short ring element g ∈ R, in
order to generate a principal ideal I = 〈g〉 ⊂ R. One should also generate an
integer parameter q and another random secret z ∈ R/qR.
Encoding: One encodes elements of the quotient ring R/I, namely elements of
the form e+ I for some e, as follows: a level-i encoding of the coset e+ I is an
element of the form ui = [c/zi]q, where c ∈ e+I is short. Such encodings can be
both added and multiplied, as long as the norm of the numerators remain shorter
than q; in particular the product of k encodings at level 1 gives an encoding at
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level k.
• The second construction [CLT13]:
One first generates n secret primes pi and publishes x0 =
∏n
i=1 pi (where n
is large enough to ensure correctness and security); one also generates n small
secret primes gi, and a random secret integer z modulo x0. A level-k encoding
of a vector m = (mi) ∈ Zn is then an integer c such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
c =
ri · gi +mi
zk
(mod pi)
for some small random integers ri; the integer c is therefore defined modulo
x0 by CRT. It is clear that such encodings can be both added and multiplied
modulo x0, as long as the numerators remain smaller than the pi’s. In particular
the product of k encodings cj at level 1 gives an encoding at level k where the
corresponding vectors mj are multiplied component wise.
Comparison between the two schemes: The second scheme was considered (before
the aforementioned attack!) to be more practical, and could fit more easily with other
existing cryptographic tools since it preserves some of the cryptographic assumptions
that didn’t hold with the first scheme, e.g. DLIN and subgroup decision. Those as-
sumptions are believed necessary to adapt constructions of modules like adaptively se-
cure functional encryption and NIZK, therefore the second construction seemed more
promising for applications than the first one. The multilinear maps topic is currently
considered one of the hot cryptographic topics, so one should expect more schemes
and cryptanalysis are yet to appear.
3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we outlined existing results that we shall be building on in our own
work. We defined the Discrete Logarithm problem (DLog), and discussed its hard-
ness level in different types of groups. Furthermore, we gave an introduction to the
Dlog family, i.e. other hardness assumptions that can be reduced to Dlog. We then
went straight to the type of groups that interests us the most, i.e. group of points
on a suitable elliptic curve. In order to do so, we first gave some useful definitions
69
about elliptic curves, then defined a very interesting tool in cryptography, i.e. pair-
ings, and back again to elliptic curves to define what we meant by suitable elliptic
curves, where we defined pairing-friendly elliptic curves. Some more assumptions of
the Dlog family were also presented, but getting pairings involved in them this time.
To relate Dlog family members together, we gave a diagram of reductions. Yet another
powerful mathematical/cryptographic tool which we rely on in the rest of the thesis,
namely, Zero-Knowledge proofs, was presented in this chapter. We defined their two
main instantiations, i.e. Fiat-Shamir heuristic and Groth-Sahai proofs. At the end, we






In this chapter, we give a general framework for decentralized traceable attribute based
signatures DTABS [EKGK14, EKGK13]. This work is a joint work with Essam
Ghadafi (Bristol University) and Dalia Khader (Luxembourg University). In this work,
we present the first general framework that covers such important features all together
i.e. decentralisation and traceability. Moreover, we will give a generic construction
of a DTABS scheme that is secure as long as the underlying cryptographic modules
are secure. All the security proofs rely on the security properties that these modules
enjoy, but not on any specific scheme. That would allow us to instantiate our DTABS
using the most efficient and up-to-date concrete modules. Furthermore, this allows for
future improvements whenever more efficient concrete versions of the needed modules
appear.
DTABS main contribution
• Formal security model: We define a formal security model for decentralized
traceable attribute-based signatures.
• Decentralization: Our focus is on the more realistic setting where there
are multiple attribute authorities that are responsible for distributing the at-
tributes/credentials to the users, and hence the word Decentralized.
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• Traceability: This is a very important security requirement when it comes to
real life applications; anonymity is a good feature that ABS usually offer, but it
should be controlled in the sense that it cannot be used in a bad way, e.g. framing
users, misuse/abuse cases. To solve this problem, we add two entities to the ABS
scheme, the first is the Opener who will be called to open the signatures that are
in question in order to repeal the anonymity and therefore tell who has produced
these signatures. Moreover, we have a Judge who has no secret keys, and yet
he is able to tell whether or not the opener has correctly opened the signature,
thanks to the NIZK tool.
• Generic construction for DTABS: We give a security model for DTABS based
on the security of the modules needed to realise it, so anyone can actually in-
stantiate the DTABS using different modules as long as they satisfy the security
requirements stated in the generic construction.
• Instantiations: Moreover, we present two example instantiations of the generic
construction and provide the first construction not relying on idealized assump-
tions. Our constructions meet strong security requirements and permit expres-
sive signing policies.
4.2 Syntax and Security Definitions of DTABS
4.2.1 Syntax of DTABS
The parties involved in a DTABS scheme are: κ attribute authorities each with a unique
identity aid and a pair of secret/verification keys (aaskaid, aavkaid); a tracing authority
T which possesses a secret tracing key tk that can be used to trace the identity of the
signer of a given signature; a set of signers each with a unique identity id and a set of
attributesA ⊆ A, where A is the universe of all possible attributes. An attribute can be
uniquely identified by concatenating the identity of the managing attribute authority
with the name of the attribute itself. A DTABS scheme is a tuple of polynomial-time
algorithms
DTABS = (Setup,AuthSetup,KeyGen, Sign,Verify,Trace, Judge)·
The syntax of the algorithms is defined below; where to aid notation all algorithms
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bar Setup and AuthSetup are assumed to take as implicit input the public parameters
pp output by algorithm Setup.
• Setup(1λ) is run by some trusted third party. It takes as input a security parame-
ter 1λ and outputs public parameters pp and the tracing key tk. We assume that
pp contains the attribute universe A.
• AuthSetup(pp, aid) used by attribute authority Authaid to generate its key pair
(aaskaid, aavkaid). The attribute authority publishes its public verification key
aavkaid.
• KeyGen(aaskaid, id, a) takes as input an attribute authority’s secret key aaskaid, a
signer’s identity id and an attribute a ∈ A that signer id possesses and generates
a secret key skid,a for attribute a for the signer. The key skid,a is given to id.
The attribute authority may locally maintain a list of signers for which it ran the
KeyGen algorithm.
• Sign({aavkaid(a)}a∈A, {skid,a}a∈A,m,Ψ) Signer id who possesses a set of at-
tributesA ⊆ A uses this algorithm to produce a signature on m w.r.t. the signing
policy Ψ where Ψ(A) = 1. The algorithm takes as input an ordered list of at-
tribute authorities’ verification keys {aavkaid(a)}a∈A, an ordered list of attributes’
secret keys {skid,a}a∈A, a message m and a signing predicate Ψ, and outputs a
signature σ. Here aid(a) denotes the identity of the attribute authority managing
attribute a ∈ A.
• Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ) is a deterministic algorithm which takes as in-
put an ordered list of attribute authorities’ verification keys {aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ, a
message m, a signature σ and a signing predicate Ψ, and outputs 1 if σ is valid
on m w.r.t. the signing predicate Ψ or 0 otherwise.
• Trace(tk,m, σ,Ψ) is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input T’s key tk,
a message m, a signature σ and a signing predicate Ψ, and outputs the identity
id of the signer plus a proof pi attesting to this claim. If the algorithm is unable
to trace the signature to a signer, it returns the special symbol ⊥. Note that if
the tracing authority additionally gets a read-only access to the local registration
tables maintained by the attribute authorities (whose identities can be inferred
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from the signing policy Ψ), then the tracing authority could additionally check
whether or not id has run the KeyGen algorithm.
• Judge({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ, id, pi) is a deterministic algorithm which takes
as input an ordered list of attribute authorities’ verification keys {aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,
a message m, a signature σ, a signing predicate Ψ, a signer identity id, and a
tracing proof pi, and outputs 1 if pi is a valid proof that id has produced σ or 0
otherwise.
4.2.2 Security Definitions
The security properties required from a DTABS scheme are: correctness, anonymity,
full unforgeability, and traceability. In defining those requirements we use a set of
experiments in which the adversary has access to a set of oracles. The following global
lists are maintained: HSL is a list of honest signers’ attributes and has entries of the
form (id, a); HAL is a list of honest attribute authorities; BSL is a list of bad signers’
attributes whose secret keys have been revealed to the adversary with entries of the
form (id, a); BAL is a list of bad attribute authorities whose secret keys have been
learned by the adversary; CAL is a list of corrupt attribute authorities whose keys have
been chosen by the adversary; SL is a list of signatures obtained from the Sign oracle;
CL is a list of challenge signatures obtained from the challenge oracle and is used only
in the anonymity game.
The details of the following oracles are given in Fig. 4-1.
• AddS(id,A) is used to add honest attributesA ⊆ A for signer id. It can be called
multiple times to add more attributes.
• AddA(aid) is used to add an honest attribute authority with identity aid.
• CrptA(aid, vk) is used to create a corrupt attribute authority whose secret key is
chosen by the adversary.
• RevealS(id,A) is used to obtain the secret keys {skid,a}a∈A corresponding to the
subset of attributes A ⊆ A owned by signer id. It can be called multiple times.




• If ∃a ∈ A s.t. (id, a) ∈ HSL Then Return ⊥.
• For each a ∈ A Do
– If aid(a) /∈ HAL Then
∗ If aid(a) ∈ CAL Then Return ⊥.
∗ AddA(aid(a)).
– If aaskaid(a) = ⊥ Then Return ⊥.
– skid,a ← KeyGen(aaskaid(a), id, a).
• HSL := HSL ∪ {(id, a)}a∈A.
AddA(aid)
• If aid ∈ HAL ∪ CAL Then Return ⊥.
• (aaskaid, aavkaid)← AuthSetup(pp, aid).
• HAL := HAL ∪ {aid}.
Sign(id,A,m,Ψ)
• If ∃a ∈ A s.t. (id, a) /∈ HSL Then Return ⊥.
• If Ψ(A) 6= 1 or ∃a ∈ A s.t. skid,a =⊥ Then
Return ⊥.
• σ ← Sign({aavkaid(a)}a∈A, {skid,a}a∈A,m,Ψ).
• SL := SL ∪ {(id,A,m, σ,Ψ)}.
• Return σ.
Trace(m,σ,Ψ)
• If Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ) = 0 Then
Return ⊥.
• If (m,σ,Ψ) ∈ CL Then Return ⊥.
• Return Trace(tk,m, σ,Ψ).
CHb((id0,A0), (id1,A1),m,Ψ)
• If Ψ(A0) 6= 1 or Ψ(A1) 6= 1 Then Return ⊥.
• For i=0 To 1 Do
– For each a ∈ Ai s.t. (idi, a) /∈ HSL DO
∗ If AddS(idi, a) =⊥ Then Return ⊥.
– If ∃a ∈ Ai s.t. skidi,a =⊥ Then Return ⊥.
• σ ← Sign({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ab , {skidb,a}a∈Ab ,
m,Ψ).
• CL = CL ∪ {(m,σ,Ψ)}.
• Return σ.
RevealA(aid)
• If aid /∈ HAL \ (CAL ∪ BAL) Then Return ⊥.
• BAL := BAL ∪ {aid}.
• Return aaskaid.
CrptA(aid, vk)
• If aid ∈ HAL ∪ CAL Then Return ⊥.
• CAL := CAL ∪ {aid}.
RevealS(id,A)
• If ∃a ∈ A s.t. (id, a) /∈ HSL \ BSL Then Re-
turn ⊥.
• BSL := BSL ∪ {(id, a)}a∈A.
• Return {skid,a}a∈A.
Figure 4-1: Oracles used in the security games for DTABS
• Sign(id,A,m,Ψ) is used to obtain a signature σ on messagem by signer id using
{skid,a}a∈A where Ψ(A) = 1.
• CHb((id0,A0), (id1,A1),m,Ψ) is a left-right oracle for defining anonymity and
is only called once. The adversary sends a couple of identities (id0,A0),
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(id1,A1), a message m and a signing policy Ψ. If Ψ(A0) = Ψ(A1) = 1, the
oracle returns a signature on m using {skidb,a}a∈Ab for b← {0, 1}.
• Trace(m,σ,Ψ) allows the adversary to ask for signatures to be traced.
The security requirements are defined by the games in Figs. 4-2 and 4-3.
ExperimentExpTraceDTABS,F(λ)
• (pp, tk)← Setup(1λ).
• CAL,HSL,HAL,BSL,BAL,SL := ∅.
• (m∗, σ∗,Ψ∗)← F (pp, tk : AddS(·, ·),AddA(·),RevealS(·, ·),Sign(·, ·, ·, ·)).
• If Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ∗ ,m∗, σ∗,Ψ∗) = 0 Then Return 0.
• (id∗, pi)← Trace(tk,m∗, σ∗,Ψ∗).
• If id∗ =⊥ Then Return 1.
• If Judge({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ∗ ,m∗, σ∗,Ψ∗, id∗, pi) = 0 Then Return 1.
• If (id, ·) ∈ HSL Then Return 0.
• Return 1.
Figure 4-2: Security experiments for DTABS-1
Correctness. This demands that signatures produced by honest signers are accepted by
the Verify algorithm and trace to the signer who produced them. Moreover, the Judge
algorithm accepts the proof produced by the Trace algorithm. Formally, a DTABS




Anonymity. This requires that a signature reveals neither the identity of the signer nor
the set of attributes used in the signing. This is a stronger notion than what is used in
other settings, e.g. [Kha07, LK08], which only require that the identity of the signer
remains anonymous. Thus, our definition ensures that a signature does not reveal more
information other than what can be already inferred from the signing predicate itself.
In the game, the adversary chooses a message, a signing policy and two signers
with two, possibly different, sets of attributes with the condition that both sets have to
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satisfy the signing policy. The adversary gets a signature by either signer and wins if
it correctly guesses the signer.
Our model provides the adversary with strong capabilities, for instance, it can fully
corrupt the attribute authorities and can ask for signers’ secret keys to be revealed
including the two signers it chooses for the challenge (and thus capturing full-key
exposure attacks). Note that since the adversary can sign on behalf of any signer, it is
redundant to provide the adversary with a sign oracle. The only restriction we impose
on the adversary is that it may not query the Trace oracle on the challenge signature.
In CPA-anonymity [BBS04], the adversary is not given access to the Trace oracle.
On the contrary, in CCA-anonymity [Men05], the adversary can ask Trace queries at
any stage of the game on any signature except the challenge signature. One can also
consider a weaker non-adaptive variant of CCA-anonymity where the adversary can
only ask Trace queries before it sees the challenge signature.
Also, our definition captures unlinkability because the adversary has access to all
signers’ secret keys and hence can produce signatures on behalf of any signer.
Formally, a DTABS scheme is anonymous if for all λ ∈ N, all PPT adversaries F
have a negligible advantage
AdvAnonDTABS,F(λ) =
∣∣Pr[ExpAnon-0DTABS,F(λ) = 1]− Pr[ExpAnon-1DTABS,F(λ) = 1]∣∣
Full Unforgeability. This requirement captures unforgeability scenarios where the
forgery opens to a particular signer. It ensures that even if signers collude and combine
their attributes together, they cannot forge a signature that opens to a signer whose
attributes do not satisfy the signing predicate. It also covers non-frameability and
ensures that even if signers collude, they cannot frame a user who did not produce the
signature.
Unlike the single attribute authority setting, here we allow the adversary to adap-
tively create corrupt attribute authorities and learn some of the honest authorities’ se-
cret keys as long as there is at least a single honest attribute authority managing one
of the attributes required for satisfying the policy used in the forgery. In addition, we
allow the adversary to fully corrupt the tracing authority.
Our definition is adaptive and allows the adversary to adaptively choose the pred-
icate and the message on which it wants to produce the forgery rather than having to
select the predicate at the start of the game. Also, note that we consider the stronger
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form of unforgeability, i.e. strong unforgeability where the adversary wins even if it
manages to produce a new signature on a message/predicate pair that was queried to
the sign oracle. We refer to this stronger definition as Strong Full Unforgeability and
use the abbreviation SFU for short. The definition can, in a straightforward manner,
be adapted to work for the weaker variant used in, e.g. [Men05, MPR11, EHM11],
by requiring that the forgery is not on a message/predicate pair that was queried to
the sign oracle. For the latter variant which we refer to as Weak Full Unforgeabil-
ity (WFU), we just need to replace the check ∃(id∗, ·,m∗,Ψ∗, σ∗) ∈ SL by the check
∃(id∗, ·,m∗,Ψ∗, ·) ∈ SL.
Formally, a DTABS scheme is fully unforgeable if for all λ ∈ N, all PPT adver-




Traceability. This requirement ensures that the adversary cannot produce a signature
that traces to a signer who did not run the honest KeyGen algorithm. Thus, it covers
unforgeability scenarios where the forgery is untraceable. In the game, the adversary
is allowed to corrupt the tracing authority and ask for the signing keys of any signer
to be revealed. However, unlike in the full unforgeability game, we require that all
the attribute authorities are honest as knowing a secret key of any attribute authority
makes it easy to create signatures by dummy signers which are thus untraceable.
Formally, a DTABS scheme is traceable if for all λ ∈ N, all PPT adversaries F




Comparison with Escala et al. Model [EHM11] for the Single Attribute Authority
Setting
Specializing our model to the single attribute authority setting, we get a stronger
model than the one in [EHM11]. In particular, our model avoids some of the short-
comings inherent to [EHM11] which we now explain. When defining non-frameability
in [EHM11], the sign oracle used by [EHM11] does not consider the identity of the
signer and hence it does not capture the following scenario: the adversary asks for two
different signers id1 with attributes A1 and id2 with attributes A2 to be added. It then
78
asks for a signature on the message m w.r.t. the signing policy Ψ by signer id1 (where
Ψ(A1) = 1), and outputs as its forgery a signature σ∗ on the same message m w.r.t. the
same signing policy Ψ but the signature opens to id2 (assume here that Ψ(A2) = 1).
Therefore, we believe that in this context, where traceability is required, it is im-
portant that the identity of the signer is taken into account when answering signing
queries. Otherwise, some of the unforgeability scenarios are not captured. This is,
of course, different from standard attribute-based signatures where traceability is not
required and thus there is no way for the adversary to learn who produced a particular
signature.
In addition, our full unforgeability definition protects against a fully corrupt tracing
authority which is stronger than the non-frameability definition in [EHM11] which
only considers a partially but not fully corrupt tracing authority.
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ExperimentExpCorrDTABS,F(λ)
• (pp, tk)← Setup(1λ).
• HSL := ∅.
• (id,A,m,Ψ)← F(pp : AddS(·, ·),AddA(·)).
• If Ψ(A) 6= 1 or A 6⊆ A Then Return 0.
• If ∃a ∈ A s.t. (id, a) /∈ HSL or skid,a =⊥ or aid(a) /∈ HAL Then Return 0.
• σ ← Sign({aavkaid(a)}a∈A, {skid,a}a∈A,m,Ψ).
• If Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ) = 0 Then Return 1.
• (id′, pi)← Trace(tk,m, σ,Ψ).
• If id′ 6= id Then Return 1.
• If Judge({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ, id, pi) = 0 Then Return 1.
• Return 0.
ExperimentExpAnon-bDTABS,F(λ)
• (pp, tk)← Setup(1λ).
• CAL,HSL,HAL,BSL,BAL,CL := ∅.
• b∗ ← F (pp : AddS(),AddA(),CrptA(),RevealS(),RevealA(),CHb(),Trace()).
• Return b∗.
ExperimentExpF-UnforgeDTABS,F(λ)
• (pp, tk)← Setup(1λ).
• CAL,HSL,HAL,BSL,BAL,SL := ∅.
• (m∗, σ∗,Ψ∗, id∗, pi∗)← F (pp, tk : AddS(),AddA(),CrptA(),RevealS(),RevealA(),Sign()).
• If Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ∗ ,m∗, σ∗,Ψ∗) = 0 Then Return 0.
• If Judge({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ∗ ,m∗, σ∗,Ψ∗, id∗, pi∗) = 0 Then Return 0.
• Let Aid∗ be the set of attributes owned by id∗ and managed by dishonest (i.e. ∈ CAL ∪ BAL)
attribute authorities.
• If ∃A s.t. {(id∗, a)}a∈A ⊆ BSL and Ψ∗(A ∪Aid∗) = 1 Then Return 0.
• If ∃(id∗, ·,m∗, σ∗,Ψ∗) ∈ SL Then Return 0.
• Return 1.
Figure 4-3: Security experiments for DTABS-2
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4.3 Modules needed to Construct DTABS
In this section we present the building blocks that we use in our constructions.
4.3.1 Tagged Signature Scheme
We define here a new variant of a signature scheme which we call a Tagged Signature
(TS) scheme1. A tagged signature scheme for a message space MTS and a tag space
TTS is a tuple of algorithms
TS = (Setup,KeyGen, Sign,Verify)
• Setup(1λ) this optional algorithm takes as input a security parameter and out-
puts common public parameters param which is an implicit input to the rest of
algorithms.
• KeyGen({param|1λ}) takes as input either public parameters (if the scheme re-
quires a setup) or just the security parameter (if no setup is required) and outputs
a pair of secret/verification keys (sk, vk).
• Sign(sk, τ,m) takes as input a secret key sk, a tag τ ∈ TTS and a message m ∈
MTS, and outputs a signature σ.
• Verify(vk, τ,m, σ) outputs 1 if σ is a signature on τ and m w.r.t. the verification
key vk.
The security of a tagged signature scheme is similar to that of a traditional digital
signature and consists of correctness and unforgeability:
• Correctness: Requires that for all m ∈ MTS, τ ∈ TTS and (sk, vk) output by
KeyGen, we have Verify(vk, τ,m, Sign(sk, τ,m)) = 1.
• (Existential) Unforgeability: Unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message-
tag attack requires that any PPT adversary F that is given a sign oracle
Sign(sk, ·, ·) has a negligible advantage in winning the following game:
– A key pair (sk, vk) is generated and vk is sent to F.
1A variant of this primitive has been used by [ACHO13] in the context of one-time signatures which
they call tagged one-time signatures.
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– F makes a polynomial number of queries to Sign(sk, ·, ·).
– Eventually, F halts by outputting a tuple (σ∗, τ ∗,m∗) and wins if σ∗ is valid
on (τ ∗,m∗) and (τ ∗,m∗) was never queried to Sign.
We note here that any signature scheme that can sign a pair of messages can be
used as a tagged signature scheme. However, to allow for generality and explicitly
distinguish the tag space from the message space (and hence care for the case where
they might be distinct), we define this notion. Note that one can always use a collision-
resistant hash function to map the tag into the message space.
Defining this as a new notion also serves to simplify the description of our con-
structions and security proofs. In particular, later in the constructions we need to hide
the tag, whereas the message remains public and hence just signing the hash of the
combination of the tag and the message using a standard digital signature would be
problematic.
Instantiation 1. To construct a tagged signature, we use a variant of the automor-
phic scheme from [Fuc09] which was given in [Fuc11]. The original scheme given in
[Fuc11] was given in the asymmetric bilinear group setting. For simplicity, the variant
we give here is in the symmetric setting. The tag space of the tagged signature scheme
is Diffie–Hellman tuples DH where DH = {(Ga, G′a) ∈ G2|a ∈ Zp}, whereas the
message space is Zp. The scheme is unforgeable under the q-ADHSDH and WFCDH
assumptions in the symmetric setting (and the q-ADHSDH and AWFCDH assump-
tions in the asymmetric setting) (cf. Section 4.3.6). Our tagged signature construction
is as follows:
• TS.Setup(1λ): Let P = (G,GT , p, G, e) be the description of Type-1 bilinear
groups. Choose F,K, T,G′, L← G and return param = (P, F,K, T, L,G′).
• TS.KeyGen(param): Choose x ← Zp and set (X,X ′) = (Gx, G′x). Set sk = x
and vk = (X,X ′).
• TS.Sign(sk, (τ, τ ′),m): Reject if (τ, τ ′) /∈ DH (i.e. e(τ,G′) 6= e(G, τ ′)). Oth-
erwise, choose u, v ← Zp and compute σ =
(
U = Gu, U ′ = G′u, V =
F v, V ′ = G′v, W = (K · T u · τ · Lm) 1x+v
)
.
• TS.Verify(vk, (τ, τ ′),m, σ): Check that:
– e(U,G′) = e(G,U ′),
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– e(V,G′) = e(F, V ′),
– e(W,X ′ · V ′) = e(T, U ′)e(K · τ · Lm, G′), and output 1 or 0 accordingly.
Instantiation 2. In [CM14], they provide an efficient randomizable structure preserv-
ing signature scheme in type-3 pairings setting that is superior to its counterpart in the
type-2 setting as presented in [AGOT14]. The original scheme in [AGOT14] can sign
a vector of messages {M1, · · · ,Mn}. We will use the case where n = 2 in order to
sign a couple of messages, i.e. (τ,M).
• TS.Setup(1λ): Let P = (G1,G2,GT , p, G, I, e) be the description of Type-3
bilinear groups. G and I are fixed generators of G1 and G2.
• TS.KeyGen(P): Choose u, v, w ← Zp and set (U, V,W ) = (Gu, Gv, Gw). Set
sk = (u, v, w) and vk = (U, V,W ).




Ir, S = τuM vIr
2+w. The signature is σ = (R1, R2, S)
• TS.Verify(vk, (τ,M), σ): Check that;
– R1 ∈ G1 and τ,M,R2, S ∈ G2
– e(R1, I) = e(G,R2)
– e(G,S) = e(U, τ) · e(V,M) · e(R1, R2) · e(W, I)
Output 1 or 0 accordingly.
4.3.2 The Full Boneh-Boyen (FBB) Signature Scheme
In [BB04a], the authors gave a signature scheme that is secure under the q-SDH as-
sumption (cf. Section 4.3.6). The signature scheme can be instantiated in both the
symmetric and asymmetric bilinear group settings. Let P = (G,GT , p, G, e) be the
description of a bilinear group. The scheme is as follows; where to aid notation all
algorithms bar KeyGen are assumed to take as implicit input P:
• KeyGen(P): Choose x, y ← Zp and set (X, Y ) = (Gx, Gy). Set sk = (x, y) and
vk = (X, Y ).
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• Sign(sk,m): To sign m ∈ Zp, choose r ← Zp such that x + r · y + m 6= 0 and
compute the signature σ = G
1
x+r·y+m .
• Verify(vk,m, σ): Output 1 if e(σ,X · Y r ·Gm) = e(G,G) and 0 otherwise.
4.3.3 Strongly Unforgeable One-Time Signatures
A digital signature scheme is called one-time signature if in the unforgeability game,
the adversary is restricted to a single signing query. Strong Unforgeability as opposed
to weak unforgeability requires that the adversary cannot even forge a new signature on
a message that she obtained a signature on from the signing oracle. We will instantiate
the one-time signature using the Full Boneh-Boyen signature scheme from Section
4.3.2.
4.3.4 Groth-Sahai Proofs.
Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs [GS12] are efficient non-interactive proofs in the Common
Reference String (CRS) model. The GS system can be instantiated under different
intractability assumptions with the SXDH-based instantiation (see section 4.3.6) being
the most efficient [GSW10].
4.3.5 Tag-Based Encryption
A Tag-based Public-Key Encryption (TPKE) scheme [MRY04] is similar to a public-
key encryption scheme with the only difference being that both Enc and Dec algorithms
take as an additional input a tag t.
More formally, a TPKE scheme for a message spaceMTPKE and a tag space TTPKE
is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms
TPKE = (KeyGen,Enc,Dec, IsValid),
where the algorithms are defined as follows:









• (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ).
• (m0,m1, stfind)← Ffind
(
stinit, pk : Dec
t∗(sk, ·, ·)
)
, where |m0| = |m1|.
• Ctbe,b ← Enc(pk, t∗,mb).
• b∗ ← Fguess
(








Figure 4-4: ST-WIND-CCA security game for TPKE
• Enc(pk, t,m): Takes as input the public key pk, a tag t ∈ TTPKE and a message
m ∈MTPKE, and outputs a ciphertext Ctbe.
• Dec(sk, t, Ctbe): Takes as input the secret key sk, a tag t ∈ TTPKE and a ciphertext
Ctbe, and outputs a message m or the reject symbol ⊥.
• IsValid(pk, t, Ctbe): This is an optional algorithm and is used to check whether
a ciphertext is valid under the tag t w.r.t. the public key pk. It returns 1 or 0
accordingly.
Besides the usual correctness requirement, we require selective-tag weak indis-
tinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (ST-WIND-CCA), which is
defined by the game in Fig. 4-4.
We say the scheme is ST-WIND-CCA secure if for all λ ∈ N, all polynomial-time
adversaries F have a negligible advantage
AdvST-WIND-CCATPKE,F (λ) =
∣∣Pr[ExpST-WIND-CCA-0TPKE,F (λ) = 1]− Pr[ExpST-WIND-CCA-1TPKE,F (λ) = 1]∣∣
Kiltz [Kil06] showed how to combine a ST-WIND-CCA secure TPKE scheme with
a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme to obtain an IND-CCA2 secure PKE
scheme. In the transformation the one-time signature verification key is used as a tag
for the TPKE scheme and then the tag-based ciphertextCtbe is signed with the one-time
signature secret signing key.
85
Instantiation of ST-WIND-CCA Tag-Based Encryption. We use the selective-tag
weakly secure CCA tag-based encryption scheme by Kiltz [Kil06] which is secure
under the DLIN assumption. The scheme is in Fig. 4-5.
In [Kak10], it was shown that the tag-based scheme in Fig. 4-5 can be translated
into both (type-2 & type-3) asymmetric bilinear group settings. The security of the
scheme in the type-3 setting relies on a variant of the DLIN assumption called the
SDLIN assumption, in which the last element in the input tuple is provided in both
groups. However, the security of this variant requires that the message space is poly-
nomial in the security parameter so that we can efficiently search when decrypting.
• TPKE.KeyGen(1λ)
– (G, p)← GrpSetup(1λ).
– K,L← G; f, h← Zp.
– F = Gf , H = Gh.
– pk = (G,F,H,K,L); sk = (f, h).
• TPKE.Enc(pk, t,M)
– r1, r2 ← Zp.
– C1 = F r1 ; C2 = Hr2 ; C3 = Gr1+r2 ·
M .
– C4 = (Gt ·K)r1 ; C5 = (Gt · L)r2 .
– Ctbe = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5).
• TPKE.Dec(sk, t, Ctbe)
– If TPKE.IsValid(pk, t, Ctbe) = 0 Then
return ⊥
– Parse Ctbe as (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5).
– M = C3 · C−1/f1 C−1/h2 .
• TPKE.IsValid(pk, t, Ctbe)
– Parse Ctbe as (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5).
– If e(F,C4) 6= e(C1, Gt ·K) Or
e(H,C5) 6= e(C2, Gt · L) Then Return
0.
– Else Return 1.
Figure 4-5: The tag-based encryption by Kiltz [Kil06]
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4.3.6 Complexity Assumptions
We will use the following assumptions from the literature:
• DDH For a group G = 〈G〉 of a prime order p given (G,Ga, Gb, C) ∈ G4 for
a, b← Zp, it is hard to decide whether or not C = Gab.
• SXDH The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds in both groups
G1 and G2.
• DLIN [BBS04] In Type-1 groups where G1 = G2 = G = 〈G〉, given the tuple
(Ga, Gb, Gra, Gsb, Gt) where a, b, r, s, t ∈ Zp are unknown, it is hard to tell
whether t = r + s or t is random.
• q-SDH [BB04a] For a groupG = 〈G〉 of a prime order p given (G,Gx, . . . , Gxq)
for x ← Zp, it is hard to output a pair (c,G 1x+c ) ∈ Zp × G for an arbitrary
c ∈ Zp\{−x}.
• WFCDH [Fuc09]. In symmetric bilinear groups, given (G,Ga, Gb) ∈ G3 for
a, b← Zp, it is hard to output a tuple (Gr, Gra, Grb, Grab) ∈ G4 for an arbitrary
r ∈ Zp.
• AWFCDH [Fuc09] In asymmetric bilinear groups, given (G,Ga, G˜) ∈ G12×G2
for a ← Zp, it is hard to output a tuple (Gb, Gab, G˜b, G˜ab) ∈ G12 × G22 for an
arbitrary b ∈ Zp.
• q-ADHSDH [Fuc09] In asymmetric bilinear groups 1, given
(G,F,K,Gx, G˜, G˜x) ∈ G41 × G22 for x ← Zp, and q − 1 tuples
(Wi = (K · Gui)
1
x+vi , Ui = G
ui , U˜i = G˜
ui , Vi = F
vi , V˜i = G˜
vi)q−1i=1 for
ui, vi ← Zp, it is hard to output a new tuple (W ∗, U∗, U˜∗, V ∗, V˜ ∗) of this form.
4.3.7 Span Programs
A span program [KW93] is defined as follows:
Definition 9. Given a monotone boolean function Φ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, a l× t matrix
M with entries in a field F, and a labelling function ρ : [l] → [n] that associates M ’s
1This can also be instantiated in symmetric groups. See [Fuc09].
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rows to Φ’s input variables. We say that M is a monotone span program for φ over a
field F if for every (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, we have the following:
[Φ(x1, . . . , xn) = 1]⇔[∃~v ∈ F1×t : ~v ·M = (1, 0, · · · , 0)
∧ (∀i : xρ(i) = 0⇒ vi = 0)]
In other words, let I = {i : xρ(i) = 1}, and MI the corresponding sub-matrix of M ,
Φ(x1, · · · , xn) = 1⇔ the rows of MI span the vector (1, 0, · · · , 0).









Let ρ(1) = ρ(2) = x2, ρ(3) = x1, and ρ(4) = x3. Consider the sets I1 = {1, 2, 3} and
I2 = {3, 4} which correspond to {x1, x2} and {x1, x3} respectively. In this case,
MI1 =
1 1 11 2 4
1 3 9





As MI1 has full rank, the rows of MI1 span (1, 0, 0), i.e., there exist a vector ~v′ =
(3, 14, 1) s.t. ~v′ ·MI1 = (1, 0, 0), in F17. It is easy to see that for ~v = (3, 14, 1, 0), we
have ~v ·M = (1, 0, 0, 0) in F17 as well. Hence, the span program accepts {x1, x2}. On
the other hand, the rows of MI2 do not span the vector (1, 0, 0) and therefore the span
program does not accept {x1, x3}. Note that the minimal authorized sets in the access
structure accepted by M are {x1, x2} and {x2, x3}.
See [Bei96, Bei11] for more details on span programs and their relation to Linear
Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) [KGH83].
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4.4 First Generic Construction
In this section, we present our generic construction for decentralized traceable
attribute-based signatures.
Overview of the construction. The tools we use in our generic construction are two
NIZK proof systems NIZK1 and NIZK2, an IND-CCA2 secure public-key encryption
scheme PKE, an existentially unforgeable tagged signature scheme TS, and an existen-
tially unforgeable digital signature scheme DS with a message spaceMDS. In addition,
we need a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →MDS.
We require that the NIZK1 proof system, which will be used in the signing, is
simulation-sound [Sah99] and a proof of knowledge [SP92]. In fact, it is sufficient for
it to be only one-time simulation-sound (see section 3.8.2). On the contrary, it suf-
fices that NIZK2 is a zero-knowledge proof system, i.e. we require neither simulation-
soundness nor knowledge extractability from NIZK2.
The Setup algorithm generates two separate common reference strings crs1 and
crs2 for the NIZK systems NIZK1 and NIZK2, respectively. It also generates a key pair
(tvk, tsk) for the digital signature scheme DS, and an encryption/decryption key pair
(epk, esk) for the encryption scheme PKE. The public parameters of the system is set
to pp = (crs1, crs2, tvk, epk,A,H), where A is the universe of attributes. The tracing
authority’s key is set to tk = esk.
When a new attribute authority joins the system, it creates a secret/verification key
pair (aaskaid, aavkaid) for the tagged signature scheme TS. To generate a signing key
for attribute a ∈ A for signer id, the managing attribute authority signs the signer
identity id (used as tag) along with the attribute a using her secret tagged signature
signing key. The resulting signature is used as the secret key for that attribute by
signer id.
To sign a message m w.r.t. a signing policy Ψ, the signer first encrypts her identity
id using the encryption scheme PKE (and some randomness µ) to obtain a ciphertext
C. She then computes, using the NIZK system NIZK1, a proof pi that she encrypted
her identity correctly and that she either has a digital signature on the hash of the
combination of the signing predicate, the message and the ciphertext containing her
identity, i.e. H(Ψ,m,C), that verifies w.r.t. the verification key tvk or that she owns
enough attributes to satisfy the original signing predicate Ψ in the form of tagged
signatures on her identity and the attributes. For ease of composition and following
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• Setup(1λ)
– (crs1, xk1)← NIZK1.Setup(1λ) and crs2 ← NIZK2.Setup(1λ).
– (tvk, tsk)← DS.KeyGen(1λ) and (epk, esk)← PKE.KeyGen(1λ; ρ).
– Choose a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →MDS.




– (aavkaid, aaskaid)← TS.KeyGen(1λ).
– Return (aavkaid, aaskaid).
• KeyGen(aaskaid(a), id, a)
– skid,a ← TS.Sign(aaskaid(a), id, a).
– Return skid,a.
• Sign({aavkaid(a)}a∈A, {skid,a}a∈A,m,Ψ)
– Return ⊥ if Ψ(A) = 0.
– C ← PKE.Enc(epk, id;µ).
– Let Ψˆ = Ψ ∨ aΨ,m,C and Z ∈ Z|Ψˆ|,βp be the span program for Ψˆ.
– Let ~a = {ai}|Ψˆ|i=1 denote the attributes appearing in Ψˆ.
– pi ← NIZK1.Prove(crs1, {id, µ, ~s, {σai}|Ψˆ|i=1} : (C, {aavkaid(ai)}|Ψˆ|−1i=1 ∪
tvk,~a) ∈ L1).
– Return σ = (pi,C).
Figure 4-6: The generic construction for DTABS-1
[MPR11], we refer to H(Ψ,m,C) as pseudo-attributes and denote them by aΨ,m,C .
Note here that including the ciphertext as part of the encoding of the pseudo-attribute
does not affect the signature size.
The extended predicate Ψˆ is proved via a span program (see section 4.3.7) repre-
sented by the matrix Z: the signer proves that she knows a secret vector ~s ∈ Z|Ψˆ|p s.t.
~sZ = [1, 0, . . . , 0]. She also needs to show that she possesses a valid (tagged) signa-
ture on each attribute in the signing predicate for which the corresponding element in
~s is non-zero or a valid signature that verifies w.r.t tvk in the case of a pseudo-attribute.
For attributes appearing in the policy that the signer does not own, she chooses random
signatures.
Note that the hiding properties of the NIZK1 system ensure that the proof pi does
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• Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ)
– Return NIZK1.Verify(crs1, pi).
• Trace(tk,m, σ,Ψ)
– Return (⊥,⊥) if Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ) = 0.
– id← PKE.Dec(tk, C).
– piTrace ← NIZK2.Prove(crs2, {tk} : (C, epk, id) ∈ L2).
– Return (id, piTrace).
• Judge(id, piTrace,m, σ,Ψ)
– If (id, piTrace) = (⊥,⊥) Then Return Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ) = 0.
– Return NIZK2.Verify(crs2, piTrace).
Figure 4-7: The generic construction for DTABS-2
not reveal how the modified predicate Ψˆ was satisfied, i.e. whether the signer has a
special signature on the pseudo-attribute or she owns enough attributes to satisfy the
original predicate Ψ. The signature is then set to σ = (pi,C). To verify the signature,
one just needs to verify the proof pi.
The modified OR predicate Ψˆ serves to bind the signature to the message and the
signing predicate. The secret signing key tsk for the digital signature scheme DS is
only used as a trapdoor in the security proofs, and thus is not given to any authority.
It allows its holder to simulate signatures and sign on behalf of any signer without
knowing their secret keys by simply encrypting their identity and producing a signature
on the pseudo-attribute associated with the message and the signing predicate. Note
that even in the unlikely case that any of the pseudo-attributes happened to collide with
a real attribute, this is not a problem since signatures associated with pseudo-attributes
must verify w.r.t. tvk which is different from all attribute authorities’ keys.
To trace a signature, the tracing authority just decrypts the ciphertext C to recover
the signer’s identity. It then produces a proof piTrace using the NIZK system NIZK2
to prove that the decryption was done correctly. To verify the tracing correctness, the
judge just needs to verify the validity of the NIZK proof piTrace.
The details of the construction are in Figs. 4-6 and 4-7, whereas the languages
associated with the NIZK proofs used in the construction are as follows, where for
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clarity we underline the elements of the witness:
L1 :
{(




~sZ = [1, 0, . . . , 0]
|Ψˆ|−1∧
i=1
if si 6= 0⇒ TS.Verify(vki, id, ai, σai) = 1
∧ if s|Ψˆ| 6= 0⇒ DS.Verify(tvk, aΨ,m,C , σa|Ψˆ|) = 1
)
∧ PKE.Enc(epk, id;µ) = C
}
·
The witness consists of a signer identity id, the randomness µ used in encrypting id, a
vector ~s ∈ Z|Ψˆ|p , and signatures {σai}|Ψˆ|i=1 s.t. the span program Z verifies w.r.t. to ~s and
for every non-zero element si for i ∈ {1, . . . |~s| − 1}, the tagged signature σai on id
(as a tag) and the attribute ai (as a message) verifies w.r.t. the corresponding attribute
authority verification key, and if s|~s| 6= 0, the signature σ|Ψˆ|, i.e. the one on the special
pseudo-attribute verifies w.r.t. the verification key tvk.
L2 :
{(
(C, epk, id), (tk, ρ)
)
:PKE.KeyGen(1λ; ρ) = (epk, tk)
∧ PKE.Dec(tk, C) = id
}
·
The witness consists of the tracing key, i.e. the decryption key for PKE, and the ran-
domness ρ (if any) used in the key generation of PKE s.t. the encryption/decryption
key pair is correct and the ciphertext C decrypts to id.
Note that if we encrypted the whole witness of pi (rather than just the signer iden-
tity) then we could drop the requirement for NIZK1 to be a proof of knowledge. The
reason why we cannot afford to do this is two-fold: first, since the decryption key is
used as a tracing key and signers do not have their own personal key pairs, this would
mean that a dishonest tracing authority will be able to forge on behalf of an honest
signer once it has opened a signature by them. Second, since in both the full un-
forgeability and traceability experiments, the adversary has access to the tracing key,
it would mean that we can no longer sign using pseudo-attributes since the adversary
will be able to learn what witness we used in producing a signature.
Also, note that for the construction to satisfy the stronger variant of full unforge-
ability (i.e. SFU) rather than WFU, NIZK1 must additionally be strongly non-malleable
in the sense that it is infeasible for the adversary to even output a new proof for a state-
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ment that it received a proof for. In particular, as noted by [Gro06] if the proof system
is simulation-sound extractable [Gro06] then it is non-malleable.
Theorem 3. The construction in Figs. 4-6 and 4-7 is a secure decentralized traceable
attribute-based signature if the building blocks are secure w.r.t. their security require-
ments.
The proof will follow in section 4.8.
4.5 Second Generic Construction
In order to get more efficient constructions in the standard model, we slightly deviate
from the generic framework by dropping the requirement that NIZK1 is simulation-
sound. In particular, in our instantiations we will use the Groth-Sahai proof system
(which is the only efficient non-interactive proof system not relying on random or-
acles) to instantiate both NIZK1 and NIZK2 systems. Note that Groth-Sahai proofs
are malleable and therefore not simulation-sound. Although there exist transforma-
tions which make Groth-Sahai proofs simulation-sound, e.g. [Gro06], unfortunately,
all those transformations degrade the efficiency of the proofs. Also, note that the fact
that one cannot efficiently extract exponents from Groth-Sahai proofs is not a problem
in our case as we never need to be able to efficiently extract the exponent components
of the witness.
We will start by describing the idea of the construction generically and then present
the exact instantiations later. To eliminate the need for NIZK1 to be simulation-sound,
we apply a trick similar to that used by Groth in [Gro07] where we sign the final signa-
ture with a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme OTS. We require that OTS
is strongly existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attack. We use
the corresponding one-time verification key as a tag for a selective-tag weakly IND-
CCA (i.e. ST-WIND-CCA secure) tag-based encryption scheme TPKE with which
we encrypt the user’s identity id. The rest of the tools are the same as in the generic
construction 4.4.
To map the one-time signature verification key into the tag space of the tag-based
encryption, we require another collision-resistant hash function, Hˆ : {0, 1}∗ → TTPKE.
In order to further bind the signature to the one-time signature verification key (i.e. the
tag used for the ciphertext), we sign the one-time signature verification key as a part of
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the pseudo-attribute, i.e. the pseudo-attribute now is (Ψ,m,Ctbe, Hˆ(otsvk)), which we
will denote by aΨ,m,Ctbe,Hˆ(otsvk). The one-time signature serves to prevent the adversary
from transforming a signature that it received into another valid signature as it now
must be able to forge a one-time signature in order to succeed.
The general idea of this construction is given in Figs. 4-8 and 4-9, whereas the
languages associated with the NIZK proofs used in the construction are as follows,
where again the elements of the witness are underlined:
• Language L′1 is defined as
L′1 :
{(
(Hˆ(otsvk), Ctbe, ~vk = {aavkaid(ai)}|Ψˆ|−1i=1 ∪ tvk,~a = {ai}|Ψˆ|i=1),
(id, µ, ~s, ~σ = {σai}|Ψˆ|i=1)
)
:(
~sZ = [1, 0, . . . , 0]
|Ψˆ|−1∧
i=1
if si 6= 0⇒ TS.Verify(vki, id, ai, σai) = 1
∧ if s|Ψˆ| 6= 0⇒ DS.Verify(tvk, aΨ,m,Ctbe,Hˆ(otsvk), σa|Ψˆ|) = 1
)
∧ TPKE.Enc(epk, Hˆ(otsvk), id;µ) = Ctbe
}
·
• Language L′2 is defined as
L′2 :
{(
(Hˆ(otsvk), Ctbe, epk, id),(tk, ρ)
)
: TPKE.KeyGen(1λ; ρ) = (epk, tk)
∧ TPKE.Dec(tk, Hˆ(otsvk), Ctbe) = id
}
·
Theorem 4. The construction in Figs. 4-8 and 4-9 is a secure decentralized traceable
attribute-based signature if the building blocks are secure w.r.t. their security require-
ments.
The proof will follow in section 4.8.
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• Setup(1λ)
– (crs1, xk1)← NIZK1.Setup(1λ) and (crs2, xk2)← NIZK2.Setup(1λ).
– (tvk, tsk)← DS.KeyGen(1λ) and (epk, esk)← TPKE.KeyGen(1λ; ρ).
– Choose collision-resistant hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → MDS and Hˆ : {0, 1}∗ →
TTPKE.
– Let tk = esk and pp = (crs1, crs2, tvk, epk,A,H, Hˆ), where A is the attribute universe.
– Return pp.
• AuthSetup(pp, aid)
– (aavkaid, aaskaid)← TS.KeyGen(1λ).
– Return (aavkaid, aaskaid).
• KeyGen(aaskaid(a), id, a)
– skid,a ← TS.Sign(aaskaid(a), id, a).
– Return skid,a.
• Sign({aavkaid(a)}a∈A, {skid,a}a∈A,m,Ψ)
– Return ⊥ if Ψ(A) = 0.
– (otsvk, otssk)← OTS.KeyGen(1λ).
– Ctbe ← TPKE.Enc(epk, Hˆ(otsvk), id;µ).
– Let Ψˆ = Ψ ∨ aΨ,m,Ctbe,Hˆ(otsvk) and Z ∈ Z
|Ψˆ|,β
p be the span program for Ψˆ.
– Let ~a = {ai}|Ψˆ|i=1 denote the attributes appearing in Ψˆ.
– pi ← NIZK1.Prove(crs1, {id, µ, ~s, {σai}|Ψˆ|i=1} : (Hˆ(otsvk), Ctbe, {aavkaid(ai)}|Ψˆ|−1i=1 ∪
tvk,~a) ∈ L′1).
– σots ← OTS.Sign(otssk, (pi,Ctbe, otsvk)).
– Return σ = (σots, pi, Ctbe, otsvk).
• Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ)
– Parse σ as (σots, pi, Ctbe, otsvk).
– Return 1 if all the following verify; otherwise, return 0:
∗ OTS.Verify(otsvk, (pi,Ctbe, otsvk), σots) = 1.
∗ NIZK1.Verify(crs1, pi) = 1.
∗ TPKE.IsValid(epk, Hˆ(otsvk), Ctbe) = 1.
Figure 4-8: Details of the second construction-1
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• Trace(tk,m, σ,Ψ)
– Return (⊥,⊥) if Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ) = 0.
– id← TPKE.Dec(tk, Hˆ(otsvk), Ctbe).
– piTrace ← NIZK2.Prove(crs2, {tk, ρ} : (Hˆ(otsvk), Ctbe, epk, id) ∈ L′2).
– Return (id, piTrace).
• Judge(id, piTrace,m, σ,Ψ)
– If (id, piTrace) = (⊥,⊥) Then Return Verify({aavkaid(a)}a∈Ψ,m, σ,Ψ) = 0.
– Return NIZK2.Verify(crs2, piTrace).
Figure 4-9: Details of the second construction-2
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4.6 An Instantiation in Symmetric Groups
We use the instantiation of the tagged signature scheme from Section 4.3.1 and in-
stantiate the digital signature DS used for pseudo-attributes with the full Boneh-Boyen
signature scheme (cf. Section 4.3.2) both in the symmetric setting. Thus, we assume
a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp. Note that we need not hide
the integer component r of the full Boneh-Boyen signature when proving pi as such a
signature can only be generated by the simulator running the security game and hence
r does not reveal any information about the attributes involved or the identity of the
signer. In other words, in both the real signature and the simulated signature cases, r
is chosen uniformly at random.
We use the selective-tag weakly IND-CCA tag-based encryption scheme by Kiltz
[Kil06] as illustrated in Fig. 4-5 to instantiate TPKE and instantiate the one-time sig-
nature with the full Boneh-Boyen signature in the symmetric setting.
We now give the specific details of the proofs involved. Let Z ∈ Z|Ψˆ|,βp be the span
program for Ψˆ = Ψ ∨ aΨ,m,Ctbe,Hˆ(otsvk). To sign, we need the following proofs:






(siZi,j) = 0, for j = 2, . . . , β (4.1)
To prove that if si 6= 0 ⇒ TS.Verify(vki, id, ai, σai) = 1, one needs to raise
each pairing involved in the signature verification equations to si. This will
ensure that if si = 1 then the only way for the equations to verify is by having
a valid signature on id and ai. On the other hand, when the user does not own
attribute ai, i.e. does not have a valid signature σai , then si = 0 and the equations
will verify since each pairing will evaluate to 1. Based on the observation that
computing the components U,U ′, V, V ′ of the tagged signature does not require
knowledge of the secret signing key and hence even when the user does not have
a valid signature on ai can still choose random components U,U ′, V, V ′ of the
correct form to satisfy the first two verification equations of the tagged signature.
Thus, it is sufficient to use si only in the last equation of the tagged signature
verification equations. This reduces the number of additional GS commitments
and equations required and hence improves the efficiency.
97
For each of the first |Ψˆ| − 1 rows in Z, we prove:
T¯i = T
si G¯′i = G
′si W¯i = Wisi (4.2)
e(Ui, G
′








′ · V ′i ) = e(T¯i, U ′i)e(K · id · Lai , G¯′i) (4.4)
For the last row in Z, i.e. the pseudo-attribute, the proofs required are:
σ¯ = σ
s|Ψˆ| G¯ = G
s|Ψˆ| e(σ¯, X · Y r ·GH(Ψ,m,Ctbe,Hˆ(otsvk)))e(G¯, G) = 1
(4.5)
• To prove that TPKE.Enc(epk, Hˆ(otsvk), id; (r1, r2)) = Ctbe, the signer
needs to prove that she computed the ciphertext (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5) =(
F r1 , Hr2 , Gr1+r2 · id, (GHˆ(otsvk) · K)r1 , (GHˆ(otsvk) · L)r2) correctly. Since the
validity of the ciphertext is publicly verifiable, and for the sake of efficiency, it
is sufficient to provide proofs that C1, C2 and C3 were computed correctly and
the rest can be verified by checking that e(F,C4) = e(C1, GHˆ(otsvk) · K) and
e(H,C5) = e(C2, G
Hˆ(otsvk) · L). Thus, proving this clause requires proving the
3 following multi-scalar multiplication equations, where the first two are linear,
whereas the last equation is quadratic
C1 = F
r1 C2 = H
r2 C3 = G
r1 ·Gr2 · id (4.6)
Note that we do not need to efficiently extract the exponents r1 and r2 from
the proofs. Also, note that the equations are simulatable and thus yield zero-
knowledge proofs.
• Finally, the signer needs to prove that her identity is a Diffie–Hellman tuple
satisfying e(id, G′) = e(G, id′).
The total size of the Groth-Sahai proofs used is Z2·βp +G42·|Ψˆ|−5. The proofs require
9 · |Ψˆ|−1 GS commitments each of sizeG3. The size of the tag-based ciphertext isG5,
whereas the size of the one-time signature including the verification key is G3 + Zp.
Thus, the total size of the signature is Z2·β+1p + G69·|Ψˆ|. An important observation
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is that the verification of the signature could be made more efficient by using batch
verification techniques for Groth-Sahai proofs [GSW09, BFI+10].
Tracing. Computing the proof piTrace requires proving the following equations
Gf = F Gh = H C3 · C−1/f1 · C−1/h2 = id (4.7)
Those are 3 linear MSME proofs and immediately yield zero-knowledge. The total
size of piTrace is G12.
The proof for the following Theorem follows from that of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5. The construction is secure if the assumptions DLIN, q-SDH, q-ADHSDH,
and WFCDH hold.
4.7 Instantiations in Asymmetric Groups
4.7.1 Instantiation 1
To improve efficiency, here we translate the above instantiation into the asymmetric
setting (i.e. Type-3 bilinear groups) where we use the more efficient SXDH-based
instantiation of Groth-Sahai proofs. We use the asymmetric variants of all the building
blocks used in the symmetric instantiation. Note that the security of the asymmetric
instantiation of the tag-based encryption scheme from [Kak10] which we use here
is based on the SDLIN assumption [Kak10] (a variant of the DLIN assumption in
which the last element in the input tuple is provided in both groups) requires that the
message space of the encryption scheme (i.e. the number of signers’ identities to be
encrypted) is polynomial in the security parameter so that we can efficiently search
when decrypting. Thus, this instantiation only works when traceability is defined w.r.t.
registered users in the system which is polynomial in the security parameter.
For clarity, in the following description we will also accent exponents with˜ when
they are to be committed to in group G2. Let Z ∈ Z|Ψˆ|,βp be the span program for
Ψˆ = Ψ ∨ aΨ,m,Ctbe,Hˆ(otsvk). To sign, we need the following proofs:
• Commit to the vector ~s in both groups G1 and G2 and prove that the values are
equal which involves |Ψˆ| proofs for QE of the form si − s˜i = 0.
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(siZi,j) = 0, for j = 2, . . . , β (4.8)
To prove that if si 6= 0 ⇒ TS.Verify(vki, id, ai, σai) = 1, for each of the first
|Ψˆ| − 1 rows in Z, we prove:
T¯i = T
s˜i ¯˜Gi = G˜
si W¯i = Wi
s˜i (4.9)
e(Ui, G˜i) = e(Gi, U˜i) e(Vi, G˜i) = e(Fi, V˜i) (4.10)
e(W¯i, X˜ · V˜i) = e(T¯i, U˜i)e(K · id · Lai , ¯˜Gi) (4.11)
For the last row in Z, i.e. the pseudo-attribute, the proofs required are:
σ¯ = σ
s˜|Ψˆ| G¯ = G
s˜|Ψˆ| e(σ¯, X˜ · Y˜ r · G˜H(Ψ,m,Ctbe,Hˆ(otsvk)))e(G¯, G˜) = 1
(4.12)
• To prove that TPKE.Enc(epk, Hˆ(otsvk), id; (r1, r2)) = Ctbe, the signer
needs to prove that she computed the ciphertext (C1, C2, C3, C˜4, C˜5) =
(F r1 , Hr2 , Gr1+r2 · id, (G˜Hˆ(otsvk) · K˜)r1 , (G˜Hˆ(otsvk) · L˜)r2) correctly. Since the
validity of the ciphertext is publicly verifiable, and for the sake of efficiency, it
is sufficient to provide proofs that C1, C2 and C3 were computed correctly and
the rest can be verified by checking that e(F, C˜4) = e(C1, G˜Hˆ(otsvk) · K˜) and
e(H, C˜5) = e(C2, G˜
Hˆ(otsvk) · L˜). Thus, proving this clause requires proving the
3 following multi-scalar multiplication equations, where the first two are linear,
whereas the last equation is quadratic
C1 = F
r˜1 C2 = H
r˜2 C3 = G
r˜1 ·Gr˜2 · id (4.13)
Note that we do not need to efficiently extract the exponents r˜1 and r˜2 from
the proofs. Also, note that the equations are simultable and thus yield zero-
knowledge proofs.
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• Finally, the signer needs to prove that her identity is a Diffie–Hellman tuple
satisfying e(id, G˜) = e(G, i˜d).
The total size of the signature in this setting isG34·|Ψˆ|−21 +G
32·|Ψˆ|−4
2 +Zβ+1p . Again, the
verification of the signature could be made more efficient by using batch verification
techniques for Groth-Sahai proofs [GSW09, BFI+10].
Tracing. Computing the proof piTrace requires proving the following equations
Gf˜ = F Gh˜ = H C3 · C−1/f˜1 · C−1/h˜2 = id (4.14)
Those are 3 linear MSME proofs and immediately yield zero-knowledge. The total
size of piTrace is G31 ×G42.
The proof for the following Theorem follows from that of Theorem 4.
Theorem 6. The construction is secure for a polynomial (in λ) signer identity space if
the assumptions SDLIN in G1, q-SDH, q-ADHSDH, AWFCDH, and SXDH hold.
We end by noting (similarly to [Kak10]) that by translating the instantiation into
the Type-2 setting, we can eliminate the requirement for the signer identity space (i.e.
the message space of the TPKE scheme) to be polynomial. In this setting, we can use
the instantiation of Groth-Sahai proofs based on DDH in G1 and DLIN in G2 as in
[GSW10].
4.7.2 Instantiation 2
In this instantiation, we replace the tagged based signature used in the first instantiation
by a randomizable structure preserving signature [CM14] (see 4.3.1). The rest of the
tools stay the same hence we are not going to repeat the common parts. The schemes
in [CM14, AGOT14] appeared recently and thus replacing the tag signature schemes
used in [EKGK14, Gha14] by this new scheme would greatly minimize the number
of terms in the final DTABS signature, which also shows the importance of building
cryptographic schemes generically whenever this is possible. As already mentioned in
[CM14], the signature components R1 and R2 can be made public, so only the second
PPE equation of the signature verification needs to be transformed when used with GS
proofs. We need to raise each equation of the Ψˆ − 1 signatures to the corresponding
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Span program vector component i.e. si. Below are the details:
G¯i = G
s˜i U¯i = U
s˜i V¯i = V
s˜i R¯1i = R
s˜i
1 W¯i = W
s˜i
e(G¯i, S) = e(U¯i, τ) · e(V¯i,M) · e(R¯1i, R2) · e(W¯i, I)
One can easily see that the factor |Ψˆ| in the signature size comes from the tagged
signature, and therefore using this efficient scheme as a tagged signature in our DTABS
should yield a smaller signature. We have commitments of size G6|Ψˆ|−61 + G
6|Ψˆ|−5
2 .
We have one quadratic PPE of size G4|Ψˆ|−41 + G
4|Ψˆ|−4
2 , we also have 5 MSE each of
size G2|Ψˆ|−21 + G
4|Ψˆ|−4
2 . Adding these group elements up to the rest of the signature





In this section, we will present the security proofs of the first generic construction of
DTABS, i.e. Theorem 3. Those of Theorem 4 concerning the second generic construc-
tion of DTABS are slightly different, thus we present them in appendix B.
Correctness of the construction follows from that of the underlying building blocks.
Lemma 1. If the NIZK proof system NIZK1 is simulation-sound and zero-knowledge,
NIZK2 is zero-knowledge, the encryption scheme PKE is IND-CCA2 secure, and the
hash functionH is collision-resistant then the generic construction is fully anonymous
(against full-key exposure).
Proof. We show that if there exists an adversary B which breaks the anonymity of
the construction, we can construct adversaries F1 against the NIZK property of the
proof system NIZK1, F2 against the NIZK property of the proof system NIZK2, F3,d
for d ∈ {0, 1} against the IND-CCA2 security of the encryption scheme PKE, F4
against the simulation-soundness of NIZK1, and F5 against the collision-resistance of
the hash function H such that
AdvAnonDTABS,B(λ) ≤2 · (AdvNIZKNIZK1,F1(λ) + AdvNIZKNIZK2,F2(λ)) + AdvIND-CCAPKE,F3,0(λ)





By the collision-resistance of the H, B has a negligible advantage in finding pairs
(Ψ∗,m∗) 6= (Ψ,m) such that H(Ψ∗,m∗, C) = H(Ψ,m,C) for some ciphertext C.
If this is not the case, we can use B to construct an adversary F5 which breaks the
collision-resistance of the hash function H. Thus, from now on we assume that there
are no hash collisions.
• Adversary F1: Adversary F1 runs the Setup algorithm normally and chooses
all the keys itself. The only two differences here is that the CRS crs1 used
for NIZK1 is obtained from F1’s environment, whereas crs2 used for NIZK2
is chosen by F1 by running (crs2, xk2) ← NIZK2.SimSetup(1λ). F1 forwards
pp = (crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H) to B.
When asked AddA queries, F1 chooses the secret/verification keys for the au-
thorities itself. Thus, F1 can answer any AddS queries itself.
To answer Trace queries, F1 just decrypts the ciphertext within the signature,
and simulates the proof piTrace.
When asked a CHb((id0,A0), (id1,A1),m,Ψ) query, F1 randomly chooses b ←
{0, 1} and generates the signature by signer idb and then forwards the details of
the witness for the signature to its environment which responsds with a proof pi
which F1 needs to tell if it is a real proof or a simulated one. F1 constructs the
rest of the signature and forwards it to B. If B’s output is equal to the bit b, then
F1 outputs “real”, otherwise outputs “simulated”.
• Adversary F2: Adversary F2 runs the Setup algorithm normally and chooses
all the keys itself. The only difference here is the the CRS crs2 used for NIZK2
is obtained from F2’s environment.
Adversary F2 forwards pp = (crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H) to B.
When asked AddA queries, F2 chooses the secret/verification keys for the au-
thorities itself. Thus, F2 can answer any AddS queries itself.
To answer Trace queries, F2 just decrypts the ciphertext within the signature,
and the proof piTrace is obtained from F2’s Prove oracle. To answer the chal-
lenge query CHb((id0,A0), (id1,A1),m,Ψ), F2 randomly chooses b ← {0, 1}
and generates the signature by signer idb and constructs the proof pi by itself. It
then forwards the challenge signature to B. At the end, the output of F2 is 1 if
B guesses the bit b correctly, and 0 otherwise.
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• Adversaries F3,0 and F3,1: The details of adversaries F3,0 and F3,1 against the
IND-CCA security of PKE are identical except for the difference in answering
B’s challenge query.
Adversary F3,d gets epk from its IND-CCA game (therefore it does not know
the corresponding decryption key esk) and chooses crs1 for NIZK1 and crs2 for
NIZK2 as simulated strings. In its IND-CCA game, F3,d has access to a decryp-
tion oracle Dec.
Adversary F3,d startsB with input pp = (crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H). When asked
AddA queries, F3,d chooses the secret/verification keys for the authorities itself.
Thus, F3,d can answer any AddS/Sign queries itself. To answer Trace queries,
F3,d sends the ciphertext C used in the input signature to its decryption oracle
and then simulates the proof piTrace (since it does not know the tracing key).
When asked a CHb((id0,A0), (id1,A1),m,Ψ) query, F3,d randomly chooses d←
{0, 1} and sets pd = idd and p1−d = 0|idd|. It then uses (p0, p1) as the challenge
pair in its IND-CCA game. When it receives the challenge ciphertext C, F3,d
constructs the rest of the challenge signature by simulating the proof pi.
The rest of B’s queries are answered normally as in Fig. 4-1.
If in the game, B queries the Trace oracle on a signature (pi′, C), i.e. one that
re-uses the challenge ciphertext C but the associated proof is different from that
used in the challenge signature, then F3,d outputs its guess d; otherwise, it out-
puts whatever B outputs.
• Adversary F4: Adversary F4 runs the Setup algorithm normally and chooses
all the keys itself. The only two differences here is that the CRS crs1 used
for NIZK1 is obtained from F1’s simulation-soundness environment and crs2 for
NIZK2 is chosen by running (crs2, xk2) ← NIZK2.SimSetup(1λ). F4 forwards
pp = (crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H) to B.
When asked AddA queries, F4 chooses the secret/verification keys for the au-
thorities itself. Thus, F4 can answer any AddS queries itself.
To answer Trace queries, F4 just decrypts the ciphertext within the signature,
and simulates the proof piTrace.
When asked a CHb((id0,A0), (id1,A1),m,Ψ) query, F4 computes C as the en-
cryption of the string of zeros of length equal to the bit length of the signer
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identity space and uses the simulated proof it gets from its game to construct the
challenge signature that it forwards to B.
If during the game, B managed to query the Trace oracle on a signature σ′ =
(pi′, C), i.e. one that re-uses the same challenge ciphertext but associated with a
different proof pi′, F4 outputs the statement with which the proof pi′ is associated
along with pi′ as its answer in its simulation-soundness game. Otherwise, it
aborts.
Lemma 2. The generic construction is fully unforgeable if the NIZK proof systems
NIZK1 and NIZK2 are sound, the hash functionH (used in encoding pseudo-attributes)
is collision-resistant, and the digital signature scheme DS and the tagged signature
scheme TS are both existentially unforgeable.
Proof. Since the NIZK proof systems NIZK1 and NIZK2 are sound, the adversary has
a negligible advantage in breaking full unforgeability by faking proofs for a false
statement. Also, by the security of the hash function H, the adversary has a neg-
ligible probability in finding collisions between the encodings of different pairs of
message/signing predicate. Thus, we proceed to show that if there exists an adversary
that wins the full unforgeability game then we can construct adversaries F1 against
the unforgeability of the tagged signature scheme TS, and adversary F2 against the
unforgeability of the digital signature scheme DS such that
AdvF-UnforgeDTABS,B(λ) ≤ κ(λ) · AdvUnforTS,F1(λ) + AdvUnforDS,F2(λ),
where κ(λ) is a polynomial in λ representing an upper bound on the number of honest
attribute authorities B is allowed to use in the game.
• Adversay F1: Adversary F1 gets the tagged signature scheme’s verification key
vk from its game and has access to an oracle Sign that it uses to obtain tagged
signatures that verify w.r.t. vk on messages and tags (i.e. identities and attributes)
of its choice. Adversary F1 starts by running (crs1, xk1) ← NIZK1.Setup(1λ),
(crs2, xk2) ← NIZK2.Setup(1λ) and creating (tsk, tvk) honestly. It also cre-
ates the key pair (esk, epk) for the encryption scheme. It then forwards pp =
(crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H) and tk = esk to B.
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Adversary F1 randomly chooses i← {1, . . . , κ(λ)} and guesses thatB’s forgery
will involve forging an attribute managed by the attribute authority i. When
asked AddA queries, for all authorities j 6= i, F1 chooses the secret/verification
keys for the authority itself. For authority i, it sets its verification key to vk it got
from its game (and thus it does not know the corresponding secret key). If in the
game, B issues RevealA query on authority i, F1 aborts the game.
Whenever B asks AddS queries, if the user has attributes managed by authority
i, it forwards such a query to its Sign oracle; otherwise, it answers the query
itself by using the authorities’ secret keys available to it. When asked for Sign
queries on (id,A,m,Ψ), F1 answers the query by first encrypting the identity
id and producing a signature on the pseudo-attribute that verifies w.r.t tvk. Note
that F1 knows tsk and hence it can produce such a signature. By the witness-
indistinguishability of NIZK1 (implied by the zero-knowledge property) B can-
not tell how the modified predicate was satisfied and hence cannot distinguish
this signature from a real signature where the actual attributes of the user are
used. The rest of B’s queries are answered normally as in Fig. 4-1.
Eventually, when B outputs its forgery, F1 uses the NIZK1’s extraction key xk1
to extract the witness and returns the tagged signature on the identity and the
attribute if B’s forgery involved forging a tagged signature. Otherwise, it aborts
(i.e. if the forgery was by forging a pseudo-attribute). If the signature does not
involve forged attributes managed by authority i that F1 has guessed, it aborts.
The probability that F1 guesses the correct authority is 1κ(λ) .
• Adversary F2: By the collision-resistant property of the hash function H, the
adversary cannot find collisions between different message/predicate pairs and
hence we ignore this case.
Adversary F2 gets tvk from its game and has access to an oracle Sign that it
uses to obtain digital signatures that verify w.r.t. tvk on messages of its choice.
It runs (crs1, xk1) ← NIZK1.Setup(1λ), (crs2, xk2) ← NIZK2.Setup(1λ). It also
creates the key pair (esk, epk) for the encryption scheme. It then forwards pp =
(crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H) and tk = esk to B.
When asked for AddA queries, F2 creates the authority keys itself. Whenever B
asks AddS queries, F2 uses the corresponding authorities’ secret keys aaskaid(a)
to create the key for the signer. When asked for Sign queries on (id,A,m,Ψ),
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F2 first encrypts id and queries its Sign oracle to obtain a signature on the cor-
responding pseudo-attribute matching (Ψ,m) and then constructs the rest of the
signature by generating the proof pi. Again, by the witness-indistinguishability
of NIZK1 (implied by the zero-knowledge property) B cannot tell which wit-
ness was used in the proof. The rest of B’s queries are answered normally as in
Fig. 4-1.
Eventually, when B outputs its forgery, F2 uses NIZK1’s extraction key xk1 to
extract the witness and returns the signature on the pseudo-attribute aΨˆ∗,m∗ if
the forgery was done by forging a signature on a pseudo-attribute; otherwise, it
aborts.
Lemma 3. The generic construction is traceable if the NIZK proof systems NIZK1 is
sound, and the digital signature scheme DS and the tagged signature scheme TS are
both existentially unforgeable.
Proof. The details are very similar to that of full unforgeability. The difference be-
tween the full unforgeability proof and the traceability proof is that here the adversary
is not allowed to corrupt or learn the secret key of any attribute authority; otherwise, it
is easy to create untraceable signature.
Since the NIZK proof systems NIZK1 is sound, the adversary has a negligible ad-
vantage in succeeding by faking proofs for false statements. Thus, we proceed to show
that if there exists an adversary that wins the traceability game then we can construct
adversaries F1 against the unforgeability of the tagged signature scheme TS, and ad-
versary F2 against the unforgeability of the digital signature scheme DS such that
AdvTraceDTABS,B(λ) ≤ κ(λ) · AdvUnforTS,F1(λ) + AdvUnforDS,F2(λ),
where κ(λ) is a polynomial in λ representing an upper bound on the number of honest
attribute authorities B is allowed to use in the game.
• AdversaryF1: AdversaryF1 gets the tagged signature scheme’s verification key
vk from its game and has access to an oracle Sign that it uses to obtain tagged
signatures that verify w.r.t. vk on messages and tags (i.e. identities and attributes)
of its choice. Adversary F1 starts by running (crs1, xk1) ← NIZK1.Setup(1λ),
107
(crs2, xk2) ← NIZK2.Setup(1λ) and creating (tsk, tvk) honestly. It also cre-
ates the key pair (esk, epk) for the encryption scheme. It then forwards pp =
(crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H) and tk = esk to B.
Adversary F1 randomly chooses i ← {1, . . . , κ(λ)} and guesses that B’s un-
traceable signature involves the attribute authority i. When asked AddA queries,
for all authorities j 6= i, F1 chooses the secret/verification keys for the authority
itself. For authority i, it sets its verification key to vk it got from its game (and
thus it does not know the corresponding secret key).
Whenever B asks AddS queries, if the user has attributes managed by authority
i, it forwards such a query to its Sign oracle; otherwise, it answers the query
itself by using the authorities’ secret keys available to it. When asked for Sign
queries on (id,A,m,Ψ), F1 answers the query by producing a signature on the
pseudo-attribute that verifies w.r.t tvk. Note that F1 knows tsk and hence it can
produce such a signature. By the witness-indistinguishability of NIZK1 (implied
by the zero-knowledge property) B cannot tell how the modified predicate was
satisfied and hence cannot distinguish this signature from a real signature where
the actual attributes of the user are used. The rest of B’s queries are answered
normally as in Fig. 4-1.
Eventually, when B outputs its forgery, F1 uses the NIZK1’s extraction key xk1
to extract the witness and returns the tagged signature on the identity and the
attributes if the forgery involves the attribute authority i. Otherwise, it aborts.
The probability that F1 guesses the correct authority is 1κ(λ) .
• Adversary F2: Adversary F2 gets tvk from its game and has access to an
oracle Sign that it uses to obtain signatures that verify w.r.t. tvk on mes-
sages of its choice. It runs (crs1, xk1) ← NIZK1.Setup(1λ) and (crs2, xk2) ←
NIZK2.Setup(1
λ). It also creates the key pair (esk, epk) for the encryption
scheme. It then forwards pp = (crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H) and tk = esk to B.
When asked for AddA queries, F2 creates the authority keys itself. Whenever B
asks AddS queries, F2 uses the corresponding authorities’ secret keys aaskaid(a)
to create the key for the signer. When asked for Sign queries on (id,A,m,Ψ),
F2 queries its Sign oracle to obtain a signature on the corresponding pseudo-
attribute matching (Ψ,m) and constructs the rest of the signature by encrypting
id and generating the proof pi using id and the signature on the pseudo-attribute
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aΨ,m as a witness. By the zero-knowledge of the proof system, the adversary
cannot tell which witness was used in the proof. The rest of B’s queries are
answered normally as in Fig. 4-1.
Eventually, when B outputs its forgery, F2 uses NIZK1’s extraction key xk1 to
extract the witness and returns the signature on the pseudo-attribute aΨˆ∗,m∗ if B
created the untraceable signature by using a forged signature on a new pseud-
attribute that it did not get from querying F2; otherwise, F2 aborts.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented our Decentralized Traceable Attribute Based Sig-
nature scheme (DTABS). We first gave the intuition of the scheme, defined the decen-
tralisation and traceability notions. We then gave the syntax and security definitions
of our DTABS. Moreover, we gave the modules needed to generically construct it. We
then gave a couple of generic constructions, one instantiation in the symmetric groups,




Attribute Based Signatures with
User-Controlled Linkability
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce Attribute-Based Signatures with User-Controlled Link-
ability (ABS-UCL) [EKCGD14]. This is a joint work with Liqun Chen (HP Labs
Bristol), Essam Ghadafi (University of Bristol) and James Davenport (University of
Bath).
Attribute-based signatures allow a signer who has enough credentials/attributes to
anonymously sign a message with respect to some public policy revealing neither the
attributes used nor his identity. User-Controlled Linkability (UCL) is a new feature
which allows a user to make some of his signatures directed at the same recipient
linkable while still retaining anonymity. Such a feature is useful for many real-life
applications (see below). We give a general framework of an ABS-UCL and its secu-
rity model, a standard model consideration and a practical construction that supports
multiple attribute authorities.
UCL is a lightweight solution that allows a user to opt to make some of his sig-
natures directed at the same verifier linkable without sacrificing anonymity. Unlike
the reliance on tracing authorities, which are generally thought of as “for trouble-
shooting”, UCL is intended to be built into normal use. For example, in the world of
attributes, assume that a signer wants to establish a session (in a analogous way to the
idea of cookies in Web browsers) with a recipient and maintain this session in a con-
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vincing way that he is indeed the same person whom the recipient is communicating
with, not someone else who also has enough credentials to satisfy the same policy in
question. A tracing authority cannot help here, whereas user-controlled linkability is
an ideal functionality for such a scenario.
ABS-UCL main contribution
• A formal security model for attribute based signatures with user controlled link-
ability.
• Decentralization: Again, and similar to our DTABS, we deal with the case where
there are multiple attribute authorities that are responsible for distributing the
attributes/credentials to the users.
• User-Controlled Linkability: This allows for a signer to convince a certain ver-
ifier that a set of signatures belongs to him without revealing any further infor-
mation about his identity or the attributes that he holds.
• Generic construction for ABS-UCL: We abstractly use the underlying modules
needed to realise ABS-UCL. Security proofs are also given for the generic con-
struction.
• Instantiations: We give a practical instantiation of ABS-UCL in the random ora-
cle model. Moreover, we use the given instantiation to give a practical instanti-
ation of our DTABS.
5.2 Syntax and Security Definitions of ABS-UCL
In this section, we define the notion of Attribute-Based Signatures with User-
Controlled Linkability (ABS-UCL), and present its security requirements. Our notion
supports multiple attribute authorities, each responsible for a subset of attributes.
5.2.1 Syntax of ABS-UCL
In an ABS-UCL scheme, we have a set AA = {AAi}ni=1 of attribute authorities, where
Ai is the space of attributes managed by attribute authority AAi. The universe of at-
tributes is defined as A =
⋃n
i=1Ai. Assume that A ⊂ A is a set of attributes for which
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a certain predicate Ω is satisfied, i.e. Ω(A) = 1. We have, a ∈ A ⇒ ∃Ai, s.t. a ∈ Ai,
so attribute a is managed by attribute authority AAi. Below are the definitions of the
algorithms used in an ABS-UCL scheme, where all algorithms (bar the first three) take
as implicit input pp produced by Setup.
• Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter, it returns public parameters pp.
• AASetup(aid, pp): Is run locally by attribute authority AAaid to generate its pub-
lic/secret key pair (aavk, aask). The authority publishes aavk and keeps aask
secret.
• UKeyGen(id, pp): Is run by user id to generate his personal secret key skid.
• AttKeyGen(id, f(skid), a, aask): Is run by attribute authority AA that is responsi-
ble for the attribute a, where f is an injective one-way function, it gives the user
id the secret key skid,a, bound to his identity id and f(skid).
• Sign(m,Ω, skid, skid,A, recip): If a user has enough attributes to satisfy the pred-
icate Ω, i.e. Ω(A) = 1, then he uses the corresponding secrets keys skid,A =
{skid,ai}ai∈A to produce a valid signature σ = {σABS, σUCL} on the message m
and the recipient tag recip w.r.t. the predicate Ω; if recip = ⊥ then σUCL =⊥.
• Verify(σ, {vkAAi}i,Ω,m, recip): Takes a signature σ on the message m and the
possibly empty recipient tag recip w.r.t. a predicate Ω, the verification keys
{vkAAi}i of the attribute authorities managing attributes involved in Ω, and re-
turns 1 if the signature is valid, and 0 otherwise.
• Link(σ0,m0, {vkAAi}i,Ω0, σ1,m1, {vkAAj}j,Ω1, recip): On input two signatures,
two messages, two signing policies and the verification keys of the attribute
authorities managing the attributes involved in the policies, and a recipient tag,
it returns 1 if the signatures are valid on their respective messages and the same
non-empty recipient tag recip (w.r.t. the respective policy), i.e. if recip 6=⊥ and
(σUCL0 = σUCL1 6= ⊥), and 0 otherwise.
5.2.2 Security Definitions
We define here the security requirements of an ABS-UCL scheme.
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Correctness. This requires that signatures produced by honest users verify correctly
and that signatures produced by the same user to the same valid recipient (i.e. on the
same non-empty recipient tag) link.
Linkability. As specified in [ISO13], there are two approaches to support user-
controlled linkability in anonymous digital signatures: in the first, a designated linking
authority can determine whether or not two signatures are linked; whereas in the sec-
ond method, there exists a public linking algorithm which can be run by any party. Our
model supports the latter. We require that only valid signatures directed at the same re-
cipient and which were produced by the same user link. In the linkability game the ad-
versary can choose all the secret keys of the users and attribute authorities. The adver-
sary outputs (σ1, recip1,m1, {vkAAi}i,Ω1, sk1) and (σ2, recip2,m2, {vkAAj}j,Ω2, sk2).
It wins if σi is valid (w.r.t. Ωi) on mi and recipi, for i = 1, 2 and either of the following
holds:
• σ1 was produced by sk1 and σ2 was produced by sk2 where sk1 = sk2 and
recip = recip1 = recip2 6=⊥ but Link(σ1,m1, {vkAAi}i,Ω1, σ2,m2, {vkAAj}j,
Ω2, recip) = 0.
• σ1 was produced by sk1 and σ2 was produced by sk2 where sk1 = sk2 and
Link(σ1,m1, {vkAAi}i,Ω1, σ2,m2, {vkAAj}j,Ω2, recipk) = 1 for k ∈ {1, 2} and
either recipk =⊥ or recip1 6= recip2.
• σ1 was produced by sk1 and σ2 was produced by sk2 where sk1 6= sk2 and
recip = recip1 = recip2 6=⊥ and Link(σ1,m1, {vkAAi}i,Ω1, σ2,m2, {vkAAj}j,
Ω2, recip) = 1.
In summary, this requires that signatures by the same user on the same non-empty
recipient tag link. Also, signatures by different users but on the same recipient tag or
those by the same user but on different recipient tags do not link.
Anonymity. This requires that a signature reveals neither the identity of the signer nor
the attributes used in the signing. In the anonymity game, we have the following:
• Adversary’s Capabilities: Full control over all attribute authorities. It can also
ask for the secret keys of signers of its choice; those signers will be referred to
as corrupt users. In addition, the adversary can ask for the secret key of any
attribute and has a signing oracle that it can query on messages and recipient
tags on behalf of honest users.
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• Adversary’s Challenge: The adversary outputs (m, id0,A0, id1,A1,Ω, recip)
where Ω(Ai) = 1 for i = 0, 1. If recip 6=⊥ then we require that throughout
the game (i.e. even after the challenge phase) id0 and id1 must be honest (i.e.
their personal secret keys are not revealed to the adversary), and that neither of
(id0, recip), (id1, recip) is queried to the signing oracle. This ensures that the
adversary cannot trivially win by exploiting the linkability feature.
The adversary gets back a signature σb produced using (idb,Ab) for b← {0, 1}.
After this, the adversary can continue accessing its oracles as long as it does not
violate the above two conditions.
• Adversary’s Output: The adversary outputs its guess b∗ and wins if b∗ = b.
Unforgeability. This requires that users cannot output signatures on (message, re-
cipient tag) pairs w.r.t. to a signing policy not satisfied by their set of attributes, even
if they pool their attributes together, which ensures collusion-resistance. In addition,
since our notion supports user-controlled linkability, we additionally require that an
adversary cannot produce signatures which link to other signatures by an honest user,
i.e. one whose personal secret key has not been revealed to the adversary, even if all
other users and attribute authorities in the system are corrupt. Note that, unlike in
DAA, e.g. [BFG13a, BFG+13b], in our notion even if a user’s personal secret key is
revealed, only signatures on non-empty recipient tags by the user can be traced, i.e. it
is impossible to trace signatures on empty recipient tags.
In the unforgeability game, we have the following:
• Adversary’s Capabilities: Access to a signing oracle. Moreover, it can corrupt
any attribute authority. We refer to the non-corrupted attribute authorities as
honest ones. It can also ask for the personal secret key of any user. We refer to
the non-corrupted users also as honest ones. It can also ask for the secret key for
any attribute.
• Winning Conditions: The adversary wins if either:
– Adversary outputs a valid signature σ on m and recip w.r.t. Ω, where
(m, recip,Ω) was not queried to the signing oracle, and there exists no
subset of attributes A∗ whose keys have been revealed to the adversary or
managed by corrupt attribute authorities s.t. Ω(A∗) = 1. In other words,
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∀A∗ s.t. Ω(A∗) = 1, ∃a∗ ∈ A∗ s.t. Ω(A∗\{a∗}) = 0 and a∗’s key has never
been revealed to the adversary and it is managed by an honest attribute au-
thority.
– Adversary outputs a tuple (m0, σ0, {vkAAi}i,Ω0,m1, σ1, {vkAAj}j,Ω1,
recip 6=⊥, id), where σ0 is valid on m0 and recip w.r.t. Ω0, σ1 is valid on
m1 and recip w.r.t. Ω1, user id is honest, Link(σ0,m0, {vkAAi}i,Ω0, σ1,m1,
{vkAAj}j,Ω1, recip) = 1 and either (id,m0, recip,Ω0) or (id,m1, recip,Ω1)
was not queried to the signing oracle.
Note here the adversary has more freedom than it has in the anonymity
game because it is allowed to ask for signatures by the honest user it intends
to frame on any recipient tag.
5.3 Modules needed to Construct ABS-UCL
5.3.1 Bilinear Groups
We refer the reader to Sec. 3.5 for information on bilinear maps. In our construction,
we use type-3 pairings.
5.3.2 Digital Signatures
A digital signature for a message space M is a tuple of polynomial-time algorithms
(KeyGen, Sign,Verify), where KeyGen outputs a pair of secret/verification keys (sk, vk)
for the signer; Sign(sk,m) outputs a signature σ on the message m; Verify(vk,m, σ)
outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on the message m or 0 otherwise.
Besides correctness, the security of a digital signature requires existential unforge-
ability under an adaptive chosen-message attack which demands that all PPT adver-
saries F have a negligible advantage in winning the following game:
• A key pair (sk, vk) is generated and vk is sent to F.
• Adversary F makes a polynomial number of queries to a sign oracle Sign(sk, ·).
• Eventually, F halts by outputting (σ∗,m∗) and wins if σ∗ is valid on m∗, and m∗
was not queried to Sign.
115
A weaker variant of existential unforgeability (i.e. existential unforgeability under
a weak chosen-message attack) requires that the adversary sends all its queries before
seeing the verification key.
We use different variants of the full Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [BB04a]. We
refer to original full Boneh-Boyen scheme as the BB scheme, whereas we refer to
its modified variant originally defined in [BB04a], and used in, e.g. [Che10], as the
BB† scheme. Both schemes are secure under the q-SDH assumption.
Let P = (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, e) be the description of a bilinear group and h1 ∈
G1 is a random element. The schemes are described below:
• KeyGen(P): Choose x, y ← Zp, set (X, Y ) = (gx2 , gy2). The secret key is (x, y)
and the verification key is (X, Y ).
• BB.Sign(sk,m): To sign m ∈ Zp, choose r ← Zp such that x + ry + m 6= 0
and compute the signature σ = g1/(x+ry+m)1 . In the BB† scheme, the signature is
σ = (g1 · hz1)1/(x+ry+m), where the BB† signer need not know the value z.
• Verify(vk,m, σ): if e(σ,X · Y r · gm2 ) = e(g1, g2) output 1, otherwise 0.
In the BB† scheme, the verification equation is e(σ,X · Y r · gm2 ) = e(g1 · hz1, g2)
5.3.3 Linkable Indistinguishable Tag Scheme LIT
A Linkable Indistinguishable Tag (LIT) scheme [BFG+13b] is similar to a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) but requires different security properties. It consists of
a couple of algorithms KeyGen and Tag. The former, on input a security parameter,
produces a secret key sk, whereas the latter, on input a message m and the secret key,
outputs a tag.
Besides correctness, the security of LIT [BFG+13b] requires Linkability and f -
Indistinguishability. Linkability requires that an adversary who is allowed to control
both the secret key and the message cannot produce equal tags unless they are tags
on the same message/key pair. Indistinguishability, which is defined w.r.t. a one-way
function f of the secret key, requires that an adversary who gets f(sk) and access to a
tag oracle, cannot determine whether or not a new tag on a message of its choice was
produced using the same key used by the tag oracle.
As in [BFG+13b], we instantiate the LIT in the ROM with the Boneh-Lynn-
Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [BLS04b]. The LIT instantiation is secure under
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the DDH and the discrete logarithm problem Dlog [BFG+13b].
5.3.4 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We refer the reader to to the formal definitions of NIZK systems that are given in
Sec 3.8.2. In our construction in the random oracle model, we use the Fiat–Shamir
transformation [FS87] applied to interactive Σ-protocols.
5.3.5 Span Programs
We refer the reader to Sec 4.3.7, in which we define Span programs and give an exam-
ple to show how it works.
5.4 Generic Construction of ABS-UCL
Overview of the Framework.The tools we use in our generic construction are: a
NIZK system NIZK that is sound and zero-knowledge, two existentially unforge-
able signature schemes DS1 and DS2, a collision-resistant hash function H and a f–
indistinguishable linkable indistinguishable tag scheme LIT. The Setup algorithm of
ABS-UCL generates the common reference string crs for the NIZK system NIZK. It
also generates a key pair (vkpsdo, skpsdo) for the digital signature schemes DS2. The
public parameters of the system are set to pp = (crs, vkpsdo,A,H), where A is the
universe of attributes. For a new attribute authority to join the system, it creates a se-
cret/verification key pair (skaid, vkaid) for signature scheme DS1. To generate a signing
key for attribute a ∈ A for signer id, the managing attribute authority signs the signer
identity along with the attribute and the image of the one-way function on his secret
key, i.e. (id, a, f(skid)), using skaid. The resulting signature is used as the secret key
for that attribute by signer id.
To sign a message m w.r.t. a signing policy Ω, there are two cases;
• If the signature is linkable (i.e. on a non-empty recipient tag recip 6=⊥), the
signer first uses LIT and his secret key to compute a tag σUCL on the recipi-
ent name recip and a NIZK proof pi that such a tag verifies w.r.t. his personal
secret key skid, and that he either has a digital signature on a pseudo-attribute
(following [MPR11, EKGK13]), i.e. the hash of the combination of the signing
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predicate, the message and the recipient name recip, i.e. apsdo = H(Ω,m, recip),
that verifies w.r.t. the verification key vkpsdo or that she has enough credentials
(DS1 signatures on (id, f(skid), ai)) to satisfy the original signing predicate Ω.
• For non-linkable signatures (i.e. when recip =⊥), it suffices to produce a NIZK
proof that the signer has enough attributes to satisfy the modified predicate, i.e
Ωˆ = Ω ∨ apsdo, and therefore, no need for the linking part that uses LIT. Note
that in this case apsdo = H(Ω,m).
Before we define the languages for the NIZK proofsL1 for linkable andL2 for non-
linkable signatures, we will generically define the format of these languages, where the
secret values, aka witnesses for proofs, are underlined:
L :
{
(public values pv), (witness w) : Ri(pv,w)
}
• Linkable signatures (recip 6= ⊥):
L1 :
{(








vi = 0 ∨ DS1.Verify(vki, id, skid, ai, σai) = 1
)
∧(
v|Ψˆ| = 0 ∨ DS2.Verify(vkpsdo, apsdo, σapsdo) = 1
)
∧(
LIT.Tag(skid, recip) = σUCL
}
·
• Non-Linkable signatures (recip = ⊥):
L2 :
{(








vi = 0 ∨ DS1.Verify(vki, id, skid, ai, σai) = 1
)
∧(
v|Ψˆ| = 0 ∨ DS2.Verify(vkpsdo, apsdo, σapsdo) = 1
)
We use a span program to prove the satisfiability of the extended predicate Ωˆ.
Using a public matrix Z, the signer needs to prove the ownership of a secret vec-
tor ~v ∈ Z|Ωˆ|p for which ~vZ = [1, 0, . . . , 0]. The zero elements in this vector ~v cor-
responds to attributes that the signer does not actually need in order to satisfy the
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predicate. For these values, the signer can safely choose random signatures. For the
non-zero elements in ~v, the signer needs to prove ownership of their corresponding
attributes/pseudo-attribute.
The hiding property of the NIZK system ensures that the proof pi does not reveal
how the modified predicate Ωˆ was satisfied.
The pseudo-attribute is used for two reasons; firstly, it binds the signature to the
message, the signing predicate, and the recipient name recip if the the signature is link-
able. Secondly, the secret signing key skpsdo for the digital signature scheme DS will
be used as a trapdoor in the security proofs to allow its holder to simulate signatures
and sign on behalf of any signer without knowing their secret keys. That could be done
by producing a signature on the pseudo-attribute associated with the message and the
signing predicate.
The full proof for the following Theorem is in 5.6.
Theorem 7. The generic construction of the attribute-based signature with user- con-
trolled linkability ABS-UCL given above is secure if the underlying building blocks are
secure.
5.5 A Practical Instantiation of ABS-UCL
Description of the Construction. The signer’s task is to provide a zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge pi w.r.t. the languages defined earlier, i.e. L1 and L2, depending on
whether or not the signature is linkable. We instantiate DS1 using the BB† scheme and
DS2 using the BB scheme. The proof will be made of 3 parts (or 2 if non-linkable).
The first deals with the Span program to show how to hide which subset of attributes
the signer has used to satisfy the modified predicate Ωˆ. For this, the signer proves that
he has used a secret vector ~v to span the public matrix Z ∈ Zα×θp of the span program,
where α = |Ωˆ|. The second part is to show that the signatures verify correctly w.r.t.
their corresponding verification keys, where the span program can safely let the signer
choose random signatures for the attributes which he does not own/want to use. The
third part is to show that, when the signature is supposed to be linkable, the linking
part indeed uses the same user secret key used in the rest of the proof. Not that the
group elements used later in the commitments, i.e. k1, k2 and k3 are parts of the public
parameters pp whereas sk is the signer’s secret key.
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1 j = 10 2 ≤ j ≤ θ (5.1)
• Commitments of vector ~v
– βvi , βti , ti ← Zp, i = 1 . . . α.
– Vi = g
βvi
1 · kβti3 ; vˆi = gvi1 · kti3
• Proof of Statement












Part 2: DS1 and DS2 Now each verification equation is as follows:
e(σai
vi , X · Y r · gai||id2 ) = e(g1, g2) · e(hsk1 , g2)
DS1 is instantiated using the BB† scheme whereas DS2 is instantiated using the BB
scheme. The signatures are as follows:
σai =
(g1 · hsk1 )1/(xi+yiri+ai||id) regular attributesg1/(xi+yiri+apsdo)1 pseudo-attributes
Where the public keys of an attribute ai is the couple of group elements Xi = gxi2
and Yi = g
yi
2 . The identity of the signer is id and his secret key is sk. In order to use
the secret vector ~v to hide the subset of attributes used to satisfy the predicate Ω, we
can simply raise each σai to its corresponding vector value vi. When vi is zero, the
signer does not want to use this attribute, and therefore he can replace the signature by
a random value.
• Commitments of (σai , ri), i ∈ [1, α] and the signer identity id:
Pick ρvi , ρid, ρri , ρsk, βρsk , βidρvi , βri , βρi , βid, βρri , βρid , βcs,← Zp, and compute:
Ti = σai




i · k2βρri , Zˆ = hβsk1 · kβρsk1 , Uˆ = g2βid · k2βρid
Let, ∀i ∈ [1, α− 1] : ρi = ρri + ρid whereas ρα = ρrα .
• Simplification: (can be done by both prover and verifier)




i = e(k1, Yi) R = e(k1, g2)
T ′i = e(Ti, k2) D
′ = e(k1, g
apsdo
2 )
• Knowledge of Exponents
∀i ∈ [1, α] and ∀j ∈ [1, θ], compute:
X′ij = (X ′i
Mij)βρvi Y′ij = (Y ′i
Mij)βriρvi T′ij = (T ′i
Mij)βρi
∀i ∈ [1, α− 1], ∀j ∈ [1, θ], compute:
Rij = (R
Mij)βidρvi
∀j ∈ [1, θ]:
– D′αj = (M ′zαj)βρvi
– Pj = X′αj · Y′αj · T′αj ·D′αj
– Bj = Pj ·
α−1∏
i=1
X′ij · Y′ij · Rij · T′ij
Part 3:Linkability- LIT The signer needs to prove the following equation:
BLS.Sign(sk, recip) = σUCL
If the signature is linkable, then compute:
N = H(recip)βsk , L =
( h1
H(recip)
)βsk · kβρsk1 σUCL = H(recip)sk,
otherwise; σUCL = ⊥.
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Finally, compute the challenge c:
c = HFS( N||L︸︷︷︸
if linkable
||λj||Si||Ti||Ki||U ||Kˆi||Uˆ ||Bj||Z),∀i ∈ [1, α],∀j ∈ [1, θ].
• Responses
– rvi = βvi + cvi, rti = βti + cti, rid = βid + cid, ssk = βsk + csk, sρsk =
βρsk + cρsk, rρid = βρid + cρid
– ∀i ∈ [1, α] :
rρvi = βρvi + cρvi , rriρvi = βriρvi + c(riρvi), rρi = βρi + cρi, rri = βri + cri,
rρri = βρri + cρri;
– ∀i ∈ [1, α− 1], compute:
ridρvi = βidρvi + c(idρvi)
Let Σ = {rρvi , rriρvi , ridi , rρi , rri , rρri , rid, rρid , rvi , rti , ssk, sρsk}, the signature is:
σABS−UCL = (Σ, c, {Λj}θ1, {vˆi, Ti, Ki}α1 , U, Z, σUCL)
Verification
Compute:










e(Ti, (Xi ·Ki · U)Mij) 2 ≤ j ≤ θ
• Uˆ = g2rid · k2rρid · U−c, Zˆ = hssk1 · ksρsk1 · Z−c
• ∀i ∈ [1, α] :
Si = g
rvi
1 · krti3 · vˆi−c Kˆi = Yirri · k2rρri ·Ki−c
• ∀j ∈ [1, θ]:







– Pj = (X ′Mαjα )rκα · (Y ′αMαj)rrακα · (T ′αMαj)rρα · (D′Mαj)rκα




rρvi · (Y ′i Mij)rriρvi · (RMij)ridi · (T ′iMij)rρi
• For the linkablility:
– If σUCL 6= ⊥, then compute:
N = H(recip)rsk · (σUCL)−c, L =
( h1
H(recip)
)ssk · ksρsk1 · ( ZσUCL
)−c
• Let cˆ = HFS( N||L︸︷︷︸
if linkable
||λj||Si||Ti||Ki||U ||Kˆi||Uˆ ||Bj||Z),





g1 · Λ1 j = 1Λj 2 ≤ j ≤ θ
The full proof for the following Theorem is in section 5.6 .
Theorem 8. The construction is secure in the random oracle model if the q-SDH, DDH
and Dlog assumptions hold, and the hash function H is collision resistant.
5.6 Proofs
Correctness can be easily checked, it’s implied by the building blocks’ correctness.
Theorem 9. Anonymity:
If the NIZK proof system NIZK is zero-knowledge, the linkable indistinguishable tag
scheme LIT is indistinguishable, and the hash function H is collision-resistant then
the generic construction is anonymous.
Proof. We will show that if there exists an adversary C which breaks the anonymity of
the ABS-UCL, we can construct adversaries D1 against the ZK property of the NIZK
proof system NIZK, D2 against the indistinguishability of LIT.
AdvAnonABS-UCL,C(λ) ≤ι(λ) ·
[
2 · AdvZKNIZK,D1(λ) + µ(λ) · AdvINDLIT,D2(λ)
]
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Let ι(λ) and µ(λ), polynomials in λ, be the upper bounds of number of users that
an adversary can create and the number of signing queries that he can ask for. We start
the game by assuming the adversary C picks a specific user id in his challenger query,
if he doesn’t, the game aborts. Now, the adversary D1 gets the crs of the NIZK system
NIZK from NIZK’s challenger. He can honestly set up the rest of building blocks of the
scheme himself. D1 needs to send a witness to the ZK challenger, he then gets back a
proof pi, his goal is to tell whether this proof is a real or a simulated one. The adversary
D1 can answer C’s signing queries by first producing a valid DS1 signature for the user
in question, and then use a random key sk to simulate LIT. He uses same random
values for already queried couples (signer, recipient) since LIT is deterministic. When
D1 gets his challenge input from C, it picks one of the (honest) ids i.e.(id1, id2) sent
by C, and sends it to the NIZK challenger and gets back the proof pi. It constructs the
rest of the signature, i.e. σUCL using a random key to sign the recip. In the second
game, and in order to show how reduce the forgery to the indistinguishability of the
LIT, we will have a series of sub-games, where each two consecutive sub-games are
indistinguishable by the indistinguishability of the LIT, i.e. they differ from each other
by a single construction of a LIT tag. We start by answering all queries related to the
selected signer id using its secret key (i.e. the one used in f(skid)), then we move
from a sub-game to another by answering one of these queries using a random key
sk. We end up in the last sub-game where we answer all those queries using a key sk
chosen uniformly at random. We have µ(λ) sub-games, where each two consecutive
sub-games differ from each other by a negligible value, i.e. the advantage against the
indistinguishability of the LIT. One can easily see that the last game is independent of
the challenge bit b used in answering C’s challenge query, and hence the anonymity of
ABS-UCL.
Theorem 10. Unforgeability:
The generic construction is unforgeable if the NIZK proof system NIZK is sound, the
hash function H (used in encoding pseudo-attributes) is collision-resistant, the LIT is
linkable, and the underlying digital signature schemes DS1 and DS2 are existentially
unforgeable
Proof. We show that if an adversary C against the anonymity of the ABS-UCL exists,
then we can construct a set of different adversaries, D1 against the soundness of the
NIZK NIZK, D2 against the linkability property of the LIT, D3 against the unforge-
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ability of the DS1, D4 against the unforgeability of DS2 and D5 against the collusion-
resistance of the hash function H for which we have:
AdvUnforgABS−UCL,C(λ) ≤AdvsoundNIZK,D1(λ) + ν(λ) · AdvUnforgDS1,D3(λ) + AdvUnforgDS2,D4(λ)
+AdvCollH,D5(λ)
We let ν(λ), a polynomial in λ, be the upper bound of honest attribute authorities in
this game. First, by the soundness of the NIZK NIZK, the adversary has negligible
probability to successfully fake proofs for false statements. Moreover, any forging
scenario that involves using different pairs of (message, predicate) that hash to same
value would be directly used to break the collision-resistance property of the hash
function H. For the digital signatures DS1 and DS2, we deal with them in different
cases. We will explain one of them and the second can be done analogously. For DS1,
the adversary D3 sets up the NIZK NIZK and DS2, and then he makes a guess about
an attribute authority AAi, with probability of success 1/ν(λ), that the adversary C
will include an attribute managed by it. The adversary D3 has full control over the
rest of the attribute authorities and thus he can deal with any request concerning these
attribute authorities, but for attributes managed by the AAi he forwards the queries to
its challenger (i.e. DS1’s challenger). For Sign queries, he can use the pseudo-attribute
to sign such queries. Eventually, whenD3 receives the signature from C, he can use the
extraction key of the NIZK NIZK, which he has already set up, to extract the witnesses,
and respond with the part concerning the guessed attribute authority AAi to the DS1’s
challenger. The game aborts if D3’s guess was not correct. The reduction to DS2 can
be done in a similar fashion, except that the adversaryD4 doesn’t need to make a guess
about the attribute authority since the target is the pseudo-attribute, so in this case the
game aborts if the forgery wasn’t against it.
Theorem 11. User-controlled linkability:
The attribute based signatures is User controlled linkable if the Linkable Indistinguish-
able Tag scheme LIT is linkable.
Proof. We will first deal with the case in which an adversary produces two supposedly
linkable signatures, but when testing them with Link, it says they are not. Given that
an adversary C has full control over the secret keys so he can generate secret keys to
any identity that he wants to be challenged on, say idLink. He should also pick the
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verifier’s name recip as a part of the challenge. At the end, he needs to produce two
signatures, σ1 and σ2 on behalf of the user idLink, for which σ1 = (σABS1 , σUCL1) and
σ2 = (σABS2 , σUCL2). He wins if the following are true:
• Verify(σ1,m1, recip) = Verify(σ2,m2, recip) = 1
• Link(σ1, σ2, recip) = 0
The contradiction is straightforward here, non-linkable signatures would lead to
σUCL1 6= σUCL2, where the fact that both signatures verify correctly against the same
recipient name recip, would lead to σUCL1 = σUCL2.
In the second case, the adversary aims to break the soundness of the linking al-
gorithm Link by producing supposedly non-linkable signatures (σ1, σ2) and yet Link
tells that they are linkable. This case can be easily reduced to breaking the linkabil-
ity property of the LIT scheme, as this can only be done by having (sk1, recip1) 6=
(sk2, recip2).
5.7 A Practical DTABS
We now show how to use the construction of ABS-UCL in the ROM to instantiate
DTABS in the ROM. The first two parts of the construction of ABS-UCL (see sec-
tion 5.5) will stay the same. We just need to replace LIT by an IND-CCA encryption
scheme. A good candidate for it would be the Cramer-Shoup scheme [CS98] (secure
under the DDH assumption) as presented in Fig. 5-1.
Traceability The signer needs to encrypt his identity id, and send it as a part of the
signature.
• C = PKE.Enc(pk, id) = (C1, C2, C3, V ).
• Choose βρid , βr ← Zp, and compute:
• C1 = L1βr ,C2 = L2βr , v = Hˇ(C1||C2||C3)
• C′ = K−βr · kβρid2
• V = F βr · (Hv)βr
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PKE.KeyGen(1λ)
• (G, p)← GrpSetup(1λ).
• L1, L2 ← G; k, f1, f2, h1, h2 ← Zp.
• F = L1f1 · L2f2 , H = L1h1 · L2h2 ,
K = L1
k.
• Hˇ : {0, 1}∗ → Zp
• pk = (L1, L2, F,H,K, Hˇ)
• sk = (k, f1, f2, h1, h2).
PKE.Enc(pk,M)
• r ← Zp.
• C1 = L1r, C2 = L2r, C3 = Kr ·M
• v = Hˇ(C1||C2||C3), V = F r ·Hrv
• Return C = (C1, C2, C3, V ).
PKE.Dec(sk, C)
• Parse C as (C1, C2, C3, V )
• Compute v = Hˇ(C1||C2||C3)
• Check if
C1
f1 · C2f2 · (C1h1 · C2h2)v = V
• Return M = C3/C1k.
Figure 5-1: IND-CCA scheme using Cramer–Shoup
Theses values need to be added to the hash computation, i.e.
c = HFS(λj||Si||Ti||Ki||U ||Kˆi||Uˆ ||Bj||Z||C1||C2||C′||V), ∀i ∈ [1, α],∀j ∈ [1, θ].
We also need to compute the response related to the random value r, i.e. rr = βr + c ·r
Verification In the verification, we need to add the parts related to the encryption
scheme as follows:
Given C = (C1, C2, C3, V ), pk = (L1, L2, F,H,K, Hˇ), compute:
• v = Hˇ(C1||C2||C3),
• C′ = Krr · k−rρid2 · (C3/U)−c
• C1 = L1rr · C−c1 ,
• C2 = L2rr · C−c2 ,
• V = F rr · (Hv)rcs · V −c
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Similarly, C′,C1,C2, and V need to be added to the verification of the hash value c.
cˆ = HFS(λj||Si||Ti||Ki||U ||Kˆi||Uˆ ||Bj||Z||C1||C2||C′||V)
This concludes the signing and verification algorithms in the DTABS scheme. To
verify that the opening was done correctly, here are the details (i.e. NIZK2 as originally
defined in Chapter 4) that the opener needs to send along with the signer’s identity id.
NIZK2. Prove
• For C = PKE.Enc(pk, id) = (C1, C2, C3, V ), compute:
Ck = C
k
1 Cf1 = C
f1
1 Cf2 = C
f2
2 Ch1 = C
h1
1 Ch2 = C
h2
2 ,
• βk, βf1 , βf2 , βh1 , βh2 ← Zp,
• Compute: Cβk1 , Cβf11 , Cβf22 , Cβh21 , Cβh22 .
• c = HFS(C1||C2||C3||V ||Cβk1 ||Cβf11 ||Cβf22 ||Cβh21 ||Cβh22 ).
• Response is Σ2 = {rk = βk + ck, rf1 = βf1 + cf1, rf2 = βf2 + cf2, rh1 =
βh1 + ch1, rh2 = βh2 + ch2}.
piTrace = (C1, C2, C3, V, Ck, Cf1 , Cf2 , Ch1 , Ch2 , c,Σ2)
NIZK2.Verify
• v = Hˇ(C1||C2||C3).
• Check if: Cf1 · Cf2 · Cvh1 · Cvh2 = V









• Check if: (c = cˆ∧ g2id = C3/Ck)
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented our Attribute Based Signature with User-Controlled
Linkability scheme (ABS–UCL). We first gave the intuition of the scheme and de-
fined the User-Controlled Linkability notion. We then gave the syntax and security
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definitions of our ABS–UCL. Moreover, we gave the modules needed to generically
construct it. We then gave its generic construction, and one practical instantiation in
the asymmetric setting in the random oracle model (ROM). We also gave the proofs
of the ABS–UCL theorems. We ended the chapter with a practical instantiation of
DTABS, but this time in the ROM.
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Chapter 6
Attribute Based Signatures with
Hidden Expressive Policy
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce a new attribute based signature scheme, namely, attribute
based signatures with hidden expressive policy from multilinear maps ABS-HEP. This
is a joint work with Liqun Chen, HP Labs, and a patent based on it has been applied
for HP [EKC14]. This scheme fully hides both the underlying signing policy and
the set of attributes being used from the verifier. We give a generic construction of
ABS-HEP along with its security model. The construction is based on the existence
of multilinear maps. The security properties hold under the multilinear computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption. An important feature is that signatures created by the
scheme are of a constant size, i.e. independent of the number of attributes presented
in the signing policy. For motivational purpose, we will start by giving the following
work scenario:
6.1.1 Scenario
Unlike chapters 4 and 5, where the verifier has a say in the policy, we now consider a
case where the verifier’s concern is only that the document is validly signed according
to the rules of the signers organisation.
Let us take a company as an example, although the proposed solution is suitable
for various organizations. Assume that the company has employees in different posi-
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tions. According to their positions, the employees are allowed to sign some message
on behalf of the company, e.g., the CEO alone can create a signature, a certain number
of managers in certain levels can work together to make a signature, and ordinary em-
ployees can go through a referendum to generate a signature. We want the identities
of the signers, along with the internal hierarchy of the company, to be hidden from a
signature verifier, as this is sensitive information of the company. The only informa-
tion that the verifier could learn from a given signature is that the signature could be
generated by the same level following company policies, without knowing anything
about the order of these levels and the policies.
Another potential example is the following: a university buying cloud services.
The university has a complex internal system, e.g. Research Students can spend up to
50 pounds, but above that need their supervisor’s signature etc., all of which is of no
concern to the cloud supplier as long as the bill is paid, therefore the signing policy
can be kept secret. The signer here could be a finance system (not a human being).
The university simply doesn’t want to expose the internal accounting system, but at
the same time, it doesn’t want people to spend money which they don’t have.
How different is ABS-HEP?
All the previous Attribute Based Signatures used bilinear maps as a building block
to construct their schemes. In our scheme, we use multilinear maps that allow us
to overcome some of the limitations caused by bilinear maps, namely, the level of
expressiveness of the policy. In our scheme, it is possible to go from boolean formu-
las/span programs (circuits with fanout=1) to deal with general circuits, and yet avoid
the backtracking attack (see section 6.2) that could have happened at any OR-gate if
one wanted to use bilinear maps. This is all possible thanks to the multilinear maps.
The contribution of ABS-HEP is three-fold:
• Circuits: This is the first attribute-based signature scheme that can deal with
general circuits as the signing policy.
• Policy privacy: The proposed attribute-based signature scheme allows the sign-
ing policy to be hidden along with the signing attributes, which enhances even
more the signer/signer’s organization privacy 1.
1In practical terms, the signer’s organisation can CHANGE policy without needing to inform the
verifier.
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• Constant size signature: The proposed scheme provides a constant size signature
and the verification process is very efficient.
6.2 Backtracking Attack
As described in [GGH+13b], a backtracking attack happens when using bilinear maps
to walk through a circuit in previous attribute based encryption/signatures schemes.
The idea is that when using bilinear maps we only have one target group GT , and
at each node we get a specific target group element. In fig 6-1, one can easily see
Figure 6-1: ABS for circuits using bilinear maps
how we can reuse an OR gate value to go backward and use it as an input to another
gate. In fig 6-2, we can see that different layers of a given circuit have values that
belong to different target groups, i.e. Gj,Gj+1, and that is why current constructions
of multilinear maps are often referred to as graded multilinear maps. Note that in
multilinear maps, it is not possible to go back from Gj+1 to Gj . Therefore, the OR
gate value at layer j + 1 cannot be used as an input to another gate at the same layer.
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Figure 6-2: ABS for circuits using multilinear maps
6.3 Modules needed to Construct ABS-HEP
Since we are working in the realm where we assume the existence of useful multilinear
maps, we will generalize the decision BDH assumption to what we call k-multilinear
assumptions.
6.3.1 Multilinear maps
Given the groups ~G = (G1, ...,Gk), and the following set:
E = {ei,j; ei,j : Gi ×Gj → Gi+j|i, j ≥ 1, i+ j ≤ k}







i+j : ∀a, b ∈ Zp
we define the following hardness assumptions related to Multilinear maps:
1For ease of exposition, we will often abuse notation and use e instead of ei,j .
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Definition 10. k-MDDH:
The k-Multilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (k-MDDH) assumes the following:
Given k groups (G1, . . . ,Gk), and generators (g = g1, . . . , gk) of prime order p,
also k + 1 group elements in G1 {gs, gc1 , · · · , gck} for s, c1, . . . , ck ∈ Zp.




k from a random group element inGk
is negligible in the security parameter λ (used initially to generate the groups).
Definition 11. k-MCDH:
The k-Multilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman (k-MCDH) assumes the follow-
ing:
Given k groups (G1, . . . ,Gk), and generators (g = g1, . . . , gk) of prime order p,
also k + 1 group elements in G1 {gs, gc1 , · · · , gck} for s, c1, . . . , ck ∈ Zp.





Observation 1. Note that l−MDDH is easy for all l < k, for instance, let l = k − 1,





easily done via the following test:








k−1 is always computable provided the (k-1)-multilinear groups
(G1, . . . , Gk−1). Note that the computational version is still assumed to be hard.
6.3.2 Simulatable-extractable Signature of Knowledge
We recall the simulatable- extractable signature of knowledge (SimExt-SoK) as it was
defined in [CL06]. Let L be a NP language, defined by R, a polynomial-time com-
putable binary relation. We define LR = {statement y | ∃ witness w : (y, w) ∈ R}.
A signature of knowledge (SoK) for a language LR consists of the three following
algorithms:
• SoK.Setup(1λ) : takes the security parameter and outputs the PSoK
• SoK.Sign(PSoK,R, y, w,m) : if (y, w) ∈ R, then outputs a signature σSoK, other-
wise outputs ⊥.
• SoK.Verify(PSoK, y,m, σSoK) : outputs 1 if σSoK is a valid signature, 0 otherwise.
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A signature of knowledge SoK has two security properties. The first is simulat-
ablity, which means the existence of an indistinguishable simulator that can sign
messages without knowing a witness. The second is extractablity, which means
the ability to extract a witness from a valid forged signature which wasn’t previ-
ously queried to the signing oracle. (See 3.8.2 for more details on simulatablity
and extractablity.)
6.4 Syntax and Security Definitions of ABS-HEP
6.4.1 Syntax
Let λ be a security parameter, ` be the maximum depth of all the circuits describing the
policies and n be the maximum input size for all attributes. A circuit f will be defined
by its description (n, q, A,B,GateType). The attribute-based signature scheme, ABS-
HEP = (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify), includes the following four algorithms.
• ABS-HEP.Setup(1λ, n, `): This outputs the public parameters P and the master
secret key MSK.
• ABS-HEP.KeyGen(MSK, f): This takes the master secret key MSK and outputs
skf .
• ABS-HEP.Sign(skf , x,m, f): This takes the secret key skf and outputs σ if
f(x) = 1, ⊥ otherwise.
• ABS-HEP.Verify(σ,m): This outputs 1 if σ verifies correctly against P, 0 other-
wise.
6.4.2 Security Definitions
The security of an ABS-HEP scheme includes two notions: Perfect Privacy and Un-
forgeability. Note that perfect privacy in the ABS-HEP scheme includes privacy of the
policy and privacy of the attributes.
Definition 12. Perfect Circuit/input privacy: The distribution of signatures on a mes-
sage m generated via different keys skf are indistinguishable, even given the secret
keys and master signing key.
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Definition 13. Unforgeability
The adversary should not be able to produce a valid ABS signature on a new mes-
sage m∗ even after seeing signatures on different messages of his choice. The unforge-
ablity game works as follows:
1. The challenger generates a key pair (P,MSK)← ABS.Setup(1λ, n, l) and pub-
lishes P.
2. The adversary can ask a polynomial number of signatures on messages w.r.t.
some circuits fi by calling the signing oracle OABS.Sign(MSK,−) The adversary
can ask a polynomial number of signatures on messages w.r.t. to the selected
circuit f and selected inputs x∗ s.t. f(x∗) = 1, by calling the signing oracle
OABS.Sign(MSK,−).
3. Finally, the adversary should output (m∗, σ∗). He wins if;
• ABS-HEP.Verify(σ∗,m∗) = 1.
• The message m∗ has been never queried to the signing oracle.
The scheme is unforgeable if the advantage of any PPT algorithm C in the above game
is negligible.
6.5 Generic Construction of ABS-HEP
Let λ be a security parameter, ` be the maximum depth of all the circuits describing
the policies and n be the maximum input size for all attributes. The attribute-based
signature scheme, ABS-HEP = (ABS-HEP.Setup, ABS-HEP.KeyGen, ABS-HEP.Sign,
ABS-HEP.Verify), includes the following four algorithms.
ABS-HEP.Setup(1λ, n, `)
Let k = ` + 1. The setup algorithm takes as input λ, ` and n, and produces groups
~G = (G1, ...,Gk+1) each of prime order p > 2λ, with canonical generators g1, ..., gk+1.
We let g = g1. Next, it chooses random values α, β ∈ Zp and h1, ..., hn ∈ G1. It sets
the master secret key MSK to be
(gk−1)α, β, h1, ..., hn,
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and outputs the public parameters, pp, which consist of the group sequence description
plus
K = gαk , d0 = g
β.
The algorithm also computes di = h
β
i for each i ∈ [1, n], which will be used as part of
each signing key.
ABS-HEP.KeyGen(MSK, f)
The algorithm takes as input the master secret key and a description f of a circuit,
and outputs a secret signing key, skf .
To create a specific signing key, the algorithm chooses random values r1, ..., rn+q ∈
Zp, where the random value rw is associated with wire w ∈ [1, n + q]. The algorithm
produces a “header” component
KH = (gk−1)α−rn+q .
The algorithm then generates key components for every wire w. The structure of the
key components depends upon whether w is an input wire, an OR gate or an AND
gate, and each case is described as follows.
• Input wire
By convention if w ∈ [1, n] then it corresponds to the w-th input. The key
generation algorithm chooses a random value zw ∈ Zp, and computes the key
components for w to be
Kw,1 = g
rw · hzww , Kw,2 = g−zw .
• OR gate
Suppose that wire w ∈ Gate, that GateType(w) = OR and that the gate has two
inputs called A and B. In addition, let j = depth(w) be the depth of wire w,
and let rA(w) be the rw value associated with A and rB(w) with B. The algorithm
chooses two random values aw, bw ∈ Zp, and then creates key components for
w to be:
Kw,1 = g
aw , Kw,2 = g
bw , Kw,3 = g
rw−aw·rA(w)





Suppose that wire w ∈ Gate, that GateType(w) = AND and that the gate has
two inputs called A and B. In addition, let j = depth(w) be the depth of wire w,
and let rA(w) be the rw value associated with A and rB(w) with B. The algorithm
chooses two random values aw, bw ∈ Zp, and then creates key components for
w to be:
Kw,1 = g
aw , Kw,2 = g
bw , Kw,3 = g
rw−aw·rA(w)−bw·rB(w)
j .
The algorithm finally outputs the secret signing key, skf , including KH , d1, ..., dn
together with all the keys for input, OR and AND wires.
Remark 1. A possible way to implement this scheme and in order to put less trust
in signers, one can split the secret key into two parts so the part that contains
{skAND, skOR} will be embedded in a certain signing device. Therefore, singers don’t
have control over this part of their secret keys.
ABS-HEP.Sign(skf , x,m, f)
Let skf be a secret signing key and x ∈ {0, 1}n for which f(x) = 1, where x is
chosen by the signer. Let m ∈ Zp be a message to be signed. A signature on m under
skf is a proof that the signer has computed g
α·β
k without knowing either α or β, and the
proof is bound with m. The signature will be created as follows.
First the signer chooses a random value t ∈ Zp, compute c0 = dt0. We let c0 be gs.
Note that the value s = β · t is unknown to the signer. Now, the signer uses the witness
t to produce a signature of knowledge SoK on m, i.e. σSoK ← (PSoK,R, t,m).




The signer makes a header computation to get
E ′ = e(KH , c0) = e(g
α−rn+q
k−1 , g
s) = gα·sk · g−rn+q ·sk .
Then, the signer computes grn+q ·sk . This is done by evaluating the circuit from the
bottom up. Consider wire w at depth j; if fw(x) = 1, the signer computes Ew =
(gj+1)
rw·s; if fw(x) = 0, the signer does nothing for that wire. The signer iteratively
starts with computing E1 and proceeds in order to finally compute En+q.
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Computing these values in order ensures that the computation on a depth j−1 wire
(that evaluates to 1) will be defined before computing for a depth j wire. We show how
to compute Ew for all w where fw(x) = 1, again breaking down the cases according
to whether the wire is an input, AND or OR gate.
• Input wire
By convention if w ∈ [1, n] then it corresponds to the w-th input. Suppose that
wire w satisfies fw(x) = 1. The algorithm computes cw = dtw and then:
Ew = e(Kw,1, c0) · e(Kw,2, cw) = e(grw · hzww , gs) · e(g−zw , hsw) = grw·s2 .
• OR gate
Consider a wire w ∈ Gate and that GateType(w) = OR. In addition, let j =
depth(w) be the depth of wirew, and fw(x) = 1. We first suppose that f(Aw) =
1 and f(Bw) = 0, the signer computes:




aw) · e(grw−aw·rA(w)j , c0) = (gj+1)rw·s.
Alternatively, if fA(w) = 0, but fB(w) = 1, then the signer computes:




bw) · e(grw−bw·rB(w)j , c0) = (gj+1)rw·s.
• AND gate
Consider a wire w ∈ Gate and that GateType(w) = AND. In addition, let
j = depth(w) be the depth of wire w. Suppose that fw(x) = 1, i.e., fA(w)(x) =
fB(w)(x) = 1 and the signer computes:




aw) · e(grB(w)·sj , gbw) · e(g
rw−aw·rA(w)−bw·rB(w)
j , c0) = (gj+1)
rw·s.
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If f(x) = fn+q(x) = 1, the signer gets En+q = g
rn+q ·s
k , and finally computes
σs = E
′ · En+q = gα·sk .
The entire signature is set as
σ = (c0, σSoK, σs).
ABS-HEP.Verify(σ,m)
To verify the candidate signature σ = (c0, σOTP , σs) on the message m, the verifier
does the following two verifications:
• SoK.Verify(PSoK, c0,m, σSoK): by this verification, the verifier is convinced that
c0 = d
t
0 and the value t is known by the signer. Recall that d0 = g
β and the
signer is not supposed to know the value β.
• Verify σs by checking whether the following equation holds.
e(σs, g) = e(K, c0).
By this verification, the verifier is convinced that σs = Ks for some value s that
is involved in the signer’s secret key.
If both of the verifications pass, the verifier accepts the signature σ; other rejects
it. This is because putting these two verifications together, s = β · t, that is
unknown to the signer.
The full proof for the following Theorem is in section 6.6 .
Theorem 12. The construction of ABS-HEP is secure if the k-MCDH assump-
tion holds over multilinear maps, and the signature of knowledge is simulatable-
extractable.
Comparison with ABS for circuits from multilinear maps done in [TLL14]
In [TLL14], and subsequent to our work in [EKC14], they provided an attribute
based signature scheme for circuits from multilinear maps. Their scheme shares with
ours the fact that it deals with the general type of policies, i.e circuits, and uses mul-
tilinear maps as a building block. However, their scheme doesn’t achieve the level of
privacy that we aim for in our scheme, i.e. hiding the policy and the attributes at the
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same time. Their scheme sends the input x to the circuit in the clear with the signa-
tures, because it’s needed in the verification process, whereas in our scheme we offer
full privacy in the sense that the verifier knows nothing about neither of policy and the
attributes.
6.6 Proofs
Theorem 13. The circuit and input, i.e. (f, x) of the proposed ABS-HEP scheme are
perfectly private.





s) ← ABS.Sign(skf2 , x∗,m, f2). The two distributions are perfectly in-
distinguishable. This follows directly from the construction and the fact that the sig-
natures are independent of fi and xi, i = 1, 2.
Theorem 14. The construction of ABS-HEP is unforgeable if the signature of knowl-
edge SoK is simulatable-extracble and the k-MCDH assumption holds over the multi-
linear maps.
Proof. We will show that if there exists an adversary C that can break the ABS-HEP
scheme, then we can construct an adversaryF1 that can break the simulation-extrability
property of the signature of knowledge SoK and another adversary F2 that can break
the k-MCDH assumption.
AdvUnforgABS,C(λ) ≤ AdvSimExtSoK,F1 + Advk-MCDHMultiMaps,F2
Adversary F1:
F2 sets up the ABS-HEP scheme as in the real case. He picks α, β uniformly at random
from Zp. He publishes the P as K = gαk and d0 = gβ . As he is playing against the
SimExt property of the SoK, he then has access to its signing oracle. Whenever C
asks for a signing query on (f,m), F2 picks t ← Zp, computes c0 = dt0, and sends
(t, c0, d0,m) to the SoK signing oracle to get σSoK. He sends the three parts of the









First, F1 receives the k-MCDH multilinear problem instance i.e, g, gs, gc1 , . . . , gck . F1




k in Gk. F1 can simulate the Setup phase as follows:





• He sets β = s and d0 = gs,
F1 outputs the public parameters, pp, including K = gαk and d0. F1 sets up the sig-
nature of knowledge by himself, so he can answer signing queries to SoK by running
his signing oracle (which doesn’t need a witness to sign). Whenever C asks for a sign-
ing query on a tuple (f,m), F1 first picks a uniformly random γ ← Zp, computes
σs = g
α·γ
k and c0 = g
γ . Now, he runs the simulator of the SoK to sign m without
a witness to get σSoK. The resultant ABS-HEP signature (c0, σSoK, σs) clearly passes
both verification tests.
Forgery
• Let σ∗ be the forged signature where σ∗ = (c∗0, σ∗SoK, σ∗s). The challenger can,
with overwhelming probability, extract the secret key t∗ = logd0 c
∗
0. In addition,
the following equation holds:
e(σ∗s , g) = e(g
α
k , c0) (6.1)
Notice that RHS of the equation (6.1) is equal to gαβt
∗




After the challenger extracted t∗, he can easily compute (σ∗s)
1/t∗ , i.e gαβk . Knowing
















τ is computable, simply by lifting gβ to gβk using the multilinear maps, and then raising
it to the power of ξ which the challenger knows of, therefore, the challenger’s answer
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to the k-MCDH challenger is (σ∗s)
1/t/τ .
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented our Attribute Based Signature with Hidden Expressive
Policy scheme (ABS–HEP). We first gave the intuition of the scheme, the motivation,
defined the hidden expressive policy notion, and gave a real case scenario. We then
gave the syntax and security definitions of our ABS–HEP. Moreover, we gave the
modules needed to generically construct it, followed by its generic construction. We
concluded this chapter by proving the theorems of ABS–HEP.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we substantially improved the state-of-the-art of Attribute Based Signa-
tures in two important ways. Firstly, we moved Attribute Based Signatures, that use
bilinear maps as one of their building blocks, into a practical state. In order to do so,
we gave two generic solutions to ABS that deal with Traceability and User-Controlled
Linkability respectively. Secondly, we gave a generic construction of another type of
ABS where the verifiers don’t have a say in the signing policy. Furthermore, the pro-
posed scheme yield a signature that doesn’t reveal any information about the signing
policy.
The first enriched ABS is the DTABS, where we generically added the Traceability
feature to ABS. The existence of the Traceability is crucial when it comes to putting
ABS into practical use. It is a security feature that anonymous schemes like ABS need
to have in order to deal with any misuse/abuse cases. A tracing authority can be called
on to open any signature subject of dispute. A Judge of public opinion makes sure that
the tracing authority is saying the truth and no framing is taking place.
The second enriched ABS is ABS-UCL, where we generically added the User-
Controlled Linkability feature to ABS. As traceability is usually thought of as a
trouble-shooting tool, there appears to be a real need for another tool that can deal with
normal use cases of ABS. User-Controlled Linkability offers a way for ABS users to
have “active sessions” between themselves, that is actually analogous to the idea of
WWW cookies.
Negotiations in general necessitate this type of signature scheme. One practical
example of a negotiation is a travel booking system, e.g. holding flights while still
looking at hotels, etc. In this case, a given signer doesn’t actually need to reveal
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anything about his personal identity to convince a certain verifier that he is still talking
to the same signer. All what they need to do is to switch on this security feature and
send a series of linkable signatures, that assure to the verifier that all these signatures
are indeed signed by the same signer.
The two important security tools were added to ABS in a modular and generic way,
in the sense that, both schemes DTABS and ABS-UCL were proven generically, and
the security requirements of the underlying modules were very well defined. There-
fore, the efficiency of the concrete constructions would only get better whenever new
concrete instantiations of the modules appear. Additionally, all our constructions work
in a decentralised fashion where there was no reliance on a central authority at all.
Multiple attribute authorities were involved in the schemes, each of them responsible
for a certain set of attributes.
Next, we investigated new promising cryptographic tools, e.g. multilinear maps,
and we gave the first ABS scheme that fully hides both the signing policy and the
attributes being used to satisfy it, which offers great levels of anonymity and flexibility.
As we mentioned before, a direct application of such a system is related to cloud
computing.
This scheme was interesting enough for HP-Labs to protect it and apply for a patent
for it. Their main motivation was its potential use in cloud computing (e.g. regulatory
compliance).
The proposed ABS scheme deals with the most expressive type of policies, i.e. cir-
cuits, and this was not possible without using the multilinear maps tool. We presented
a generic construction that relies on two modules, namely the multilinear maps and
signature of knowledge. We believe that this work illustrates the great progress that
can be made using multilinear maps.
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Future Work
There is no doubt that Attribute Based Cryptography is going to play an essential role
in the near future, especially with the remarkable growth of the Cloud Computing
business which has several security requirements to fulfil, including compliance to
regulations, etc. Both Attribute Based Encryption and Signatures have their essential
and important use in maintaining both confidentiality and authenticity. Therefore, one
aims to get even more efficient constructions (in terms of the signature) of enriched
ABS (i.e. DTABS, ABS-UCL).
So far, all the constructed schemes of attribute based signatures schemes, that deal
with policies of predicate type yield signatures of a size that is linear in the number of
attributes that appears in the predicate. It would be great if we could come up with an
ABS scheme which yields a constant size signature or maybe sub-linear in the number
of attributes presented in the signing policy. One possible way to get DTABS and
ABS–UCL schemes that yield constant size signature is to deal with less expressive
policies. Instead of using signing policies of predicate type, one can use threshold
policies, e.g. a given signer should have n out of m attributes presented in the policy
to be able to sign. This is an ongoing work with Essam Ghadafi (Bristol University)
and Liqun Chen (HP Labs).
The second path is to modularly add both traceability and user-controlled linka-
bility to one ABS scheme. A new security model has to be defined to deal with this
scheme. This would give an ABS scheme that can deal with misuse cases and at the
same time can give the verifier some control to tell whether or not he is still in the same
session and talking with the same anonymous signer.
The fourth path is to use another approach to provide linkability. Instead of giving
signatures that can be publicly checked whether or not they are linkable, we can have a
linking authority that is responsible for checking whether a set of signatures belong to
the same anonymous signer or not. The linking authority should not be able to repeal
the anonymity of the signatures. A judge is of course needed here to verify if they
linking test was done correctly.
The fifth path is to study the applicability of ABS–UCL in the reputation system
domain [RKZF00]. Recall that in a reputation system, users can rate products/services
which they previously purchased. These systems often have some restrictions so that
users are allowed to rate these products only once. Users that try to rate the same
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product more than once are misusing the system and therefore their identity should be
revealed. A user can anonymously rate different products, he might choose to link his
rating, but he can’t rate more than once. A tracing authority can be helpful in this case.
Further research is needed here to study how compatible existing ABS schemes are
with the security requirements of reputations systems.
The sixth path is about the compatibility of multilinear maps with existing schemes,
e.g. (NIZK, etc.). As we mentioned earlier, the development and cryptanalysis of mul-
tilinear maps are still at nascent stage and some of the recently realised multilinear map
schemes are more vulnerable against certain attacks than others. On the other hand,
each of these schemes enjoys different “hardness assumptions”, i.e. some assumptions
that hold for some mulilinear maps construction don’t hold for other schemes (e.g.
DLIN [BBS04]). The study of the compatibility of existing schemes with the concrete





[ABR01] Michel Abdalla, Mihir Bellare, and Phillip Rogaway. The oracle Diffie-
Hellman assumptions and an analysis of dhies. In CT-RSA, pages 143–
158, 2001. 166
[ACHO13] M. Abe, S. S. M. Chow, K. Haralambiev, and M. Ohkubo. Double-
trapdoor anonymous tags for traceable signatures. In International Jour-
nal of Information Security, Springer LNCS 12, Issue 1, pp. 19–31,
2013, 2013. 80
[Adl94] Leonard M. Adleman. The function field sieve. In Proceedings of the
First International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory, ANTS-I,
pages 108–121, London, UK, UK, 1994. Springer-Verlag. 41, 46
[AFCK+12] Diego F. Aranha, Laura Fuentes-Castan˜eda, Edward Knapp, Alfred
Menezes, and Francisco Rodrı´guez-Henrı´quez. Implementing pairings
at the 192-bit security level. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2012:232,
2012. 46
[AGOT14] Masayuki Abe, Jens Groth, Miyako Ohkubo, and Mehdi Tibouchi.
Structure-preserving signatures from type ii pairings. Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2014/312, 2014. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
82, 100
[ALdP11] Nuttapong Attrapadung, Benot Libert, and Elie de Panafieu. Expres-
sive key-policy attribute-based encryption with constant-size cipher-
texts, 2011. 26
[AP13] Nadhem J. AlFardan and Kenneth G. Paterson. Lucky thirteen: Breaking
the tls and dtls record protocols. In IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, pages 526–540, 2013. 19
[BB04a] D. Boneh and X. Boyen. Short Signatures Without Random Oracles.




[BB04b] Dan Boneh and Xavier Boyen. Efficient selective-id secure identity-
based encryption without random oracles. In Christian Cachin and
Jan Camenisch, editors, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2004,
volume 3027 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 223–238.
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2004. 10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3 14. 25,
166, 170
[BB04c] Dan Boneh and Xavier Boyen. Secure identity based encryption without
random oracles. In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2004, volume
3152 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 443–459. Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 2004. Available at http://www.cs.stanford.
edu/˜xb/crypto04b/. 25
[BBD+13] Razvan Barbulescu, Cyril Bouvier, Je´re´mie Detrey, Pierrick Gaudry,
Hamza Jeljeli, Emmanuel Thome´, Marion Videau, and Paul Zimmer-
mann. Discrete logarithm in GF(2809) with FFS. IACR Cryptology ePrint
Archive, 2013:197, 2013. 33
[BBS04] Dan Boneh, Xavier Boyen, and Hovav Shacham. Short group signatures.
In In proceedings of CRYPTO 04, LNCS series, pages 41–55. Springer-
Verlag, 2004. 76, 86, 146, 167
[BCC88] Gilles Brassard, David Chaum, and Claude Cre´peau. Minimum disclo-
sure proofs of knowledge. J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 37(2):156–189, October
1988. 55
[BCK96] Mihir Bellare, Ran Canetti, and Hugo Krawczyk. Keying hash functions
for message authentication. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual Inter-
national Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO
’96, pages 1–15, London, UK, UK, 1996. Springer-Verlag. 18
[BDZ03] Feng Bao, Robert Deng, and HuaFei Zhu. Variations of Diffie-Hellman
Problem. 2836:301–312, 2003. 173
[Bei96] Amos Beimel. Secure schemes for secret sharing and key distribution.




[Bei11] Amos Beimel. Secret-sharing schemes: A survey. In YeowMeng Chee,
Zhenbo Guo, San Ling, Fengjing Shao, Yuansheng Tang, Huaxiong
Wang, and Chaoping Xing, editors, Coding and Cryptology, volume
6639 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 11–46. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. 87
[BF01] D. Boneh and M. K. Franklin. Identity-based encryption from the Weil
pairing. In CRYPTO 2001, pp. 213–229, 2001. 40
[BF03] Dan Boneh and Matthew K. Franklin. Identity-based encryption from
the weil pairing. SIAM J. Comput., 32(3):586–615, 2003. 24, 42
[BFG13a] D. Bernhard, G. Fuchsbauer, and E. Ghadafi. Efficient Signatures of
Knowledge and DAA in the Standard Model. In ACNS 2013, Springer
LNCS 7954, pp. 518–533, 2013. 113
[BFG+13b] D. Bernhard, G. Fuchsbauer, E. Ghadafi, N.P. Smart, and B. Warinschi.
Anonymous attestation with user-controlled linkability. In International
Journal of Information Security, 12(3), pp. 219–249, 2013. 113, 115,
116
[BFI+10] Olivier Blazy, Georg Fuchsbauer, Malika Izabache`ne, Amandine Jam-
bert, Herve´ Sibert, and Damien Vergnaud. Batch groth-sahai. pages
218–235, 2010. 98, 100
[BFK+06] R. Bobba, O. Fatemieh, F. Khan, C.A. Gunter, and H. Khurana. Using
Attribute-Based Access Control to Enable Attribute-Based Messaging.
In ACSAC 2006, IEEE Computer Society 3027, pp. 403–413, 2006. 27
[BFM88] Manuel Blum, Paul Feldman, and Silvio Micali. Non-interactive zero-
knowledge and its applications. In Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC ’88, pages 103–112,
New York, NY, USA, 1988. ACM. 56
[BKK+09] Joppe W. Bos, Marcelo E. Kaihara, Thorsten Kleinjung, Arjen K.
Lenstra, and Peter L. Montgomery. On the security of 1024-bit rsa and
160-bit elliptic curve cryptography. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2009/389, 2009. http://eprint.iacr.org/. 33
150
REFERENCES
[BKLS02] Paulo Barreto, Hae Kim, Ben Lynn, and Michael Scott. Efficient algo-
rithms for pairing-based cryptosystems. In Moti Yung, editor, Advances
in Cryptology CRYPTO 2002, volume 2442 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 354–369. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2002. 48
[BLS03] Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, Ben Lynn, and Michael Scott. Constructing el-
liptic curves with prescribed embedding degrees. pages 257–267, 2003.
43, 45, 46
[BLS04a] Paulo Barreto, Ben Lynn, and Michael Scott. On the selection of pairing-
friendly groups. In Mitsuru Matsui and Robert Zuccherato, editors, Se-
lected Areas in Cryptography, volume 3006 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 17–25. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2004. 48
[BLS04b] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham. Short Signatures from the Weil
Pairing. In Journal of Cryptology 2004, Springer-Verlag, 297-319, 2004.
40, 115
[BMW03] Mihir Bellare, Daniele Micciancio, and Bogdan Warinschi. Founda-
tions of group signatures: formal definition, simplified requirements and
a construction based on trapdoor permutations. In Eli Biham, editor,
Advances in cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2003, proceedings of the in-
ternarional conference on the theory and application of cryptographic
techniques, volume 2656 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
614–629, Warsaw, Poland, May 2003. Springer-Verlag. 21
[BN00] Mihir Bellare and Chanathip Namprempre. Authenticated encryp-
tion: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composi-
tion paradigm. In Tatsuaki Okamoto, editor, Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT 2000, volume 1976 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 531–545. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2000. 18
[BN06] Paulo S.L.M. Barreto and Michael Naehrig. Pairing-friendly elliptic
curves of prime order. In Bart Preneel and Stafford Tavares, editors,
Selected Areas in Cryptography, volume 3897 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science. 2006. 46, 48
151
REFERENCES
[Bon98] Dan Boneh. The decision diffie-hellman problem. In JoeP. Buhler, edi-
tor, Algorithmic Number Theory, volume 1423 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 48–63. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1998. 35
[Boy07] X. Boyen. Mesh Signatures. In EUROCRYPT 2007, Springer LNCS
4515, pp. 210–227, 2007. 27
[BR93] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A Paradigm
for Designing Efficient Protocols. In ACM-CCS 1993, ACM, pp. pp. 62–
73, 1993. 8, 23, 28
[BS99] Mihir Bellare and Amit Sahai. Non-malleable encryption: Equivalence
between two notions, and an indistinguishability-based characterization.
In Michael Wiener, editor, Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 99, vol-
ume 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 78–78. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 1999. 17
[BS02] Dan Boneh and Alice Silverberg. Applications of multilinear forms
to cryptography. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2002/080, 2002.
http://eprint.iacr.org/. 67
[BSW06] Dan Boneh, Emily Shen, and Brent Waters. Strongly unforgeable signa-
tures based on computational Diffie-Hellman. In Moti Yung, Yevgeniy
Dodis, Aggelos Kiayias, and Tal Malkin, editors, Public Key Cryptog-
raphy - PKC 2006, volume 3958 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 229–240. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. 20
[BSW07] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption, May 2007. 26
[BWZ14] Dan Boneh, David J. Wu, and Joe Zimmerman. Immunizing multilin-
ear maps against zeroizing attacks. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2014/930, 2014. http://eprint.iacr.org/. 67
[cae12] Caesar: Competition for Autheticated Encryption. Security, Appli-




[CH91] David Chaum and Eugene Heyst. Group signatures. In DonaldW.
Davies, editor, Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 91, volume 547
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 257–265. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 1991. 20
[Che06] Jung Hee Cheon. Security analysis of the strong Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem, 2006. 166
[Che10] L. Chen. A DAA Scheme Requiring Less TPM Resources. In Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 350-365, 2010.
115
[CHK03] Ran Canetti, Shai Halevi, and Jonathan Katz. Chosen-ciphertext secu-
rity from identity-based encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2003/182, 2003. http://eprint.iacr.org/. 25
[CHL+14] Jung Hee Cheon, Kyoohyung Han, Changmin Lee, Hansol Ryu, and
Damien Stehle. Cryptanalysis of the multilinear map over the inte-
gers. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/906, 2014. http:
//eprint.iacr.org/. 67
[CKS08] David Cash, Eike Kiltz, and Victor Shoup. The twin Diffie-Hellman
problem and applications. In Nigel Smart, editor, Advances in Cryptol-
ogy EUROCRYPT 2008, volume 4965 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 127–145. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2008. 36, 167,
172
[CL01] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya. An Efficient System for Non-
transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revo-
cation. In EUROCRYPT 2001, Springer LNCS 2045, pp. 93–118, 2001.
27
[CL06] Melissa Chase and Anna Lysyanskaya. On signatures of knowledge. In
In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 06, pages 78–96. Springer, 2006.
133
[CLT13] Jean-Sbastien Coron, Tancrde Lepoint, and Mehdi Tibouchi. Practical
multilinear maps over the integers. In Ran Canetti and JuanA. Garay, ed-
153
REFERENCES
itors, Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 2013, volume 8042 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 476–493. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
2013. 67, 68
[CLT14] Jean-Sebastien Coron, Tancrede Lepoint, and Mehdi Tibouchi. Crypt-
analysis of two candidate fixes of multilinear maps over the inte-
gers. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/975, 2014. http:
//eprint.iacr.org/. 67
[CM09] Sanjit Chatterjee and Alfred Menezes. On cryptographic protocols em-
ploying asymmetric pairings - the role of psi revisited. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 2009:480, 2009. 25, 42, 43
[CM14] Sanjit Chatterjee and Alfred Menezes. Type 2 structure-preserving sig-
nature schemes revisited. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/635,
2014. http://eprint.iacr.org/. 62, 82, 100
[Coc01] Clifford Cocks. An identity based encryption scheme based on quadratic
residues. In Bahram Honary, editor, Cryptography and Coding, volume
2260 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 360–363. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2001. 10.1007/3-540-45325-3 32. 24
[Cop84] D. Coppersmith. Fast evaluation of logarithms in fields of characteristic
two. Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 30(4):587 – 594, jul
1984. 44
[CS98] R. Cramer and V. Shoup. A practical public key cryptosystem prov-
ably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. In CRYPTO 1998,
Springer LNCS 3152, pp. 13–25, 1998. 25, 125
[CS06] Sanjit Chatterjee and Palash Sarkar. On (hierarchical) identity based
encryption protocols with short public parameters (with an exposition of
waters’ artificial abort technique). Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2006/279, 2006. http://eprint.iacr.org/. 25
[DDN91] Danny Dolev, Cynthia Dwork, and Moni Naor. Non-malleable cryptog-
raphy. In Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on
Theory of computing, STOC ’91, pages 542–552, 1991. 15, 17
154
REFERENCES
[DH76] W. Diffie and M. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. Information
Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 22(6):644 – 654, nov 1976. 13, 19, 34
[EHM11] A. Escala, J. Herranz, and P. Morillo. Revocable Attribute-Based Signa-
tures with Adaptive Security in the Standard Model. In AFRICACRYPT
2011, Springer LNCS 6737, pp. 224–241, 2011. 28, 29, 77, 78
[EKC14] Ali El Kaafarani and Liqun Chen. Attribute based signatures with
hidden expressive policy. Patent application for Hewlet Packard,
PCT/US2014/047773 , filed on 23/07/2014. 2014. 1, 129, 139
[EKCGD14] Ali El Kaafarani, Liqun Chen, Essam Ghadafi, and James Davenport.
Attribute-based signatures with user controlled linkability. In Cryptol-
ogy and Network Security CANS 2014, Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence. Springer International Publishing, 2014. 1, 109
[EKGK13] Ali El Kaafarani, Essam Ghadafi, and Dalia Khader. Decentralized
traceable attribute-based signatures. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2013/828, 2013. http://eprint.iacr.org/. 1, 70, 116
[EKGK14] Ali El Kaafarani, Essam Ghadafi, and Dalia Khader. Decentralized trace-
able attribute-based signatures. In Josh Benaloh, editor, Topics in Cryp-
tology CT-RSA 2014, volume 8366 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 327–348. Springer International Publishing, 2014. 1, 4, 70,
100
[Eni14] Enisa 2014: Algorithms, Key sizes, and Parameters. http://www.
enisa.europa.eu/, 2014. 33
[FKMV12] Sebastian Faust, Markulf Kohlweiss, GiorgiaAzzurra Marson, and
Daniele Venturi. On the non-malleability of the fiat-shamir transform.
In Steven Galbraith and Mridul Nandi, editors, Progress in Cryptology -
INDOCRYPT 2012, volume 7668 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 60–79. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. 58
[FLA06] K.B. Frikken, J. Li, and M.J. Atallah. Trust negotiation with hidden cre-
dentials, hidden policies, and policy cycles. In NDSS 2006, The Internet
Society, pp. 157–172, 2006. 27
155
REFERENCES
[FR94] G. Frey and H. Ruck. A remark concerning m-divisibility and the dis-
crete logarithm in the divisor class group of curves. page 62:865874,
1994. 41, 44
[Fre06] David Freeman. Constructing pairing-friendly elliptic curves with em-
bedding degree 10. In Florian Hess, Sebastian Pauli, and Michael Pohst,
editors, Algorithmic Number Theory, volume 4076 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 452–465. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2006.
46
[FS87] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions
to identification and signature problems. 263, 1987. 58, 116
[FST10] David Freeman, Michael Scott, and Edlyn Teske. A taxonomy of
pairing-friendly elliptic curves, 2010. 10.1007/s00145-009-9048-z. 43,
44, 45, 46
[Fuc09] Georg Fuchsbauer. Automorphic signatures in bilinear groups and an
application to round-optimal blind signatures, 2009. 81, 86
[Fuc11] Georg Fuchsbauer. Commuting signatures and verifiable encryption. In
Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2011, pages 224–245. Springer
LNCS 6632, May 2011. 81
[Gal05] David Galindo. Boneh-franklin identity based encryption revisited. In
Lus Caires, Giuseppe Italiano, Lus Monteiro, Catuscia Palamidessi, and
Moti Yung, editors, Automata, Languages and Programming, volume
3580 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 102–102. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2005. 10.1007/11523468 64. 25
[Gal12] Steven D. Galbraith. Mathematics of public key cryptography. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 2012. 23, 36, 37, 38,
39, 40, 47, 48
[Gen06] Craig Gentry. Practical identity-based encryption without random ora-
cles. In EUROCRYPT, pages 445–464, 2006. 25, 170
[GGH13a] Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, and Shai Halevi. Candidate multilinear
maps from ideal lattices. In Thomas Johansson and PhongQ. Nguyen,
156
REFERENCES
editors, Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 2013, volume 7881 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1–17. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg, 2013. 67
[GGH+13b] Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Amit Sahai, and Brent Wa-
ters. Attribute-based encryption for circuits from multilinear maps.
8043:479–499, 2013. 9, 131
[Gha14] E. Ghadafi. Stronger Security Notions for Decentralized Traceable
Attribute-Based Signatures and More Efficient Constructions. In Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/278, 2014. 100
[GHS02] P. Gaudry, F. Hess, and N. Smart. Constructive and destructive facets of
weil descent on elliptic curves. Journal of Cryptology, 15:19–46, 2002.
10.1007/s00145-001-0011-x. 40
[Gir14] Damien Giry. Bluekrypt: Cryptographic Key Length Recommendation.
http://www.keylength.com/, 2014. 33
[GKR04] Rosario Gennaro, Hugo Krawczyk, and Tal Rabin. Secure hashed diffie-
hellman over non-ddh groups. In Christian Cachin and JanL. Camenisch,
editors, Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2004, volume 3027 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 361–381. Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2004. 35, 170
[GM84] Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali. Probabilistic encryption. Journal
of Computer and System Sciences, 28(2):270 – 299, 1984. 15
[GMR88] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Ronald L. Rivest. A digital signa-
ture scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. SIAM J.
Comput., 17(2):281–308, April 1988. 19
[GMR89] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. The knowledge complexity of
interactive proof systems. SIAM Journal on Computing, 18(1):186–208,
1989. 53, 54, 55
[GMV07] S.D. Galbraith, J.F. McKee, and P.C. Valena. Ordinary abelian varieties
having small embedding degree. Finite Fields and Their Applications,
13(4):800 – 814, 2007. 46
157
REFERENCES
[GMW91] Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, and Avi Wigderson. Proofs that yield
nothing but their validity or all languages in np have zero-knowledge
proof systems. J. ACM, 38(3):690–728, July 1991. 53
[GMY03] Juan A. Garay, Philip MacKenzie, and Ke Yang. Strengthening zero-
knowledge protocols using signatures. In Proceedings of the 22Nd Inter-
national Conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Tech-
niques, EUROCRYPT’03, pages 177–194, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003.
Springer-Verlag. 57, 58
[GNSN12] Ma. Gagne´, S. Narayan, and R. Safavi-Naini. Short Pairing-Efficient
Threshold-Attribute-Based Signature. In Pairing 2012, Springer LNCS
7708, pp. 295–313, 2012. 28
[GO94] Oded Goldreich and Yair Oren. Definitions and properties of zero-
knowledge proof systems. Journal of Cryptology, 7(1):1–32, 1994. 54
[GPS08] Steven D. Galbraith, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Nigel P. Smart. Pairings
for cryptographers. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 156(16):3113–3121,
2008. 43
[GPSW06] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Attribute-Based Encryp-
tion for Fine-Grained Access Control of Encrypted Data. In CCS 2006,
ACM ,pp. 89–98, 2006. 24
[Gro06] J. Groth. Simulation-sound NIZK proofs for a practical language and
constant size group signatures. In ASIACRYPT 2006, Springer LNCS
4284, pp. 444–459, 2006. 58, 92
[Gro07] Jens Groth. Fully anonymous group signatures without random oracles.
In Kaoru Kurosawa, editor, Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT 2007,
volume 4833 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 2007. 92
[GS08] Jens Groth and Amit Sahai. Efficient non-interactive proof systems for
bilinear groups. In Nigel Smart, editor, Advances in Cryptology EU-
ROCRYPT 2008, volume 4965 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 415–432. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. 58, 59, 62
158
REFERENCES
[GS12] J. Groth and A. Sahai. Efficient non-interactive proof systems for bilin-
ear groups. In SIAM Journal on Computing, volume 41(5), pp. 1193–
1232, 2012. 83
[GSW09] Practical zero-knowledge proofs for circuit evaluation. In MatthewG.
Parker, editor, Cryptography and Coding, volume 5921 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science. 2009. 98, 100
[GSW10] Essam Ghadafi, Nigel P. Smart, and Bogdan Warinschi. Groth-sahai
proofs revisited. In Public Key Cryptography, pages 177–192, 2010. 83,
100
[HLLR12] J. Herranz, F. Laguillaumie, B. Libert, and C. Ra´fols. Short Attribute-
Based Signatures for Threshold Predicates. In CT-RSA 2012, Springer
LNCS 7178, pp. 51–67, 2012. 28
[HSV06] F. Hess, N.P. Smart, and F. Vercauteren. The eta pairing revisited. Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/110, 2006. http://eprint.
iacr.org/. 41
[ISO13] ISO/IEC. ISO/IEC 20008 Information technology. Security techniques
–Anonymous digital signatures (All parts), 2013. 112
[JL02] Antoine Joux and Reynald Lercier. The function field sieve is quite
special. In ANTS, pages 431–445, 2002. 32
[JN03] Antoine Joux and Kim Nguyen. Separating decision Diffie-Hellman
from computational Diffie-Hellman in cryptographic groups. J. Cryp-
tology, 16(4):239–247, 2003. 35, 170
[Jou00] Antoine Joux. A one round protocol for tripartite diffie-hellman.
1838:385–393, 2000. 10.1007/10722028 23. 41
[Jou13a] Antoine Joux. Faster index calculus for the medium prime case applica-
tion to 1175-bit and 1425-bit finite fields. pages 177–193, 2013. 33
[Jou13b] Antoine Joux. A new index calculus algorithm with complexity l(1/4 +




[Kak10] S.A. Kakvi. Efficient fully anonymous group signatures based
on the groth group signature scheme. Masters thesis, University
College London, 2010. http://www5.rz.rub.de:8032/mam/
foc/content/publ/thesis_kakvi10.pdf, 2010. 85, 98, 100
[KCD09] D. Khader, L. Chen, and J. H. Davenport. Certificate-Free Attribute
Authentication. In Cryptography and Coding: IMACC 2009, Springer
LNCS 5921, pp. 301–325, 2009. 28
[KGH83] E.D. Karnin, J. Greene, and M.E. Hellman. On secret sharing systems.
Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, 29(1):35–41, Jan 1983. 87
[Kha07] D. Khader. Attribute based group signatures with revocation. In Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive, Report 2007/241, http://eprint.iacr.
org/2007/241.pdf, 2007. 28, 29, 75
[Kil06] Eike Kiltz. Chosen-ciphertext security from tag-based encryption. In
Shai Halevi and Tal Rabin, editors, Theory of Cryptography, volume
3876 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 581–600. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. vii, 84, 85, 96
[Kil07] Eike Kiltz. Chosen-ciphertext secure key-encapsulation based on gap
hashed Diffie-Hellman. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2007:36,
2007. 167
[KL07] Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. Introduction to Modern Cryptogra-
phy (Chapman & Hall/Crc Cryptography and Network Security Series).
Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2007. 15
[KM05] Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes. Pairing-based cryptography at high
security levels. In IMA Int. Conf., pages 13–36, 2005. 44
[KM15] Neal Koblitz and Alfred Menezes. The random oracle model: A twenty-
year retrospective. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/140, 2015.
http://eprint.iacr.org/. 23
[KSS08] Ezekiel Kachisa, Edward Schaefer, and Michael Scott. Constructing
brezing-weng pairing-friendly elliptic curves using elements in the cy-
clotomic field. In Steven Galbraith and Kenneth Paterson, editors,
160
REFERENCES
Pairing-Based Cryptography Pairing 2008, volume 5209 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 126–135. Springer Berlin / Heidel-
berg, 2008. 46
[KV08] Eike Kiltz and Yevgeniy Vahlis. CCA2 secure IBE: Standard model ef-
ficiency through authenticated symmetric encryption. IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, 2008:20, 2008. 170, 172
[KW93] M. Karchmer and A. Wigderson. On span programs. In 8th IEEE Struc-
ture in Complexity Theory, pp. 102–111, 1993. 86
[KY00] Jonathan Katz and Moti Yung. Complete characterization of security
notions for probabilistic private-key encryption. In Proceedings of the
Thirty-second Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC
’00, pages 245–254, New York, NY, USA, 2000. ACM. 15
[LAS+10] Jin Li, Man Ho Au, Willy Susilo, Dongqing Xie, and Kui Ren. Attribute-
based signature and its applications. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM
Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security,
ASIACCS ’10, pages 60–69, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM. 28
[LK08] J. Li and K. Kim. Attribute-Based Ring Signatures. In Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2008/394, http://eprint.iacr.org/
2008/394.pdf, 2008. 28, 75
[LL82] A. K. Lenstra and H. W. Lenstra. Factoring polynomials with rational
coefficients. Muth. Ann, pages 515–534, 1982. 41
[Men05] Alfred Menezes, editor. Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2005, The Cryp-
tographers’ Track at the RSA Conference 2005, San Francisco, CA,
USA, February 14-18, 2005, Proceedings, volume 3376 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science. Springer, 2005. 21, 76, 77
[Mil86] Victor S. Miller. Short programs for functions on curves. In IBM Thomas
J. Watson Research Center, 1986. 47
[MNT01] Miyaji, Nakabayashi, and Takano. New Explicit Conditions of Elliptic
Curve Traces for FR-Reduction. TIEICE: IEICE Transactions on Com-
161
REFERENCES
munications/Electronics/Information and Systems, 2001. 40, 41, 43, 45,
46
[MOV93] Alfred Menezes, Tatsuaki Okamoto, and Scott A. Vanstone. Reducing
elliptic curve logarithms to logarithms in a finite field. IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory, 39(5):1639–1646, 1993. 32, 34, 41, 44,
170
[MPR08] Hemanta Maji, Manoj Prabhakaran, and Mike Rosulek. Attribute-Based
Signatures: Achieving Attribute-Privacy and Collusion-Resistance. In
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/328, http://eprint.
iacr.org/2008/328.pdf, 2008. 24, 27, 28, 29
[MPR11] Hemanta Maji, Manoj Prabhakaran, and Mike Rosulek. Attribute-Based
Signatures. In CT-RSA 2011, Springer LNCS 6558, pp. 376–392, 2011.
20, 27, 28, 77, 89, 116
[MRY04] P. MacKenzie, M.K. Reiter, and K. Yang. Alternatives to Non-
malleability: Definitions, Constructions, and Applications. In TCC
2004, Springer LNCS 2951, pp. 171–190, 2004, 2004. 83
[MZW96] Alfred Menezes, Robert Zuccherato, and Yi-Hong Wu. An elementary
introduction to hyperelliptic curves. Faculty of Mathematics, University
of Waterloo, 1996. 40
[Nac05] David Naccache. Secure and practical identity-based encryption. IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2005:369, 2005. 25
[OT11] T. Okamoto and K. Takashima. Efficient Attribute-Based Signatures
for Non-Monotone Predicates in the Standard Model. In PKC 2011,
Springer LNCS 6571, pp. 35–52, 2011. 28, 29
[OT13] T. Okamoto and K. Takashima. Decentralized Attribute-Based Signa-
tures. In PKC 2013, Springer LNCS 7778, pp. 125–142, 2013. 28, 29
[PHP08] Jill Pipher, Jeffrey Hoffstein, and Jill Pipher. Joseph H. Silverman An
Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography. 2008. 31
162
REFERENCES
[Pol78] J. M. Pollard. Monte carlo methods for index computation mod p. Math-
ematics of Computation, 1978. 32, 43, 46
[PP10] Christof Paar and Jan Pelzl. Message authentication codes (macs). In
Understanding Cryptography, pages 319–330. Springer Berlin Heidel-
berg, 2010. 15
[PSV06] D. Page, N. Smart, and F. Vercauteren. A comparison of MNT curves
and supersingular curves. Applicable Algebra in Engineering, Commu-
nication and Computing, 17:379–392, 2006. 10.1007/s00200-006-0017-
6. 32, 40, 46
[QQQ+90] Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Myriam Quisquater, Muriel Quisquater,
Michae¨l Quisquater, Louis Guillou, Marie Annick Guillou, Gaı¨d Guil-
lou, Anna Guillou, Gwenole´ Guillou, and Soazig Guillou. How to ex-
plain zero-knowledge protocols to your children. In Advances in Cryp-
tologyCRYPTO89 Proceedings, pages 628–631. Springer, 1990. 53
[RKZF00] Paul Resnick, Ko Kuwabara, Richard Zeckhauser, and Eric Friedman.
Reputation systems. Communications of the ACM, 43(12):45–48, 2000.
145
[RS92] Charles Rackoff and Daniel Simon. Non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack. In Joan Feigenbaum,
editor, Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 91, volume 576 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 433–444. Springer Berlin / Heidel-
berg, 1992. 15
[RST01] RonaldL. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Yael Tauman. How to leak a secret. In
Colin Boyd, editor, Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT 2001, volume
2248 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 552–565. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 2001. 20, 21
[Sah99] Amit Sahai. Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adap-
tive chosen-ciphertext security. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual Sym-
posium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’99, pages 543–,
Washington, DC, USA, 1999. IEEE Computer Society. 57, 88
163
REFERENCES
[SB06] Michael Scott and Paulo Barreto. Generating more mnt elliptic curves,
2006. 10.1007/s10623-005-0538-1. 43
[Sch99] Oliver Schirokauer. Using number fields to compute logarithms in finite
fields. Math. Comp, 69:1267–1283, 1999. 32
[Sha49] Claude E. Shannon. Communication theory of secrecy systems.
28(4):656–715, October 1949. A footnote on the initial page says: “The
material in this paper appeared in a confidential report, ‘A Mathemati-
cal Theory of Cryptography’, dated Sept. 1, 1945 ([? ]), which has now
been declassified.”. 14
[Sha84] A. Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In
CRYPTO 1984, pp. 47–53, 1984. 24, 42
[Sma99] N. P. Smart. The discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves
of trace one. Journal of Cryptology, 12:193–196, 1999.
10.1007/s001459900052. 32, 40
[Sma13] Nigel Smart. Cryptography: An Introduction, 3rd Edition. Mcgraw-Hill
College, 2013. 14, 36, 37, 55
[SP92] A. De Santis and G. Persiano. Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
without interaction. In FOCS 1992, pp. 427–436, 1992. 88
[SSHT12] Naoyuki Shinohara, Takeshi Shimoyama, Takuya Hayashi, and
Tsuyoshi Takagi. Key length estimation of pairing-based cryptosystems
using ηt pairing. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/042, 2012.
http://eprint.iacr.org/. 41
[SSN09] S. F. Shahandashti and R. Safavi-Naini. Threshold Attribute-Based Sig-
natures and Their Application to Anonymous Credential Systems. In
AFRICACRYPT 2009, Springer LNCS 5580, pp. 198–216, 2009. 28
[SV07] Nigel P. Smart and Frederik Vercauteren. On computable isomorphisms
in efficient asymmetric pairing-based systems. Discrete Applied Mathe-
matics, 155(4):538–547, 2007. 43, 49, 50
164
REFERENCES
[SW05] A. Sahai and B. Waters. Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption. In EURO-
CRYPT 2005, Springer LNCS 3494, pp. 457–473, 2005. 24
[SWD96] Oliver Schirokauer, Damian Weber, and Thomas Denny. Discrete loga-
rithms: The effectiveness of the index calculus method. In Henri Cohen,
editor, Algorithmic Number Theory, volume 1122 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 337–361. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1996.
10.1007/3-540-61581-4 66. 43
[TLL14] Fei Tang, Hongda Li, and Bei Liang. Attribute-based signatures for cir-
cuits from multilinear maps. In ShermanS.M. Chow, Jan Camenisch,
LucasC.K. Hui, and SiuMing Yiu, editors, Information Security, volume
8783 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 54–71. Springer In-
ternational Publishing, 2014. 139
[Wat04] Brent R. Waters. Efficient identity-based encryption without random
oracles. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/180, 2004. http:
//eprint.iacr.org/. 25




Variants of Diffie–Hellman Problem
• The Computational Diffie–Hellman problem CDH is as follows:
Given g, ga, gb ∈ G, where a, b ∈ Zp.
Compute gab.
• The Decisional Diffie–Hellman problem DDH is as follows:
Given g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G, where a, b, c ∈ Zp.
Decide if gc = gab.
• The Generalized Diffie–Hellman problem GDH is as follows;
Given g
∏




• The Square Computational Diffie–Hellman problem SCDH is as follows:
Given g, gx ∈ G.
Compute gx2 .
• The Inverse Computational Diffie–Hellman problem InvCDH is as follows:
Given g, gx ∈ G.
Compute gx−1 .
• The Divisible Computational Diffie–Hellman problem DCDH is as follows:





• l–wDH[Che06] or l–DHI[BB04b]
The l-weak Diffie–Hellman Problem l–wDH is as follows;
Given g, gαi ∈ G for i = 1, . . . , l.
Compute g 1α .
• q–SDH[BB04a]
The q–Strong Diffie–Hellman Problem q–SDH is as follows;
Given gαi1 ∈ G1 for i = 0, . . . , l and g2, gα2 ∈ G2, a (l + 3)-tuple of elements
Compute a pair (c, g1/(α+c)1 ) ∈ Zp ×G1 such that c 6= 0 mod p. 1
• HDDH[ABR01]
The Hash Decisional Diffie–Hellman can be defined as:
Given a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, gu, gv ∈ G, where u, v ∈ Zp,
R ∈ {0, 1}n chosen randomly.
Decide if R = H(guv).
• ODDH[ABR01]
The Oracle Decisional Diffie–Hellman can be defined as:
Given H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, gu, gv ∈ G where u, v ∈ Zp. An access to an
oracleHv defined asHv(X) = H(Xv) that can be queried for any element in G
except gu, at the same time, the adversary is allowed to make oracle queries that
depend on gu. R ∈ {0, 1}n chosen randomly.
Distinguish between H(guv) and R.
• SDH[ABR01] 2
The Strong Diffie–Hellman can be defined as:
Given: g, gu, gv, an access to an oracle Ov defined as Ov(U,X)= 1 if X = U v
and 0 otherwise.
Compute guv.
1One can easily notice that for a fixed c in the given of q–SDH, and for G1 = G2 then the weaker
version of SDH will be equivalent, in terms of hardness, to l–wDH.
2Note that this version of Strong Diffie–Hellman, SDH is totally different from the q–SDH.
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• GapDH
The Gap Diffie–Hellman problem states that the computational Diffie–Hellman
problem CDH is still hard even though an adversary has access to an oracle that
solves DDH.
• GapHDDH[Kil07] 1
The Gap Hashed Diffie–Hellman problem is as follows;
Given H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, and a random string R ∈ {0, 1}n, and an ac-
cess to DDH–oracle that can efficiently distinguish between (gx, gy, gxy) and
(gx, gy, gz).
Distinguish between (gx, gy, H(gxy)) and (gx, gy, R))
• DLIN[BBS04]
The Decision Linear Diffie–Hellman in a group G is as follows;
Given u, v, h and ua, vb, hc
Decide if a+ b = c .
• TwinDH[CKS08]
The Twin Diffie–Hellman is as follows;
Given g,X = gx, Y = gy and Z = gz ∈ G.
Compute gxz and gyz, in other words, compute DH(X,Z) and DH(Y, Z)
• STwinDH
The Strong Twin Diffie–Hellman is as follows;
Given: random X1, X2, Y ∈ G, an access to a decision oracle that can answer
any decisional query of type TwinDH(X1, X2, Yˆ ) == (Zˆ, Wˆ ), for any input
(Yˆ , Zˆ, Wˆ ) ∈ G3.
Compute: DH(X1, Y ) and DH(X2, Y ).
• TwinDDH
1In the literature it’s sometimes abbreviated as GHDH.
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The Twin decisional Diffie–Hellman problem TwinDDH is to Distinguish be-
tween the two distributions (X1, X2, Y, DH(X1, Y )) and (X1, X2, Y, Z) for ran-
dom X1, X2, Y, Z ∈ G.
• STwinDDH
The Strong Twin Decisional Diffie–Hellman problem TwinDD is as follows;
Given access to a decision oracle that tells for inputs of form (Yˆ , Zˆ, Wˆ ), if
TwinDH(X1, X2, Yˆ ) = (Zˆ, Wˆ ).
Distinguish between the two distributions (X1, X2, Y, DH(X1, Y )) and
(X1, X2, Y, Z) for random X1, X2, Y , Z, ∈ G.
Note that DH(X2, Y ) can not be provided as input to the distinguisher, otherwise
the STwinDDH could be broken using the decision oracle.
• STwinHDDH
The Strong Twin Hashed Decisional Diffie–Hellman problem STwinHDDH is
as follows;
Given a hash function H : G→ {0, 1}k, plus an access to a decision oracle that
tells for inputs of form (Yˆ , Zˆ, Wˆ ), if TwinDH(X1, X2, Yˆ ) = (Zˆ, Wˆ ).
Distinguish between the two distributions (X1, X2, Y, H(DH(X1, Y ))) and
(X1, X2, Y, Z) for random X1, X2, Y , Z ∈ G.
Note that DH(X2, Y ) can not be provided as an input to the distinguisher, oth-
erwise the STwinHDDH could be broken using the decision oracle.
A.1 Variants of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
We will give more definitions of some other variants of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman.The
type of the pairing being used is clear from the context.
• GapBDH
The Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman is as follows;
Given X, Y,W ∈ G and Z ∈ GT , and an access to a full decisional oracle
that on input (Xˆ, Yˆ , Wˆ , Zˆ) checks whether BDH(Xˆ, Yˆ , Wˆ ) == Zˆ, for random
Xˆ, Yˆ , Wˆ , Zˆ
169
Compute BDH(X, Y,W ), i.e. e(g, g)xyw when X = gx, Y = gy,W = gw .
• BPI
The Bilinear Pairing Inversion BPI is as follows;
Given g ∈ G and z ∈ GT .
Compute h ∈ G such that z = e(g, h).
• l–BDHI[BB04a]
The l-Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Inversion l–BDHI is as follows;
Given g, gαi for i = 1, . . . , l ∈ G.
Compute e(g, g) 1α .
• l–wBDH
l-weak Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Inversion l–BDHI, for all pairing types, is as
follows;




l–Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Exponent l–BDHE is as follows;
Given g, h and gαi for i = 1, . . . , l − 1, l + 1, . . . , 2l
Compute e(g, h)αl
• TwinBDH
The Twin Bilinear Diffie–Hellman is as follows;
Given X1, X2, Y,W ∈ G.
Compute 2BDH(X1, X2, Y,W ), i.e. BDH(X1, Y,W ) and BDH(X2, Y,W ).
• STwinBDH
The Strong Twin Bilinear Diffie–Hellman is as follows;
Given X1, X2, Y,W ∈ G, and access to a restricted decisional oracle that on
input (Yˆ , Wˆ , Zˆ, Tˆ ) will check if 2BDH(X1, X2, Yˆ , Wˆ ) = (Zˆ, Tˆ ).
Compute BDH(X1, Y,W ) and BDH(X2, Y,W ).
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• BDDH[KV08]
Distinguish between the following distributions:
(g, gx, gy, gy
2
, gz, e(g, g)xyz) and (g, gx, gy, gy2 , gz, e(g, g)r) for x, y, z, r ∈ Zp
• q–BDDHI[BB04b]
Distinguish between the following distributions:






x ) and (gx, . . . , gxq , e(g, g)r), where q = q(k) is a polyno-
mial and r, x ∈ Zp
• truncated q–ABDHE[Gen06]
Distinguish between the following distributions:






) and (gx, . . . , gxq , gz, gz.xq+2 , e(g, g)r),
where q = q(k) is a polynomial and r, z, x ∈ Zp
A.2 Hardness and Reductions
We will start by some facts about the decisional Diffie-Hellman DHH as proven in
[JN03]. DDH is easy in any groupG1 accompanied with a bilinear map e : G1×G1 →
GT , simply by checking if e(ga, gb) == e(g, gc). If they are equal, then c = ab,
otherwise c is random. The other case is when we have an asymmetric pairing, i.e.
e : G1 × G2 → GT . If there exists an isomorphism φ : G2 → G1, which means







2 ∈ G2, one can compare e(g1, gc2) to e(φ(ga2), gb2), knowing that g1 = φ(g2)
is a generator of G1. On the other hand, DDH in G1 is still assumed to be hard in
Type-2 setting. For Type-3 pairing (When no computable isomorphisms are known
between G1 and G2), DDH is still considered to be hard in both G1 and G2 1. Some
other known observations about the reductions between some members of the Dlog
family of hardness assumptions are listed below.
A.2.1 One way implication
• DlogGT≥DlogG1by [MOV93]
1We note here that in some groups where the DDH is known to be easy, the Hashed DDH (HDDH)
is still assumed to be hard for a reasonable choice of the hash function H [GKR04]
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Given g, ga ∈ G1, compute a.
Let x ← e(g, g) and y ← e(g, ga). It’s clear that y = xa; we send them both x
and y to the DLogGT oracle to get a.
• DLog≥CDH
We want to solve CDH using Dlog.
Given g, ga, gb, compute gab.
We can simply give g and ga to the Dlog oracle, the result is a, then we can
easily find (gb)a.
• CDH≥BDH
Given g, ga, gb, gc, compute e(g, g)abc.
We can first give ga and gb to the CDH oracle, the result will be gab. We can then
compute e(gab, gc) = e(g, g)abc.
• CDHGT ≥BDH
Given g, ga, gb, gc, compute e(g, g)abc.
We let G = e(g, g)Ga = e(g, ga), Gb = e(g, gb) and Gc = e(g, gc). We first give
Ga and Gb to the CDHGT oracle to get G
ab, and call one more time on input Gab
and Gc to Gabc.
• CDH≥DDH
Given g, ga, gb, gc, decide if gab = gc.
Using the CDH oracle, we can easily find gab and then compare it to gc
• BDH ≥DBDH
Given P, ga, gb, gc, gz, decide if e(g, g)abc = e(g, g)z.
We use the CBDH oracle to get e(g, g)abc and then we find e(gz, g) and we
compare the two results.
• DlogG1≥BDH
Given g, ga, gb, gc. Find e(g, g)abc.
We can give g, ga to the Dlog oracle to retrieve a, we then compute (gb)a, and
finally get r = e(gab, gc), which is e(g, g)abc.
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• HDDH≥DDH
It is easy to notice that if we let the hash function H be the identity function
than using the oracle HDDH we can easily recover the DDH, and here lies the
importance of HDDH that it is between CDH and DDH.
• SDH≥GapDH
The reason is that in SDH we have a restricted decisional oracle but in Gap we
have the full version of the oracle, where none of its inputs are fixed ahead of
querying it.
• DBDH≥BDDH≥2–BDDHI ≥. . . ≥q–BDDHI≥truncated q–ABDHE
Proof. See [KV08].
A.2.2 Equivalence between some computational variants
• STwinDH ≡ CDH
It’s the main contribution of [CKS08], in which they proved some existing sys-
tems secure under the assumptions STwinDH and therefore secure under the
standard computational Diffie-Hellman. It is an equivalence between the hard-
ness of two problems where one of them, namely STwinDH, has a free decisional
oracle offered to the adversary whereas the second is a pure computational prob-
lem.
As they mentioned, there is a trapdoor test which plays the main role in the
proof.
Trapdoor Test Given a group G of order q, g is a generator of G. Suppose
that X1 ∈ G and r, s ∈ Zq are mutually independent random variables. Let
X2 = g
s/Xr1 , and Yˆ , Zˆ, Wˆ are random elements in G, each of which is defined
as some function of X1 and X2, then the following are true;
– X2 is uniformly distributed over G;
– X1 and X2 are independent;
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– If X1 = gx1 and X2 = gx2 ,
Then the probability that the truth value of
ZˆrWˆ = Yˆ s (A.1)
doesn’t agree with the truth value of
Zˆ = Yˆ x1 ∧ Wˆ = Yˆ x2 (A.2)
is at most 1/q; moreover, if (A.2) holds, then (A.1) certainly holds.
Proof of the equivalence:
– CDH ≥STwinDH
It’s trivial, since we can just use the CDH oracle twice to solve STwinDH.
– STwinDH ≥CDH
Given a challenge instance (X, Y ), compute DH(X, Y ).
Let’s choose r, s ∈ Zq, set X1 = X and X2=gs/Xr1 . We give the instance
(X1, X2, Y ) to the STwinDH oracle. Suppose that STwinDH makes Qd
queries, of the form, (Yˆ , Zˆ1, Zˆ2) to its decisional oracle. Finally, STwinD-
Hwill outputs (Z1, Z2). We can test if Z1Zr2 = Y
s holds, then the CDH
will output Z1 as DH(X, Y ), otherwise it outputs “failure” with a proba-
bility Qd/q, since the probability of disagreement as stated by the trapdoor
test for each query is 1/q.
• SCDH≡ CDH
The equivalences between CDH, SCDH, InvCDH, and DCDH have been proved
in [BDZ03].
We will prove the equivalence between the four of them as a chain that links
them two by two. First, let’s start from the equivalence between SCDH and
CDH
– SCDH ≥CDH
Given g, gx, gy, we want to compute gxy using the Oracle SCDH, that
acts this way; on input g and gx the output is gx2 . We will first choose
a1, a2, b1, b2 as auxiliary random values ∈ Zq. Now let’s compute gxa1 ,





and g(xa1b1+ya2b2)2 .Therefore, gxy can be computed.
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– CDH ≥SCDH
Given g, gx we want to compute gx2 using the oracle CDH. we can simply
give g, gx, and gx to the oracle CDH to get gx2 .
Therefore, we can say that CDH ≡ SCDH.
• SCDH ≡ InvCDH.
– SCDH ≥InvCDH
Given g, gx, we want to compute gx−1 . Recall that the InvCDH oracle
works this way; given g, gx, it outputs gx2 . In other word, given 1st, 2nd =
(1st)n, it outputs (1st)n2 , so if we assign;
1st← gx
2nd← g
Where 2nd = (1st)
1





x2 which is gx−1 .
– InvCDH ≥SCDH
Given g, gx, we want to compute gx2 . We can use the same method for the
first implication by defining the oracle as follows; if input is 1st, 2nd =
(1st)n,then output is (1st)n−1 , so if we assign;
1st← gx
2nd← g
Where 2nd = (1st)
1




)−1 = (gx)x which is gx2 .
Thus, InvCDH ⇐⇒ SCDH
• CDH ≡ DCDH
– CDH ≥DCDH
Given g, gx, gy we want to get g
x
y . Since we are given access to the oracle
CDH , then consequently we can have access to the oracle Inv–CDHto get
gy






Given g, gx, gy we want to compute gxy. We choose four auxiliary random
values a1, b1, a2, b2 ∈ Zq, then we compute (gxa1 , ga2), and then we feed
them to the DCDH oracle to get u = g
xa1
a2 . In analogous way we compute
(gb1 , gyb2), and then we feed them to the DCDH oracle to get v = g
b1
yb2 .
Finally we feed DCDH oracle by both (u, v) to get g
xya1b2
a2b1 , which immedi-
ately gives gxy.
Now we can state that fact the all the above variations of the computational
Diffie–Hellamn,
STwinDH≡ CDH ≡ Inv–CDH≡ SCDH≡ DCDH.
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Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 4
Lemma 4. If the NIZK1 and NIZK2 proof systems are zero-knowledge, the tag-based
encryption scheme TPKE is selective-tag weakly IND-CCA secure, the one-time sig-
nature OTS is strongly existentially unforgeable, and the hash functions Hˆ and H are
collision-resistant then the construction is fully anonymous (against full-key exposure).
Proof. We show that if there exists an adversary B which breaks the anonymity of
the construction, we can construct adversaries F1 against the collision-resistance of
the hash function Hˆ, F2 against the strong unforgeability of the one-time signature
OTS, F3 against the collision-resistance of the hash function H, F4 against the NIZK
property of the proof system NIZK1, F5 against the NIZK property of the proof system
NIZK2, and F6 against the selective-tag weakly IND-CCA security of the tag-based
encryption scheme TPKE.
By the collision-resistance of the hash function Hˆ, B has a negligible probability
in finding otsvk′ such that Hˆ(otsvk′) collides with the tag Hˆ(otsvk∗) we will use for
the tag-based ciphertext within the challenge signature. If this is not the case, then we
can use B to construct an adversary F1 that breaks the collision-resistance of Hˆ.
By the strong existential unforgeability of OTS, we also have that B has a neg-
ligible probability in forging a one-time signature under otsvk∗ used in the challenge
signature. If this is not the case, we can construct an adversary F2 that wins the strong
unforgeability game of the one-time signature.
By the collision-resistance of the H, B has a negligible advantage in finding pairs
(Ψ∗,m∗) 6= (Ψ,m) such that H(Ψ∗,m∗, Ctbe, Hˆ(otsvk)) = H(Ψ,m,Ctbe, Hˆ(otsvk)).
If this is not the case, we can use B to construct an adversary F3 which breaks the
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collision-resistance of the hash function H. Thus, from now on we assume that there
are no such hash collisions.
We now start NIZK1 in the simulation setting which is by the security of NIZK1 is
indistinguishable from the soundness setting. The proof pi is thus now zero-knowledge
and hence does not reveal any information about the witness.
We now also start NIZK2 in the simulation setting which is indistinguishable from
the soundness setting. The proof piTrace is now also zero-knowledge and hence B can-
not tell simulated proofs from real proofs.
We now proceed to show how to use B to construct an adversary F6 against the
selective-tag weakly IND-CCA security of TPKE.
Adversary F6 runs the Setup algorithm where it starts by randomly choosing a key
pair (otsvk∗, otssk∗) for OTS that it will use in answering B’s challenge signature.
Note that we needed to choose the key pair beforehand as the tag-based encryption
scheme is only selective-tag secure and hence the challenger in the ST-WIND-CCA
game needs to know the challenge tag before it sends the public-key epk for TPKE.
F6 sends Hˆ(otsvk∗) to its challenger and gets back epk. In its game, F6 has access to
a decryption oracle Dec which it can query on any ciphertext under any tag different
from Hˆ(otsvk∗). F6 chooses crs1 and crs2 as simulation reference strings. F6 also
chooses a key pair (tvk, tsk) for the digital signature scheme DS. F6 forwards pp =
(crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H, Hˆ) to B.
When asked AddA queries, F6 chooses the secret/verification keys for the authori-
ties itself. Thus, F6 can answer any AddS queries itself.
To answer the challenge query CHb((id0,A0), (id1,A1),m,Ψ), F6 sends (id0, id1)
as its challenge in its ST-WIND-CCA game and gets a ciphertext under the tag
Hˆ(otsvk∗) of either the plaintext id0 or id1 which he needs to distinguish. F6 can
now construct the rest of the challenge signature by simulating the proof pi and signing
the whole thing with otssk∗ to obtain σots.
To answer Trace queries, F6 just uses its decryption oracle to get the decryption
of Ctbe which is part of the signature and then simulates proof piTrace. Note that since
we have chosen the challenge tag otsvk∗ uniformly at random and since we already
eliminated any case where any signature sent to Trace uses the same tag as that we
used for the challenge signature, such a query will be accepted by F6’s decryption
oracle because the tag is different from the tag used in the challenge ciphertext. The
rest of B’s queries are answered normally as in Fig. 4-1.
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Finally, when B outputs its guess, F6’s output is that of B
Lemma 5. The construction is fully unforgeable if NIZK1 and NIZK2 proof systems are
sound, the hash functionsH (used in encoding pseudo-attributes) and Hˆ are collision-
resistant, and the one-time signature OTS, the digital signature DS and the tagged
signature TS are all existentially unforgeable.
Proof. We instantiate both NIZK1 and NIZK2 proof systems in the soundness setting
and hence the adversary cannot break full unforgeability by faking proofs for a false
statement. Thus, we proceed to show that if there exists an adversary that wins the full
unforgeability game then we can construct adversaries F1 against the unforgeability of
the tagged signature scheme TS, adversary F2 against the unforgeability of the digital
signature scheme DS, adversary F3 against the strong unforgeability of the one-time
signature scheme OTS, and adversaries F4 and F5 against the collision-resistance of





where κ(λ) and µ(λ) are polynomials in λ representing an upper bound on the number
of honest attribute authorities and sign queries, respectively, B is allowed to make in
the game.
By the security of the hash function H, B has a negligible probability in
finding collisions between the encodings of different tuples of signing predi-
cate/message/ciphertext/OTS verification key. If this is not the case, we can use B
to construct an adversary F4 that breaks the collision-resistance of H.
Similarly, by the collision-resistance of the hash function Hˆ, B has a negligible
probability in finding two different one-time signature keys otsvk 6= otsvk′ such that
Hˆ(otsvk) = Hˆ(otsvk′). If this is not the case, we can use B to construct an adversary
F5 that breaks the collision-resistance of Hˆ.
Thus, from now on we assume that there are no hash collisions.
• Adversay F1: Adversary F1 gets the tagged signature scheme’s verification key
vk from its game and has access to an oracle Sign that it uses to obtain tagged
signatures that verify w.r.t. vk on messages and tags (i.e. identities and attributes)
of its choice. Adversary F1 starts by running (crs1, xk1) ← NIZK1.Setup(1λ),
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(crs2, xk2) ← NIZK2.Setup(1λ) and choosing (tsk, tvk) honestly. It also cre-
ates the key pairs (esk, epk) for the tag-based encryption scheme TPKE. It then
forwards pp = (crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H, Hˆ) and tk = esk to B.
Adversary F1 randomly chooses i← {1, . . . , κ(λ)} and guesses thatB’s forgery
will involve forging an attribute managed by the attribute authority i. When
asked AddA queries, for all authorities j 6= i, F1 chooses the secret/verification
keys for the authority itself. For authority i, it sets its verification key to vk it got
from its game (and thus it does not know the corresponding secret key). If in the
game, B issues RevealA query on authority i, F1 aborts the game.
Whenever B asks AddS queries, if the user has attributes managed by authority
i, it forwards such a query to its Sign oracle; Otherwise, it answers the query
itself by using the authorities’ secret keys available to it.
When asked for Sign queries on (id,A,m,Ψ), F1 first chooses a fresh key pair
(otsvk, otssk) for the one-time signature OTS and encrypts id using Hˆ(otsvk)
as a tag. It then uses tsk to generate a signature on the pseudo-attribute. Note
that by the witness-indistinguishability of NIZK1, B cannot tell whether we con-
structed the signature by using real attributes that id possesses or using a pseudo-
attribute. F1 forwards the signature to B. The rest of B’s queries are answered
normally as in Fig. 4-1.
Eventually, when B outputs its forgery, F1 uses the NIZK1’s extraction key xk1
to extract the witness and returns the tagged signature on the identity and the
attribute if B’s forgery involved forging a tagged signature. Otherwise, it aborts.
F1 also aborts if the forgery does not involve forged attributes managed by au-




By the existential unforgeability of the tagged signature scheme, the probability
of B winning in this case is negligible.
• Adversary F2: Adversary F2 gets tvk from its game and has access to an oracle
Sign that it uses to obtain signatures that verify w.r.t. tvk on messages of its
choice. It runs (crs1, xk1)← NIZK1.Setup(1λ), (crs2, xk2)← NIZK2.Setup(1λ).
It also creates the key pair (esk, epk) for the tag-based encryption scheme TPKE.
It then forwards pp = (crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H, Hˆ) and tk = esk to B.
180
When asked for AddA queries, F2 creates the authority keys itself.
Whenever B asks AddS queries, F2 uses the corresponding authorities’ secret
keys aaskaid(a) to create the key for the signer.
When asked for Sign queries on (id,A,m,Ψ), F2 generates a fresh key pair
(otsvk, otssk) for the one-time signature. It then produces the tag-based cipher-
text Ctbe which is the encryption of id using Hˆ(otsvk) as a tag and forwards
the pseudo-attribute H(Ψ,m,Ctbe, Hˆ(otsvk)) to its oracle. After receiving the
signature from its own sign oracle, F2 produces the proof pi using id and the
signature on the pseudo-attribute as a witness. It then signs the whole thing
with otssk and returns σ = (σots, pi, Ctbe, otsvk) as the answer. By the witness-
indistinguishability of the proof system NIZK1, the adversary cannot tell which
witness was used in the proof. The rest of B’s queries are answered normally as
in Fig. 4-1.
Eventually, when B outputs its forgery, F2 uses NIZK1’s extraction key
xk1 to extract the witness and returns the signature on the pseudo-attribute
am∗,Ψˆ∗,Ctbe,Hˆ(otsvk∗) if the forgery was done by forging a signature on a pseudo-
attribute; otherwise, it aborts.
By the existential unforgeability of the of the digital signature scheme DS, the
probability of B winning in this case is negligible.
• Adversary F3: Adversary F3 gets otsvk from its game and has access to an
oracle Sign that it uses to obtain a single one-time signature that verify w.r.t.
otsvk on a message of its choice. It runs (crs1, xk1) ← NIZK1.Setup(1λ),
(crs2, xk2) ← NIZK2.Setup(1λ). It also creates the key pair (esk, epk) for the
tag-based encryption scheme TPKE and (tsk, tvk) for the digital signature DS.
It then forwards pp = (crs1, crs2, epk, tvk,A,H, Hˆ) and tk = esk to B.
When asked for AddA queries, F3 creates the authority keys itself. Whenever B
asks AddS queries, F3 uses the corresponding authorities’ secret keys aaskaid(a)
to create the key for the signer.
Adversary F3 randomly chooses i← {1, . . . , µ(λ)} and guesses thatB’s forgery
will involve forging a one-time signature that verifies under otsvk used in an-
swering the i-th signing query.
181
When asked for the j-th Sign query on (id,A,m,Ψ), if j 6= i, F3 chooses a
fresh key pair (otsvk, otssk) for the one-time signature scheme and answers the
query by itself. If j = i, F3 encrypts id using Hˆ(otsvk) (i.e. the public key it
got from its game) as a tag to obtain Ctbe, it then generates a signature on the
pseudo-attribute and constructs the proof pi. It then forwards (pi,Ctbe, otsvk) as
the message to its one-time signature signing oracle to get a one-time signature
σots. F3 sends the signature σ = (σots, pi, Ctbe, otsvk) to B.
The rest of B’s queries are answered normally as in Fig. 4-1.
Eventually, when B outputs its forgery, F3 aborts if the B’s forgery did not
involve forging a one-time signature that verifies w.r.t otsvk it got from its game.
The probability that B forges a one-time signature that verifies w.r.t the same
otsvk that F3 has guessed is 1µ(λ) .
By the strong existential unforgeability of the one-time signature OTS, B has a
negligible advantage in wining this case.
This concluded the proof.
Lemma 6. The construction is traceable if the NIZK1 proof system is sound, and the
digital signature DS and the tagged signature TS are all existentially unforgeable.
Proof. Since the NIZK proof systems NIZK1 is sound, the adversary has a negligible
advantage in succeeding by faking proofs for false statements. Thus, we proceed to
show that if there exists an adversary that wins the traceability game then we can
construct adversaries F1 attacking the unforgeability of the tagged signature scheme
TS, and adversary F2 attacking the unforgeability of the digital signature scheme DS
such that
AdvTraceDTABS,B(λ) ≤ κ(λ) · AdvUnforTS,F1(λ) + AdvUnforDS,F2(λ),
where κ(λ) is a polynomial in λ representing an upper bound on the number of honest
attribute authorities B is allowed to use in the game.
The reductions are very similar to those in the full unforgeability game. The dif-
ference here is that B is not allowed to make any CrptA or RevealA queries.
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Appendix C
An Example of ABS–HEP
Example 6. ABS-HEP.
Consider the circuit f = (A ∧ B) ∨ C. This circuit has 5 wires with 3 input wires
and 2 gate (one OR and one AND), and the 5th wire is designated as the output wire.
Let x ∈ {0, 1}3 = {A,B,C} be a possible input string to f , we have
1. f({0, 0, 0}) = 0.
2. f({0, 0, 1}) = 1.
3. f({0, 1, 0}) = 0.
4. f({0, 1, 1}) = 1.
5. f({1, 0, 0}) = 0.
6. f({1, 0, 1}) = 1.
7. f({1, 1, 0}) = 1.
8. f({1, 1, 1}) = 1.
Let λ be security parameter, the maximum depth of all the circuits be ` = 3, the
maximum input size for all attributes be n = 3, the maximum number of the gates is
q = 2 and finally k = `+ 1 = 4.
The attribute-based signature scheme, ABS-HEP = (ABS.Setup, ABS.KeyGen,
ABS-HEP.Sign, ABS-HEP.Verify), includes the following five algorithms.
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ABS-HEP.Setup(1λ, n = 3, ` = 3)
The setup algorithm produces groups ~G = (G1,G2,G3,G4) of prime order p, with
canonical generators g1, g2, g3, g4. We let g = g1. Next, it chooses random values
α, β ∈ Zp and hA, hB, hC ∈ G1, and then computes d = gβ and dA = hβA, dB = hβB
and dC = h
β
C . It sets the master secret key MSK to be
MSK = {gα3 , β, hA, hB, hC}.




The algorithm takes as input the master secret key and a description f . The algo-
rithm chooses random values r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 ∈ Zp, where we name r1 = rA, r2 = rB,




The algorithm then generates key components for every wire (1 to 5). The structure
of the key components depends upon whether the wire is an input wire, an OR gate or
an AND gate, and each case is described as follows.
• Input wire
For w ∈ {A,B,C}, the key generation algorithm chooses random values
zA, zB,and zC ∈ Zp, and computes the key components as
KA,1 = g
rA · hzAA , KA,2 = g−zA .
KB,1 = g
rB · hzBB , KB,2 = g−zB .
KC,1 = g
rC · hzCC , KC,2 = g−zC .
• AND gate
For the wire w = AND, the gate has two inputs, A’s wire and B’s wire. In
addition, the depth of the wire AND is depth(AND) = 2. The algorithm chooses
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random values aAND, bAND ∈ Zp, and then creates key components for AND to
be:
KAND,1 = g
aAND , KAND,2 = g




For the wire w = OR, the gate has two inputs, AND’s wire and C’s wire. In ad-
dition, the depth of wire OR is depth(OR) = 3. The algorithm chooses random
values aOR, bOR ∈ Zp, and then creates key components for OR to be:
KOR,1 = g
aOR , KOR,2 = g
bOR , KOR,3 = g
rOR−aOR·rAND
3 , KOR,4 = g
rOR−bOR·rC
3 .
ABS-HEP.Sign(skf , x,m, f)
Let skf be a secret signing key associated with a set of wires in the circuit f such
that f(x) = 1 and let m ∈ Zp be a message to be signed. A signature on m under sk is
a proof that the signer has computed gα·s4 without knowing either α or s, and the proof
is bound with m.
In the Sign algorithm, the signer chooses a random value t ∈ Zp, compute c0 = dt0.















Now, the signer uses the witness t to produce a signature of knowledge SoK on m,
i.e. σSoK ← (PSoK,R, t,m).




First, the signer make a header computation to get
E ′ = e(KH , c) = e(g
α−r5
3 , g
s) = gα·s4 · g−r5·s4 .
Secondly, the signer computes E5 = gr5·s4 .
Suppose that Signer1 has skf including the keys for A, B, AND and OR, i.e., x =
{1, 1, 0} therefore f(x) = 1. In this case, he will use the following keys:
KA,1 = g
rA · hzAA , KA,2 = g−zA .
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KB,1 = g
rB · hzBB , KB,2 = g−zB .
KAND,1 = g
aAND , KAND,2 = g




aOR , KOR,3 = g
rOR−aOR·rAND
3 .
Signer1 first computes the two input wires (secret keys are underlined):
EA = e(KA,1, c) · e(KA,2, cA) = e(grA · hzAA , gs) · e(g−zA , hsA) = grA·s2 .
EB = e(KB,1, c) · e(KB,2, cB) = e(grB · hzBB , gs) · e(g−zB , hsB) = grB ·s2 .
Then, he computes the AND wire:
EAND = e(EA, KAND,1) · e(EB, KAND,2) · e(KAND,3, c)
= e(grA·s2 , g
aAND) · e(grB ·s2 , gbAND) · e(grAND−aAND·rA−bAND·rB2 , gs) = (g3)rAND·s.
Then, he computes the OR wire (for f(AND) = 1 and f(C) = 0):
EOR = e(EAND, KOR,1) · e(KOR,3, c)
= e(grAND·s3 , g
aOR) · e(grOR−aOR·rand3 , gs) = grOR·s4 .
Signer1 has now reached E5 = gr5·s4 as rOR = r5.
We will show that the signer can achieve the same result if he uses a different x,
i.e. x = {0, 0, 1}, since f(x) = 1. Suppose that another signer, say signer2 has skf
including the keys for C and OR, i.e.,
KC,1 = g
rC · hzCC , KC,2 = g−zC .
KOR,2 = g
bOR , KOR,4 = g
rOR−bOR·rC
3 .
Signer2 first computes the input wire:
EC = e(KC,1, c) · e(KC,2, cC) = e(grC · hzCC , gs) · e(g−zC , hsC) = grC ·s2 .
He then lifts the result to the next layer
E ′C = e(g
rC ·s




Then, he computes the OR wire (for f(AND) = 0 and f(C) = 1):
EOR = e(E
′
C , KOR,2) · e(KOR,4, c)
= e(grC ·s3 , g
bOR) · e(grOR−bOR·rC3 , gs) = grOR·s4 .
Signer2 has now reached E5 = gr5·s4 .
Clearly, either of the signers can compute σs = E ′ · E5 = gα·s4 . Both E5 = gr5·s4
and σs can be made accessible to the verifier.
The entire signature is set as
σ = (c0, σSoK, σs).
Verify(σ,m)
To verify the candidate signature σ = (c0, σSoK, σs) on the message m, the verifier
does the following verifications:
• SoK.Verify(PSoK, c0,m, σSoK), by following the verification algorithm of the un-
derlying SoK signature scheme. By this verification, the verifier is convinced
that c0 = dt0 and the value t is known by the signer. Recall that d0 = g
β and the
signer is not supposed to know the value β.
• Verify σs by checking whether the following equation holds.
e(σs, g) = e(K, c0).
By this verification, the verifier is convinced that σs = Ks for some value s that
is involved in the signer’s secret key.
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